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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Governing Global Health: Knowledge and power in the global tobacco epidemic  
 
by 
 
Katherine Elizabeth Kenny 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology (Science Studies) 
 
University of California, San Diego, 2015 
 
Professor Isaac Martin, Chair 
Professor Steven Epstein, Co-Chair 
 
This dissertation examines the coproduction of epistemic and regulatory 
authority in the field of global health using the case of international tobacco control. In 
2005, the world’s first public health treaty – the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) – was brought into force by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Unanimously adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003, the FCTC has since 
become one of the most widely and rapidly adopted treaties in the history of the United 
Nations. The success of the treaty is frequently attributed to its “unequivocal evidence 
base” and, as a result, the FCTC is frequently seen primarily as a technical 
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accomplishment. However, the evidence base of global tobacco control has been built 
on a very particular economic valuing of human life that emerged with the introduction 
of the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) metric by the World Bank in 1993. The 
development of the DALY metric, coupled with organizational reconfigurations in the 
field of world health, instantiated cost-effectiveness as a dominant logic and enabled 
tobacco control to rise to prominence on the WHO’s agenda. At the same time, the 
international movement for tobacco control began to gain traction as new political and 
discursive opportunity structures arose amidst WHO reform during the last 1990s. The 
dissertation argues that the accomplishment of the FCTC is much more than an 
evidence-based technical accomplishment: it represents the institutionalization of a new 
way of quantifying disease, economizing life and governing health on a global scale and 
a key moment in the transition from a post-war configuration of international health to 
the contemporary neoliberal global health order. Drawing on a range of textual sources, 
participant observations and interviews with key actors, the dissertation attends to the 
economization of life by tracing the epistemological, social and political dimensions of 
the development of the FCTC treaty. Its findings contribute to interdisciplinary 
scholarship on the history of world health, critical studies of global health and social 
studies of the relationship between science and policy – or between knowledge and 
power – including science and technology studies, biopolitics and social studies of 
globalization and postcolonialism. 
	  	   1 
INTRODUCTION: 
GLOBAL HEALTH AND TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
On February 27th 2005, the world’s first international health treaty came into 
force: the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(WHO FCTC). Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, then-director general of the WHO, praised 
the development of the evidence-based treaty as a landmark achievement in the history 
of world health and as “a milestone in international collaboration in a globalized world” 
(World Health Organization 2003a,  311). Characterized as a world-wide solution to a 
problem brought about by various processes of globalization, the FCTC is intended to 
address the world’s single leading preventable cause of death – tobacco use – as well as 
the devastating social, economic, and environmental consequences it entails. The FCTC 
is the first treaty ever negotiated by the WHO and the first legally binding international 
agreement specifically directly towards a matter of health.  
The FCTC was created at a distinct moment in the history of attempts to govern 
the health of the world’s population. Frequently characterized as a transition from an 
older “international health” model to a new era of “global health”, what this transition 
consists of, or entails, exactly, is not yet clear. It is sometimes celebrated as a positive 
development – one in which the nefarious cloud of Cold War politics on international 
health has lifted to reveal and new, morally superior landscape of global health. 
Alternatively, it is seen as a retrograde step that has displaced the socially and 
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economically progressive primary health care movement enshrined in the World Health 
Organization’s 1978 Alma Ata declaration of “health for all by the year 2000” with 1) 
the global rise of neoliberalism, 2) the neocolonial imposition of exploitative markets in 
pharmaceuticals and health care services and 3) the continued hegemony of Western 
epistemic, philanthropic and regulatory institutions.  
This dissertation is concerned with the global governance of health at the dawn 
of the 21st century, as seen through the case of global tobacco control. While addressing 
broader themes, I anchor my analysis in the history and development of a concrete 
global health intervention: the world’s first public health treaty. The FCTC provides a 
useful case through which to examine the coproduction of knowledge and power in the 
field of global health and to reflect on the transition from international to global health 
over the last three decades. 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH AND NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES (NCDs) 
The emergence of global health has prompted considerable activity among 
multilateral health organizations, academic/medical/research institutions, philanthropic 
donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). More recently, it has also 
prompted critical reflection from across a range of the social sciences. However, much 
of this social scientific attention has focused on global dimensions of infectious diseases 
such as HIV/AIDs, pandemic influenza, SARS, malaria, tuberculosis and dengue fever 
(A. M. Brandt 2013; MacPhail 2014; MacPhail 2010; McGoey, Reiss, and Wahlberg 
2011; Lakoff 2010; Lakoff and Collier 2008; Nading 2012; Nading 2015). In a recent 
article in The New England Journal of Medicine, historian of health Allan Brandt 
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suggested that AIDS “invented” global health: “the HIV epidemic and the responses it 
generated have been crucial forces in “inventing” the new “global health” (2013: 2149). 
While not discounting the role of infectious disease, this study takes a different 
approach. It focuses on non-communicable diseases (NCDs), specifically those caused 
by tobacco use, as crucially important to the emergence of the new global health.  
The centrality of NCDs to the new global health can be seen in the following 
example. In September 2011, the United Nations General Assembly convened a high-
level meeting to address the prevention and control of NCDs. It was only the second 
time in history that such a meeting had been devoted to a topic related to health, the first 
having been in response to the HIV/AIDs pandemic a decade earlier. Unlike the earlier 
meeting, at which the vast majority of the burden of HIV/AIDs was acknowledged to 
fall on the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 2011 summit presented the threat posed 
by NCDs as universal (United Nations General Assembly 2012; United Nations General 
Assembly 2001). Far from the diseases of affluence that cancers, diabetes, and 
hypertension were once portrayed to be, NCDs had by late 2011 come to occupy a 
central place on the global health agenda. 
However, the precise kind of threat that NCDs were seen to present was not 
limited to the domain of health: the UN Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
declared that “the global burden and threat of non-communicable diseases constitutes 
one of the major challenges for development in the twenty-first century” and that “non-
communicable diseases are a threat to the economies of many Member States” (United 
Nations General Assembly 2012). A report by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the World Economic Forum (WEF) published to coincide with the UN NCD 
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summit similarly warned: “The economic consequences of NCDs are staggering” with 
projected losses to low and middle income countries surpassing 4% of their annual 
output (WHO and WEF 2011:3). Another report projected that the cost of NCDs to the 
global economy would exceed US $30 trillion over the next twenty years (Bloom, D.E. 
et al. 2011: 5). NCDs were thus positioned as a threat to global health and to the global 
economy as well. 
During the UN NCD summit, the global tobacco epidemic featured prominently 
– as an example the scale of the NCD problem and as an example of an effective 
solution. The FCTC was characterized as a “best buy” – a cost effective solution that 
represented a sound investment in global health and could ameliorate both the health 
and economic threat posed by the tobacco problem. By interrogating the history of the 
FCTC, then, this study also helps shed light on the place of NCDs within the boarder 
landscape of the new global health. 
 
TACKLING TOBACCO 
 Tobacco has become the subject of a vast body of scholarship across a range of 
academic disciplines. Perhaps most obviously, tobacco and tobacco control have 
become fundamental topics of study within the field of public health where the harms to 
human health caused by tobacco use – and strategies to combat them – constitute the 
central focus (David and da Costa e Silva 2004; World Health Organization 1999a; S 
Chapman and Wong 1990; Simon Chapman 2007). But tobacco has also driven an 
impressive body of scholarship across the humanistic and social scientific disciplines. 
Most centrally, historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor have both contributed 
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weighty tomes that give exhaustive treatment to the history of the tobacco industry and 
American culture and the “cigarette catastrophe” and case for abolition, respectively 
(Brandt 2007; Proctor 2012b). Before them, journalist Richard Kluger’s Ashes to Ashes 
had provided the most comprehensive account of the history of tobacco during the 
twentieth century (Kluger 2010). Other scholarship has focused on the politics of 
tobacco regulation (Pertschuk 2001; Zegart 2000; Kessler 2001; R. L. Rabin and 
Sugarman 2001) while still more has been motivated by the disclosure of millions of 
formerly secret tobacco industry documents (Glantz and Balbach 2000; Glantz, Bero, 
and Slade 1998). Much of this work highlights the evils perpetrated by the tobacco 
industry. A much smaller body of literature has celebrated the phenomenology of 
smoking (Klein 1995).  
 This dissertation takes neither an exhaustive historical approach to tobacco nor 
addresses the tobacco industry, per se. Rather, it takes tobacco – or more accurately the 
global tobacco epidemic as an object of knowledge and the FCTC as a policy 
instrument – as a case through which to examine broader questions about the 
coproduction of knowledge and policy and the history and governance of global health 
at the turn of the 20th century.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation interrogates tobacco control, non-communicable diseases and 
global health by posing the following research questions:  
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• How did the threat posed by tobacco come to be seen as an issue of global 
concern? How did a “global tobacco epidemic” emerge as an object of 
knowledge?  
Throughout the second half the 20th century research on the negative health 
consequences of tobacco use was carried out at the level of the, predominantly Western, 
nation-state. Nevertheless, since the early1990’s the field of tobacco control has come 
increasingly to acknowledge the emergence of a “global tobacco epidemic”. How was 
this shift from a national to a global framing of the tobacco problem accomplished? 
Through what processes has the epistemic authority of global tobacco control science 
been established? Whose knowledge has emerged as “global knowledge”; which 
experts have emerged as “international experts”? 
• Why did international regulation, in the form of a legally binding, WHO 
sponsored treaty, emerge as the best strategy for intervening upon the global 
tobacco problem? 
The FCTC has become one of the mostly widely accepted treaties in the history of the 
United Nations. Importantly, the success of the treaty is often attributed to its 
“unequivocal evidence base” (Ruth Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005; Mackay 2003; 
D Yach and von Schirnding 2014). How has this evidence base come to be seen as 
sufficient justification for legally binding international regulatory approach? In other 
words, how has the regulatory authority of the FCTC been co-produced with the 
epistemic authority of global tobacco control science? 
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• What light does the case of the FCTC shed on the transition from 
international to global health during 1990s more generally?   
To what extent does the case of the FCTC serve as an exemplar for the field of global 
health, both in terms of how health is imagined and how it is governed? How does the 
“evidence base” of the FCTC and the best practices it has established for the global 
governarnce of health extend beyond tobacco control? Does this new way of knowing 
and managing the health of the global population illuminate the field of global health or 
shed light on the transition from “international” to “global” health more generally?  
 I argue that despite warnings of a coming tobacco epidemic advanced by anti-
tobacco activists since approximately the 1970s, the emergence of the tobacco epidemic 
as a contemporary global health concern depended on a particular way of quantifying 
the global burden of disease that was introduced by the World Bank in its 1993 World 
Development Report: Investing in Health. In addition to its more familiar (and widely 
criticized) recommendations for the privatization of health systems and the introduction 
of user-fees for clinical services, the Investing in Health Report also introduced the 
Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) metric. The purpose of the DALY metric 
purpose was two-fold. First, it was intended to account for the “full loss of healthy life” 
due to death, disease and disability by measuring both mortality and morbidity in the 
same units of analysis. Second, it was intended to facilitate the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in prioritizing potential health interventions in the units of dollars spent per 
DALYs gained.  But far more than just facilitating cost-benefit calculation, I argue that 
the DALY metric renders life itself economic by imagining health as a form of human 
capital and, as the very title of the World Bank report suggests, as a site of investment. 
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Investing in health, then, becomes an economic project that is oriented towards the 
speculative future, known through a range of forecasting techniques and concerned with 
optimizing rates of return on investment in life itself, especially through practices of 
self-investment.  
Crucially for the FCTC, the DALY metric also brought both the scale of the 
global tobacco epidemic and the cost-effectiveness of interventions to curb its spread 
into sharp relief. DALY calculations and the findings of various World Bank-sponsored 
studies that employed the DALY methodology helped constitute the global tobacco 
epidemic as an object of epidemiological and economic knowledge. Characterized in 
this way, to global tobacco epidemic quickly became a global health priority.  
In answering these questions, this dissertation draws on a wide range of textual 
sources, data from participant observation and oral history interviews with key actors. It 
uses Foucauldian-inspired interpretive methods to investigate the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of the world’s first health treaty. The resulting analysis 
contributes to a range of scholarly literatures. In part, it is a historical narrative of global 
tobacco control and its place in the history of world health. More fundamentally, 
though, it contributes to interdisciplinary studies of the relationship between science, 
society and the state, especially as each of these is rearticulated within an increasingly 
global context. It draws on, and contributes to work in science and technology studies, 
biopolitics and neoliberalism, social movements and political sociology, and social 
studies of post-colonialism and globalization. In the remainder of this chapter, I detail 
the empirical background of the case, before outlining my theoretical commitments. I 
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then discuss my methods and, finally, give a brief overview of my key findings and how 
they are presented in the chapters that follow. 
 
THE TOBACCO PROBLEM 
While tobacco consumption is declining throughout much of the Western world, 
the global dimensions of the tobacco epidemic have only recently come to be known. 
Smoking prevalence rates since the 1980s have fallen in the United States of America, 
much of Western Europe and other industrialized countries, but global consumption 
patterns have been steadily increasing. The number of smokers worldwide is reportedly 
due to increase from 1.1. billion in 2001 to 1.6 billion by 2025, an increase of almost 
50%, if current smoking trends continue (World Bank 1999a, 2). Annually, 5 million 
deaths are currently attributed to tobacco use, but this figure is expected to double to 10 
million deaths each year within the next decade if current trends continue. The sheer 
scale of the tobacco epidemic is further complicated by the geographic distribution of 
smokers, up to 84% of whom live in countries with developing or transitional 
economies, that is, in the global South (WHO 2008: 13).  
The spread of tobacco use has been attributed to various processes of 
globalization – including trade liberalization, direct foreign investment and global 
marketing – and has been blamed for interfering with the project of development, 
contributing to third-world poverty and causing considerable environmental degradation 
(World Bank 1999). Because it attempts to ameliorate these problems – by requiring 
such measures as increased tobacco excise-taxes, public education campaigns and 
warning labels on tobacco products – the FCTC has been touted as a world-wide 
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solution to a problem of globalization and represents the first time in its sixty-year 
history that the WHO has exercised its constitutional mandate to negotiate a health 
related treaty.  
Nevertheless, acceptance for a legally binding, multilateral approach was not 
immediately forthcoming. The idea of a tobacco treaty was conceived as early as 1993 
and presented to the World Health Assembly in 1995. However, these early efforts were 
met with considerable initial resistance. As one senior WHO executive explained, at 
that time the proposal seemed “ambitious to a fault” (Ruth Roemer, Taylor, and 
Lariviere 2005, 937). But with the election of Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland as director 
general of the WHO in 1998, and the support of the World Bank, the momentum behind 
the framework convention began to build, such that by the time the World Health 
Assembly came to vote to accept the FCTC in May 2003, the full 192 member states of 
the Assembly voted unanimously in its favour. Since its adoption, 180 countries, 
representing over 90% of the world’s population, have ratified the convention, making 
the FCTC one of the most widely and rapidly accepted treaties in the history of the 
UN.1 That an overwhelming global consensus has emerged is clear. But for scholars 
interested in the social study of knowledge-production and the relationship between 
knowledge and policy, the standard “convergence model” of policy achievement, i.e. 
that science discovers, policy applies and society benefits, is deeply unsatisfying. The 
convergence model also sheds little light on the social, political or historical context in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of those countries that have not ratified the treaty, Indonesia and the United States of America 
stand unrivalled as the most populous. See, for example, http://www.who.int/fctc/en/. 
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which such policy successes are achieved. In other word, it disregards the very 
conditions of possibility with which this dissertation is concerned.  
 
EXPLAINING THE FCTC  - THE STANDARD STORY 
Traditional explanations for the emergence of consensus in social policy 
typically presume what Clark Miller (2001, 248) has termed “cognitive convergence”.  
On this model, different parties adopt convergent ideas based on shared scientific 
understandings of the world and enact social change on the basis of scientific evidence. 
Science is seen as prior to and as a determinant of social policy and as standing outside 
of social, political or historical context. The cognitive convergence model is evident in 
much of the rhetoric surrounding the FCTC: implicitly in the ubiquitous presentation of 
the framework convention as an “evidence-based” treaty; in Dr Brundtland’s 
pronouncements that “[t]he science that underpins our work in unequivocal”; and in her 
view that “tobacco control can be achieved when scientists communicate with 
policymakers, when policymakers act on science, and when the media and NGOs are 
effective. It doesn’t matter if a country is a major tobacco producer or consumer, from 
the North of the South, or from the developing or developed world” ( de Beyer and 
Brigden 2003, 190).  
The cognitive convergence model is evident also in the field of public health, 
where narratives about the development of the FCTC tend to operate with similar 
assumptions about the appropriate role of scientific evidence in tobacco control 
(Roemer et al., 2005). These public health narratives leave little room for the possibility 
of legitimate variation in tobacco control policies across different contexts, with 
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instances of dissent, disagreement or divergence quickly attributed instead to the 
nefarious influence of the global tobacco lobby.2 In contrast to the linear causal stories 
provided by this line of scholarship, Roddey Reid (2005) has convincingly tied the 
different configurations of tobacco control initiatives in California, France and Japan to 
the respective cultural contexts and historical trajectories of the three countries. Taking 
a highly interdisciplinary approach that draws on the theories and methods of history, 
anthropology, cultural studies, media studies and science studies, Reid’s account 
highlights the complexity involved in the attempt to “globalize” tobacco control – a 
degree of complexity that does not lend itself easily to the linear narratives of cognitive 
convergence nor to the homogeneous globalization of “best practice” tobacco control 
frequently espoused by the field of public health.  This dissertation takes a similarly 
interdisciplinary approach in order to attend to the complexity involved in the 
emergence of the global tobacco epidemic, the development of the FCTC, and the 
transition from international to global health more generally. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) Meets Globalization and Postcolonial Studies 
Much work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has identified 
the many ways in which the convergence model of the relationship between science and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to exposing industry interference in tobacco 
control initiatives, especially since the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998 made public 
millions of tobacco industry documents. See, for example, (Assunta and Chapman 2006; Simon 
Chapman and Carter 2003; Givel and Glantz 2001; Stanton A. Glantz and Balbach 2000; Zegart 
2000; S. Glantz, Mamudu, and Hammond 2008). I discuss the rhetorical importance of industry 
interference in the latter part of Chapter 4. 
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society is inadequate. From its inception as a field, STS scholarship has generated a 
wealth of empirical studies that demonstrate how science, like other forms of socio-
cultural knowledge, is constitutively social. The practices and products of science are 
seen as historically situated, locally specific, and socially contingent (Kuhn 1962; Bloor 
1976). Far from being historically inevitable, the emergence of scientific entities (Fleck 
1979), the credibility of particular scientific claims (Shapin 1995), the boundaries of 
scientific communities (Gieryn 1994), and the recognition of scientific experts (H. M. 
Collins and Evans 2002), are all seen as social achievements in need of empirical 
explanation. Careful analyses of the historical and political conditions of the production 
of scientific knowledge have shown that science encapsulates not only how the natural 
world purportedly is, but also particular visions of how the social world ought to be 
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985). STS scholars have employed the “idiom of co-production” 
(Jasanoff 2005; Jasanoff 2004; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005; Latour 1993) in order to 
emphasize the ways in which science and society, or natural and social orders, are 
always co-produced, simultaneously, in ways that inevitably incorporate a normative 
dimension. Knowledge of the natural world is produced through processes imbued with 
the complex political and cultural dynamics of the social world and changes in the 
social order are, in turn, influenced by what is known about the natural order. Scientific 
knowledge and social practice are thus inseparable, and comprehensive studies of one 
must always account for the other.  
Applying these insights to the case of global tobacco control, instead of seeing 
the “global tobacco epidemic” as a naturally occurring, ontologically independent 
entity, I treat it as an object of knowledge that has been coproduced with particular 
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social, historical and political developments, namely the transition from international to 
global health and attendant rise of global neoliberalism as an important mode of 
rationality in attempts to deal with the problem of health on a transnational scale. 
Similarly, the boundaries of the knowledge community involved in global tobacco 
control and the recognition, inclusion, or exclusion of particular experts within that 
community, are also seen as phenomena that warrant empirical attention.  
The field of STS has attended to the commingling of scientific and social 
practices in a variety of ways, primarily by using richly detailed historical and 
ethnographic case studies of instances of scientific change, controversy and emergence, 
or of the mundane work of “normal science” (Kuhn 1962). For example, following 
Latour’s injunction to  “follow the actors” through their daily activities of scientific 
practice, a number of scholars embarked on deeply ethnographic laboratory studies that 
highlighted the local contingency and cultural specificity of scientific practice (Latour 
1987; Traweek 1988; Knorr-Cetina 1999). While these collected works have served as 
an important corrective to earlier structural-functionalist approaches to the sociology of 
science (Merton 1973), and firmly established cultural and social constructionist 
approaches within the field of STS, the micro-focus on the culture of scientific practices 
has occasionally eclipsed the institutional and organization bases of power in scientific 
knowledge production.3  
More recently, some scholars have proposed to reinsert attention to social 
structure in the STS agenda in a way that is not retrogressive, but is enlightened by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Feminist science studies is an important exception here. See, for example (Haraway 1989; 
Keller 1985; Murphy 2013).  
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cultural approaches of the recent past. For example, Scott Frickel and Kelly Moore label 
their approach the “New Political Sociology of Science”, and characterize it as such:  
Sensitive to the arguments and incorporating insights gained from 
cultural science studies, but with an explicit focus on the structural 
dimensions of power and inequality in knowledge politics, NPSS extends 
the cultural schools” thick descriptions of how science works toward 
research explaining why science works better or more often for some 
groups than for others, and the ways in which social attributes such as 
race, gender, class, and profession interact with and condition those 
particular outcomes (2006:7). 
 
To be sure, their programmatic statement of an NPSS agenda formally articulates the 
approaches taken in many previous STS studies (see, for example Epstein’s (1996) 
analysis of the production of knowledge in the AIDS epidemic and Jasanoff’s (1995) 
study of scientists as policy advisors within governmental halls of power). Nevertheless, 
I follow Frickel and Moore in attempting to attend more explicitly to the institutional 
bases of power in processes of knowledge production. In the case of the FCTC this 
entails paying particular attention to the role of the World Bank in creating the 
conditions in which a WHO-led anti-tobacco treaty could eventually be passed.  
Similarly drawing attention to the importance of political theory for STS, 
Charles Thorpe points out that the “theorization of politics within STS has particular 
relevance and urgency today as both the polity of science and the structure of the 
broader polity are being refashioned in the context of globalization” (2007, 63). While 
“globalization” has become a topic of increasing interest across the gamut of the social 
sciences, work in the field of STS often has remained focused at the local level – at the 
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level of the laboratory, or within the context of the individual nation state.4  Across the 
social science literature, globalization is variously characterized as the increased flow of 
material goods, economic capital, people, technology and information across 
geographically dispersed yet interdependent networks in a way that simultaneously 
reorganizes both the local and the global orders. However, most of the literature on 
globalization does not to engage with the epistemological issues that constitute a central 
focus of the field of STS. Instead, “information” or “evidence” is treated as just another 
commodity to be exchanged, without sufficient attention to its essentially constructed 
and situated character.  
Recently, a growing body of STS scholarship has called for greater attention to 
the “patterns of local transactions that give rise to global, or universalist, claims” (W. 
Anderson 2002, 643), and has suggested that attention to the “postcolonial” may be a 
productive way in which to do so (see, in addition, McNeil 2005; Reid and Traweek 
2000). The term “postcolonialism”, not unlike “globalization”, encapsulates multiple, 
often amorphous, meanings. As characterized by Anderson (2002): 
 [Post-colonialism] has been taken to signify a time period (after the 
colonial; a location (where the colonial was); a critique of the legacy of 
colonialism; an ideological backing for newly created states; a 
demonstration of the complicity of Western knowledge with colonial 
projects; or an argument that colonial engagements can reveal the 
ambivalence, anxiety and instability deep within Western though and 
practice (645).   
 
At its broadest, postcolonial theory draws attention to the consequences of the history of 
colonialism for current configurations of the geo- and socio-political orders, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For important exceptions to this general trend see, for example, (Jasanoff 2005; Jasanoff 2004; 
Miller 2007; Miller 2004; Winickoff and Bushey 2009). 
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“alludes to both the impact and legacies of formally deposed imperial regimes and to 
new forms of exploitative global relations” (McNeil 2005: 106).  
While postcolonial critique has focused primarily on literary representations, it 
has often “worked to destabilize, or at least challenge, the assumption that Western 
knowledge is objective, authoritative and universally applicable” (Anderson 2002: 646). 
Moving beyond literary theory, a similar emphasis on the consequences of the history of 
colonialism, the presumed universality of Western knowledge, and on the constitution 
of power in a transnational frame has been incorporated into the project of “postcolonial 
studies of science and technology”. Also known as  “postcolonial technoscience”, this 
approach couples the theoretical agendas of STS with the emergence of new global 
formations to advance the “empirical study of the translocal co-production of techno-
science and social orders” on a global scale (Anderson 2002:647). By focusing on the 
“global tobacco epidemic” and the FCTC this dissertation contributes to more overtly 
political studies of the consequences of the coproduction of science and policy in a 
context of postcolonialism and globalization.  
 
Foucault, Biopower & Biopolitics 
This dissertation also draws theoretical guidance from the work of French 
historian and social theorist Michel Foucault, especially his work on biopolitics, 
governmentality and neoliberalism. Foucault famously described a fundamental shift in 
the order of politics that began in the West starting around the seventeenth century. In 
contrast to an older form of power, typified by the right of the sovereign to take life or 
let live, modern forms of power, he argued, invert this relationship by fostering life or 
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disallowing it to the point of death (Foucault 1978, 138–145). This power over life – 
what Foucault termed “biopower” – takes two basic forms. The first, which Foucault 
called an anatomo-politics of the human body, consists in the application of a 
disciplinary technology to individual bodies. The second form – the biopolitics of the 
population – consists in the application of a “technology of security”, that is 
interventions and regulatory controls directed towards the “species body” i.e. at the 
level of the population (Foucault 2004:249). Whereas the anatomo-politics of individual 
bodies operates at the nexus of the body-organism-discipline-institution, the biopolitics 
of populations cohere at the juncture of the population-biological process-regulatory 
mechanism-State (Foucault 2004: 250. See also Lemke 2011: 37). According to 
Foucault, the function of this “bipolar” technology of power is “to invest life through 
and through (1978: 139).  
 In order to “invest life” at the level of the population, knowledge of the species 
body – its rates of reproduction, mortality, productivity health and disease – become 
imperative, driving the development of new disciplines such as statistics, demography 
and epidemiology. The object of these disciplines is not individual human beings, but 
rather their biological features abstracted and aggregated at the level of the population 
(Lemke 2011, 5). One consequence of the development of bio-power is the growing 
importance assumed by the action of the norm. The regulatory strategy of biopolitics 
does not rely on the discipline or surveillance of individuals, but rather regulation and 
normalization:  
It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of 
sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and 
utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize 
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rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to 
draw the line that separates the enemy of the sovereign from his loyal 
subjects. It effects distributions around the norm (Foucault 1978: 144). 
 
Of course, the two axes of biopower that Foucault describes do not operate in complete 
isolation from one another. Instead, they intersect in domains where individual bodily 
practices and aggregate level properties of populations overlap – as with the “apparatus 
of sexuality” or, in my case, health and disease. Biopolitics thus helps shed analytic 
light on cases like tobacco control, which are at once privately managed through 
individual bodily practices of the self and publicly administered through population 
level regulatory strategies. 
 
Social Movements without the Sovereign 
Finally, this dissertation draws somewhat selectively on some strands of social 
movements theory while retaining a Foucauldian notion of power as inhering within 
structures beyond those of the formal state. Contemporary social movements theory has 
been characterized by the fragmentation and hybridization of two earlier paradigms: 
North American resource mobilization/political process (RM/PP) theory and its 
European counterpart: new social movements (NSM) theory. RM (Mccarthy and Zald 
1977; Jenkins 1983) and PP theory (McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986) have both tended 
to operate on a rational-actor model that directs attention to the availability of resources 
and political opportunities and how these were put into service by cost/benefit-
calculating mobilizers. Implicit in this paradigm is a conception of power as operating 
solely through, or in relation to, the structures of the formal state. In contrast, NSM 
theory (Touraine 1985; Touraine 2004; Offe 1985; Habermas 1981) has argued that 
 	  
20 
rational-actor models could not be applied to many contemporary mobilizations, 
especially those directed towards identity and autonomy rather than economic 
redistribution or policy change (Gamson 1989). The NSM paradigm expressly rejected 
the cost/benefit-calculating rational actor model and, with it, the narrow conception of 
political action.  
However, both RM/PP and NSM theories have drawn heavy criticism on a 
number of fronts. RM/PP theories were criticized for their state-centric approaches 
which could not adequately account for the full diversity of collective action in society 
and for ignoring the role of history, culture and context in collective action (Buechler 
2000: 38; Goodwin and Jasper 1999). On the other hand, the empirical adequacy of the 
post-industrial uniqueness of NSMs has been called into question, while other critics 
have questioned the totalising tendency of NSM theories to view NSMs as indicative of 
the primary tension or conflict in post-industrial society (Buechler 2000; Polletta and 
Jasper 2001; Pichardo 1997).  
Sociology of social movements has since been characterized by fragmentation 
and hybridisation of these two paradigms in attempt to better account for the role of 
historical and culture in social movements operations.  For example, newer, multi-
institutionally oriented approaches to social movements have attempted to move beyond 
the long-standing politics/culture binary by encompassing a much broader range of 
institutional targets, and thus a broader range of collective change efforts, within their 
explanatory domain. On these views, social movements need not be directed solely 
towards the structures of the formal state, and may legitimately adopt institutional 
targets, such as medicine (Epstein 1996) or education (Binder 2002), or more 
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amorphous cultural targets, as the focus of their activities. Building on the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977; 1989) and Michel Foucault (Foucault 1978; Foucault 
1980; 1982), some scholars have adopted the terminology of “fields of protest”, “fields 
of contention”, (Armstrong 2002; Ray 1999; Crossley 2002; Crossley 2006) or “multi-
institutional politics” (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008) to differentiate their new 
theoretical approaches from earlier paradigms, especially those associated with RM/PP 
theories. Despite the terminological differences, these various perspectives collectively 
reject the view of politics as pertaining only to the structures of formal governance of 
nation-states and the accompanying view that power functions in society through these 
channels alone. Instead, they hold that domination is organized around multiple sources 
of power, each of which is simultaneously material and symbolic. In contrast to the 
view of power as flowing only through the channels of the formal state, a multi-
institutional politics approach sees power as distributed across a much wider variety of 
social institutions. This substantially broadens the domain of social movements inquiry 
beyond forms of collective action that challenge the state and grounds the study of 
social movements in empirical research that is sensitive to historical change and 
situational contingency (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Instead of insisting that movements 
conform to pre-existing theoretical models, the emergence of any given movement, its 
targets, goals and strategies all become questions in need of empirical investigation. In 
the case of the FCTC, this entails paying particular attention to the emergence of the 
global tobacco epidemic as an epidemiological problem, as an economic problem, as a 
WHO concern and as the subject of the WHO’s first legally binding health treaty.  
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Building on my theoretical commitments, my methodological approach is 
similarly inspired by scholarship in the Foucauldian tradition, broadly construed. I draw 
on a range of qualitative sources that I treat as primary data: articles in the scientific 
literature, published reports, working papers and discussion papers, technical reports 
and archival documents. These include articles from leading scientific journals: Lancet, 
New England Journal of Medicine, British Medical Journal, American Journal of 
Public Health, Tobacco Control, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, World 
Health Statistics Quarterly, Social Science and Medicine, Journal of Health Economics 
and Journal of Political Economy. I utilize additional textual documents, especially 
World Bank and World Health Organization technical reports, working papers, meeting 
proceedings, agendas, speeches and memos from the organizations’ electronic archives. 
Finally, I draw also on published materials such as annual reports, conference 
proceedings and academic edited volumes.  
 I supplemented my analysis of these textual sources with interviews with key 
actors in the history of the FCTC and with participant observations at a range of WHO, 
tobacco control and public health conferences and events both within the United States 
and internationally. Early in my fieldwork I undertook a professional development 
course in Public Health at the University of Sydney led by Professor Simon Chapman 
entitled “Tobacco Control Advocacy in the 21st century”. Here I learned about common 
strategies for advancing tobacco control within Australia and internationally as well as 
the “evidence base” on which such policy initiative are frequently justified. I attended 
the 13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Mumbai, India in March 2009 and 
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the US National Conference on Tobacco or Health in Phoenix, Arizona in June 2009. 
This helped me begin to map the key actors, organizations and institutions active in 
national and international tobacco control. In November 2010 I attended the 4th 
Conference of the Parties of the WHO’s FCTC in Montevideo, Uruguay where  
I was able to observe, first hand, the work of global tobacco control through the 
ongoing negotiation, management and implementation of the world’s first health treaty. 
Finally, I conducted in-depth oral history interviews with a range of key actors: World 
Bank officials, WHO consultants, public health and tobacco control experts and 
activists. 
To make sense of these data I follow Steven Epstein in employing analysis that 
is both “genealogical” and “archeological in orientation (Epstein 1996: 355-360. See 
also Foucault 1970, 1972, 1984). In presenting the history of the FCTC treaty, I have 
sought to present a genealogical account that emphasizes the deeply contingent nature 
of the treaty’s development and eventual passage. In this, I hope to destabilize the more 
common public health histories that emphasize the almost teleological path from the 
treaty’s “unequivocal evidence base” to its final ratification. My analysis is also 
archeological in that it attempts to uncover the historically specific “conditions of 
possibility” for the production of certain types of knowledge claims. In this, too, I hope 
to destabilize any sense of inevitability about the global tobacco epidemic as an object 
of knowledge, its positioning as a global health priority or the particular strategies 
adopted to curb its spread.  
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FINDINGS AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The finding of my research are presented across five substantive chapters. In the 
first chapter, I draw extensively (though not exclusively) on secondary sources in order 
to trace the development of “world health” through three eras: colonial tropical 
medicine and Cold War international health and contemporary (neoliberal) global 
health. I use “world health” as an umbrella term to refer to the problematization of 
health on a transnational scale at its most general level. I reserve the terms “tropical 
medicine”, “international health” and “global health” to mark historically specific eras 
in the history of world health. Similarly, I use the term “international” to refer to action 
between nations and the term “transnational” to refer to actors and actions that purport 
to transcend the international. Throughout this genealogy, I highlight the biopolitical 
dimensions of world health. I illustrate how, during each of these eras, developments in 
the practice of world health are intimately tied to the science of health and hygiene, to 
geopolitical transformations at the national, international and transnational level, and 
ideological contests on the world stage. 
In Chapter Two, I begin my examination of the interconnectedness of science 
and politics in the contemporary global health era using the case with which this 
dissertation is centrally concerned: the World Health Organization’s Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The successful adoption of the treaty is 
almost universally attributed to its “overwhelming evidence base”. I investigate the 
origins of the evidence base of global tobacco control, locating its roots in the creation 
of the DALY metric, which was first introduced in the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 1993: Investing in Health. Investing in Health is frequently 
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identified as a key moment in the structural transformation of the field of world health 
in the transition from international to global health (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; 
Chorev 2012; Blanchet et al. 2013; Jamison et al. 2013; World Bank 1993). Here, I 
focus instead on the epistemological importance of Investing in Health, that is, how it 
has helped shape the mode of rationality that underpins the health of the global 
population as a scientific and political problem. The logic of Investing in Health 
prioritizes those public health strategies, like tobacco control, that attempt to intervene 
upon the health behaviors of individuals in order to make them more health-
maximizing, i.e. its primary governmental strategy is self-governance. I argue that in 
addition to the semantic shifts and neoliberal structural reforms, this new way of 
knowing and governing the health of the global population is key in understanding the 
transition from international to global health at the end of the 20th century. Crucially for 
the case of the FCTC, the DALY metric also brought the “tobacco epidemic” into sharp 
relief. The development of the DALY metric bolstered global tobacco control efforts – 
as I describe in the following chapters - and contributed indirectly but significantly to 
the eventual passage of the FCTC treaty. 
However, the newly recognized burden of the tobacco epidemic was not the first 
warning of an impending tobacco threat. Nor did the World Bank’s problematization of 
the global tobacco epidemic lead directly to the creation of global tobacco control 
interventions in a strictly linear way. The World Bank’s burden-of-disease 
characterization of tobacco and the World Health Organization’s solution to that 
problem in the form of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control did proceed 
chronologically: the DALY metric was first published in 1993, the full results of the 
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GBD study in 1996 (World Bank 1993; Murray and Lopez 1996a). The initial idea for a 
WHO Treaty was also conceived in 1993 and the World Health Assembly (WHA) 
adopted resolutions to pursue a legally binding international instrument of tobacco 
control in 1995 and 1996  (Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005; Mackay 2003). And 
although these became complementary and mutually reinforcing developments, each 
was motivated by slightly different epistemological, organizational and political 
concerns. While these were necessary conditions for the eventual passage of the FCTC, 
they were not sufficient causes. In Chapter Three, I begin to trace various other factors 
that contributed to the eventual passage of the treaty. I detail the slow growth of a 
public health movement for international tobacco control, the development of the idea 
for an legally-binding regulatory approach by Allyn Taylor (then a doctoral student in 
international law); and the uptake of her ideas by Professor of health law and public 
health activist Ruth Roemer.  
Having traced the development of the early movement for tobacco control 
through its inception in the late 1960s, its mobilization of a moral outrage frame during 
the 1970s and 1980s, and its growing professionalization during the 1980s and into the 
1990s, I turn more specifically to the history of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control itself in Chapter Four. I begin with its initial conceptualization by Allyn Taylor 
and the uptake of Taylor’s idea by public health activist and Professor of Health Law at 
UCLA Ruth Roemer. Roemer enthusiastically promoted the idea within the 
international tobacco control community and at the ninth World Conference on Tobacco 
or Health in Paris in 1994, which led to the creation of the WHO resolution in support 
of a tobacco treaty soon after.  
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However, the idea for a FCTC was initially met with skepticism and even 
hostility at the WHO, especially from the WHO’s legal department. It was eventually 
embraced by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland upon her election as Director General of the 
WHO in 1998. Importantly, Brundtland adopted the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 1993: Investing in Health as her “roadmap” to reforming the WHO and was 
guided by its recommendations for structuring national health systems according to a 
logic of economic rationalization, i.e. DALYs gained for dollars spent. Tobacco control 
presented an opportunity for the WHO to: 1) demonstrate its technical leadership by 
mobilizing scientific evidence in support of a legally-binding approach global tobacco 
control, largely in the form of GBD epidemiological forecasts and economic studies co-
sponsored by the World Bank and 2) re-assert its moral voice regarding health equity, 
especially in light of the disproportionate burden of tobacco-related illness that was 
projected to fall on countries of the global South. It also gave the WHO an opportunity 
to position itself as the lead coordinating body within the field of global health by 
enacting Article 19 of its constitution and negotiating an unprecedented legally-binding 
health treaty. Tobacco control became a WHO priority at this point: Brundtland created 
the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and appointed South African epidemiologist and anti-
smoking campaigner Derek Yach as its head. With Brundtland at the helm of the WHO 
and Yach as head of the TFI, negotiations for the FCTC quickly got underway.   
During the treaty-making process a number of developments helped speed its 
passage: public hearings in advance of treaty negotiations, the creation of an active 
transnational NGO movement, the deployment of various rhetorical strategies and, 
crucially, the publication and dissemination of the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic 
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(1999) report during the negotiations. Throughout this history, I pay particular attention 
to the relationship between science and politics and to the persuasive power of the 
putatively objective evidence base of global tobacco control in the history of the FCTC 
treaty. 
The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(WHO FCTC) was claimed to usher in a new era of global health not just because it was 
an unprecedented legally binding world health treaty, nor even because of the unique 
level of international cooperation it inspired. The WHO FCTC was claimed also to 
represent a “paradigm shift” in the control of diseases caused by harmful and addictive 
substances because it emphasized demand reduction strategies. That is to say, instead of 
regulating tobacco products, the FCTC treaty primarily regulates the behaviors of 
tobacco-using people.  In attempting to intervene upon the risky yet still perfectly legal 
decision to consume tobacco products, then, the FCTC attempts to govern global health 
through prescribing health-maximizing, risk-minimizing behaviors – i.e. by prescribing 
the “conduct of conduct” of the global population (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 
2). And it attempts to do so by correcting what the World Bank identified as a market 
failure in the decision to smoke, i.e. that smokers neither full know their risks nor bear 
the costs of their individual consumer choice (1999). In Chapter Five, I examine the two 
central demand reduction strategies of the FCTC that are designed to correct for this 
market failure: education (increasing smokers” knowledge about the risks of smoking) 
and taxes (increasing the “costs” involved in deciding to smoke).  
I argue that both of these demand reduction strategies are based on a model of a 
cost-benefit calculating neoliberal homo oeconomicus – the same figuration of human 
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action that I argued undergirds the DALY metric discussed in Chapter 2. Education 
campaigns and taxation strategies both seek to alter the costs and benefits of present and 
future smoking in such a way that the decision not to smoke is the only rational course 
of action. I conclude with a visual tour of a novel health education strategy that emerged 
in Australia in the late 1990s and has since been strongly adopted as FCTC “best 
practice” – the graphic warning strategy. 
Finally, in the conclusion to the dissertation, I return to the theme of the 
economiczation of life. Popular public health narratives present a picture of the 
development and acceptance of the FCTC as dependent largely on the strength of its 
evidence base and the political will of its key advocates. In contrast, I present a history 
of the FCTC treaty that emphasizes its dependence on a new way of quantifying 
disease, economizing life and governing health that emerged during the 1990s. In turn, I 
argue that this tripartite process of quantifying disease, economizing life and governing 
health is important in understanding the transition from international to global health at 
the dawn of the 21st century. I conclude with some more recent examples of the 
continued relevance of economization in the field of contemporary global health. 
  
	  	   30	  
CHAPTER 1: 
HISTORICIZING WORLD HEALTH: COLONIAL TROPICAL 
MEDICINE, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH, NEOLIBERAL 
GLOBAL HEALTH  
 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the global governance of health at 
the dawn of the 21st century. However, concern with the health of populations beyond 
the territorial borders of individual nation states has a long and detailed history, one that 
dates back to the earliest moments of international exploration, conquest, trade and 
exchange.5 The precise form that collective health efforts have taken has varied 
considerably over at least the last three hundred years. In this chapter I trace the 
development of “world health” through three eras: colonial tropical medicine, Cold War 
international health and contemporary (neoliberal) global health. I use the term “world 
health” as an umbrella term to refer to the problematization of health on a transnational 
scale at its most general level. I reserve the terms “tropical medicine”, “international 
health” and “global health” to mark historically specific eras in the history of world 
health. Throughout this genealogy, I highlight the biopolitical dimensions of world 
health. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Treatments of this history that apply a critical, rather than a celebratory lens have emerged 
largely in the last 20 years (Bashford 2006; Bashford 2004; A.-E. Birn 1996; A.-E. Birn and 
Solorzano 1999; A.-E. Birn 2009; A. Birn 2014; Cueto 2007; W. P. Anderson 1998). For the 
definitive celebratory account, see (Rosen 1993).  
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Biopolitics and Biopower 
Michel Foucault famously introduced the terms biopower and biopolitics to 
describe how the life and productivity of human bodies are individually and collectively 
interpolated into broader relations of power (1978; 2004; 2010). In contrast to pre-
modern forms of sovereign power, typified by the right to take life -  i.e. to kill, modern 
forms of biopower, he argued, operate through the promotion and intensification of life 
– i.e. through the regulation and optimization of population processes such as fertility, 
birth, health, morbidity and death. In their clarification and extension of Foucault’s 
sketch of biopower, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (2006) explain:  
At its most general… the concept of “biopower” serves to bring into 
view a field comprised of more or less rationalized attempts to intervene 
up on the vital characteristics of human existence… [W]ithin the field of 
biopower, we can use the term “biopolitics” to embrace all the specific 
strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human 
vitality, morbidity and mortality; over the forms of knowledge, regimes 
of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, legitimate 
and efficacious (196-197). 
 
As such, an analysis of biopolitics, they argue, should account for the authoritative 
discourses and supporting institutional structures directed towards the vital character of 
living human beings; the interventionist strategies that target certain collectivities in 
service of life and health; and the modes of subjectification whereby the objectives of 
the life and health of the population come to be enacted through practices of the self. 
These three elements serve as sensitizing concepts throughout this dissertation. In this 
chapter, I focus largely on the first two: discursive/institutional formations and 
interventionist strategies, and how these have varied across the three eras of world 
health. Another way of formulating my focus is on the coproduction of the science and 
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policy of world health across the eras of colonial tropical medicine, cold war 
international health and neoliberal global health.  
While Foucault’s genealogy of the arts of government (including biopower) is 
now well known (Rabinow and Rose 2006; Lemke 2001; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 
1991; Dean 2012) here I follow a different set of historical developments in order to 
attend sufficiently to the global biopolitical dimensions of world health. In addition to 
discourse, authority structures and strategies of intervention– all essential dimensions of 
Foucault’s original concept - an understanding of contemporary biopower and global 
biopolitics must also take seriously the deterritorialization of political power and 
economic productivity that has occurred in recent years as a result of neoliberal 
globalization (Waldby 2005). Throughout this analysis, then, I highlight the operation 
of biopower by drawing attention to the coproduction of historically specific and 
geographically embedded forms of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of 
intervention seen as legitimate in each of these different eras of world health.  
 
Overview of Three Eras of World Health 
Dating from the early to mid-nineteenth century, the first era of world health can 
be seen as the age of tropical medicine, which arose in order to deal with the health 
effects of colonization. It was not, it is important to note, motivated by a concern with 
the well-being of “natives” or people indigenous to colonized territories.  Instead, 
tropical medicine focused on making the colonies habitable by white Europeans and 
protecting the health and wealth of Western empires. Tropical medicine drew on the 
new fields of parisitology, germ theory and epidemiology and coupled them with extant 
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colonial structures of authority in order to attend to the vital needs of white bodies in 
tropical lands. The founding of the London School of Tropical Medicine in 1899 can be 
seen as emblematic of this era.   
Although the study and practice of tropical medicine persists in various forms to 
this very day, a shift in the dominant mode of attending to world health began to emerge 
in the years following World War I. This era saw the founding of the League of Nations 
and its attendant Health Organization and laid the groundwork of a brand of 
internationalism that would be revisited with renewed vigor in the wake of World War 
II. Although this post-war approach to international health aspired to political neutrality 
and principles of universality, it was inevitably shaped by broader relations of power 
configured by the geopolitics of post-colonialism and the Cold War. While there were 
gestures towards universalism during this era, ultimately Cold War international health 
concerned itself with those bodies perceived to be vulnerable to the political germs of 
communism within the geographic space of the third world. The World Health 
Organization’s Global Malaria Eradication Program illustrates the era’s guiding logic, 
institutional players and key tensions.  
A more recent transformation in the institutional responses to collective health 
concerns can be discerned in the transition from “international” to “global” health since 
the early 1990s. More than a simple semantic shift, the emergence of global health has 
both resulted from and contributed to a reconfiguration of multilateral institutions, 
international non-governmental organization, philanthropic donors and civil society 
actors all of whom purport to care for nothing less than the health of each and every 
member of the population of the globe. A stable definition of “global health” has yet to 
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emerge, and contests over its underlying ethics, overarching mission and immediate 
agenda occur frequently.  Nevertheless, the discursive and institutional transformations 
that have occurred over the last twenty-five years point to a rupture with the earlier 
mode of international health. In the following chapters, I develop the argument that one 
important feature of the contemporary global health era is a new way of quantifying 
health and disease, valuing life and governing health on a global scale – a tripartate 
process that I refer to as the economization of life. In this chapter I survey the history of 
world health through the eras of colonial tropical medicine and Cold War international 
health as important antecedents to the contemporary global health era. This history 
serves as necessary background to the argument I advance in Chapter 2 regarding the 
economization of life. Table 1 sketches the primary points of differences between these 
three eras. 
Table 1.1: Three Eras of World Health 
 Tropical 
Medicine 
International Health Global Health 
Primary 
Institutional 
Actors 
Colonial 
Governments 
National Governments, 
World Health 
Organization  
Multilaterals, 
philanthropics, 
public/private 
partnerships, NGOs 
Guiding 
philosophy 
Colonialism Cold War 
Capitalism/Communism 
Neoliberalism 
Target 
population 
“white” bodies 
in tropical lands 
“vulnerable” bodies in 
the third world 
“productive” bodies 
everywhere  
Geographic 
reach 
Colonial 
Empires 
Third World Universal  
Source of 
threat 
“tropics” “communism” “economic 
underdevelopment” 
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THE EARLY DAYS: COLONIAL TROPICAL MEDICINE AND THE LONDON 
SCHOOL 
The Prehistory of World Health – Contact, Conquest, Death and Disease 
I began this chapter by stating that concern with the health of populations 
beyond the territorial borders of individual nation states has a long and detailed history. 
In fact, collective health concerns in many ways preceded the creation of nation states 
themselves. Innovations that we would now consider to be within the domain of public 
health, such as public sanitation measures, methods of ensuring clean water supply, 
drainage and waste disposal all date to the ancient civilizations of Greece, Rome, China, 
Ethiopia and Mesoamerica thousands of years ago. However, until the Middle Ages, 
health concerns and disease outbreaks were of limited geographic reach. This changed 
dramatically with the epic outbreak of plague in the 14th century that came to be known 
as the Black Death. Increased trade and exchange had intensified contact between 
peoples of distant regions over the preceding centuries.  When the Black Death broke 
out, it spread prolifically across Europe and the Far East, carried by flea-infested rats 
that frequented merchant vessels along these trade routes. More than 25 million 
Europeans, and tens of millions of inhabitants of China, Russia, India and the Eastern 
Mediterranean all perished with the plague - it has been estimated that approximately 
one third of the world’s population died during the horrendous pandemic. To this day, 
the Black Death is still regarded as the most deadly epidemic in the history of 
humankind (Birn, Pillay, & Holtz, 2009: 19). 
Because the Black Death’s initial onslaught also predated the formation of 
nation states, efforts to forestall it – the use of quarantine, for example – and measures 
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to clean up in its wake – such as fumigating the bodies and belongings of the deceased - 
fell to local authorities which operated independently of one another since there was no 
system of cooperation between local municipalities or city-states at the time.  While 
other diseases plagued Europe during the Middle Ages and early modern period, it was 
the plague itself, and the responses to it mounted by independent local municipalities 
and city-states that can be seen as archetypical of this early period in the (pre)history of 
world health. 
During the early years of the 15th century, technical improvements in navigation 
and increased maritime prowess spurred a series of conquests by western Europeans in 
far corners of the globe. These conquests brought new lands and new materials such as 
gold and other minerals to imperial powers. But to the native inhabitants of colonized 
lands, contact with Europeans primarily brought great suffering, including devastating 
rates of mortality from diseases against which indigenous populations had precious little 
immunity. Precise statistics are lacking, but a number of scholars estimate that between 
one-third and one-half of indigenous inhabitants of colonized lands perished during the 
conquests of the 15th and early 16th centuries from conditions ranging from smallpox to 
influenza (Rosen 1993; A.-E. Birn, Pillay, and Holtz 2009). For example, the Spanish 
bishop Bartolome de las Casas recorded that the indigenous population of the Antilles 
in 1492, the year that Christopher Columbus arrived in what came to be called the West 
Indies, numbered 3,770,000.  A short 25 years later, only 15,600 had survived slavery, 
death and diseases (Birn, Pillay, and Holtz 2009: 22).  
Early contact between European colonizers and indigenous peoples brought 
considerable mortality to newly conquered lands. While indigenous groups shouldered 
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the vast majority of this burden, colonizers, too, succumbed to disease. Attempts to 
colonize West Africa, in particular, decimated European expeditions to such an extent 
that the region was referred to as the “white man’s grave” (Birn, Pillay and Holtz 2009: 
24). Dysentery and malaria were rife, especially in Africa, and diseases such as 
influenza, smallpox, measles, cholera and yellow fever were common in the New 
World. Trade, exploration, conquest, and later the slave trade, resulted in the spread of 
these diseases to previously unaffected regions. However, the promise of riches far 
outweighed the fear of death and disease – especially for those who profited from 
colonial exploits without ever leaving Europe (Birn, Pillay and Holtz: 25).  
 
The Birth of Tropical Medicine  
Against this historic background, three specific developments immediately 
preceded the emergence of the field of tropical medicine. The first was the “invention of 
the tropics” as a discursive space, not just a geographic locale. Labeling certain regions 
of the globe in this way made it possible for imperial powers to define the environment 
and its peoples as essentially, and inherently, different from Europeans. As Birn, Pillay 
and Holtz (2009) put it,  
The idea of the tropics was, in origin and essence, the perception 
and the experience of white men (and women) venturing into an 
unfamiliar world in which climate, vegetation, diseases, and 
people all appeared to be different, and in which the familiar 
forms of temperate life were threatened, overturned, or inverted 
(26). 
  
The assumption of essential differences between black or brown inhabitants of the 
tropics and white Europeans of more temperate climes grounded the supposed racial 
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superiority of the latter and justified the “exploitation of regions and peoples deemed 
unable to escape their medico-geographic state of underdevelopment” (27).  This 
assumption also came to undergird the development of tropical medicine as a branch of 
medicine separate and distinct from that practiced at “home”.  
Second, processes of rapid industrialization produced important changes on two 
fronts. First, it made imperial powers hungry for the resources of colonial territories. 
Where particular diseases presented a threat to effective exploitation of the resources 
and labor of the colonies, they quickly became an area of concern for imperial powers. 
The obstacle posed by malaria, for example, to rubber plantations on the Malay 
peninsula (Manderson 2002) or, later, yellow fever to the construction of the Panama 
canal (Abernathy 2000) brought the control of such tropical diseases to the attention of 
British and American powers.  
Rapid industrialization, especially in Britain, caused important domestic 
consequences, too. In bringing about increased urbanization around manufacturing 
centers, the process of industrialization led all too often to squalid living conditions for 
a great majority of the new laboring class.  As a result, diseases such as typhoid, typhus 
and cholera were rampant and presented a constant threat not only to the lives of 
workers, but to the profits of capitalists as well. This led to sanitary reforms intended to 
improve the living conditions, health and, putatively, the moral standing of the new 
laboring class.6 Early domestic public health efforts, spearheaded by social reformers 
such as Sir Edwin Chadwick, advocated clean water supply, urban waste disposal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is to this historical period that Foucault dates the emergence of modern forms of domenstic 
or nationally-based biopower (Foucault 2004).  
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sewage systems and emphasized the overall economic benefit of investing in such 
infrastructure . Importantly, reformers of the Chadwickian persuasion rejected improved 
working conditions, wages and food as remedies for the ills of the working class. This 
view was popularized in the contemporaneous writings of Friedrich Engels, who 
attributed the same problems documented by Chadwick to the exploitation of the 
proletariat under a capitalist economic system (Engels and McLellan 2009). Ultimately, 
however, it was Chadwick’s, rather than Engel’s vision, that came to be entrenched as 
the foundation of many public health efforts. This tension between specific technical 
interventions and overall improvements in social conditions – or between “vertically” 
and “horizontally” integrated initiatives in today’s parlance – has been an enduring 
theme throughout the history of public health, both domestically and internationally. 
Finally, the middle years of the 19th century saw a shift away from a miasmatic 
understanding of disease, which had held sway for the previous two millennia, towards 
more mechanistic ideas about disease causation. Instead of viewing disease as caused 
by “bad air”, malodorous vapors or general filth, the emergence of parisitology, germ 
theory, and the science of epidemiology directed medical attention towards infectious 
agents such as germs and parasites as potential causes of a number of tropical ailments 
and raised new questions about modes and vectors of transmissions. This shift 
eventually made diseases such as malaria and cholera conditions for which targeted 
interventions could be sought. Importantly though, as historian John Farely points out, 
the emergence of germ theory and parisitology often made vectors, rather than victims 
of disease the object of concern, resulting in a top down authority structure that 
privileged Western administration of local interventions: “parasitic diseases” Farely 
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observes,  “could be prevented without the involvement of the people with the disease” 
(Farley 2004: 291). And, of course, it was interventions of precisely this kind that the 
field of tropical medicine came to seek. 
These developments set the stage for the emergence of the field of tropical 
medicine, which combined new discoveries in science and medicine with the expansion 
of western empires. The new disciple came to be institutionalized, first and foremost, in 
the London School of Tropical Medicine, founded in 1899 by Sir Patrick Manson. 
Widely regarded as the father of tropical medicine, Manson had spent his early career in 
the Far East, where he became frustrated at his lack of knowledge of the range of 
diseases he witnessed there. This frustration motivated his own studies in the field, one 
of which led to the discovery that local mosquitoes were involved in the transmission of 
filariasis – a parasite that causes elephantiasis. This discovery conditioned his 
subsequent hypothesis that the mosquito was also responsible for the transmission of 
malaria, a hypothesis that would be proved correct in later collaboration with Sir Ronald 
Ross (Hamlin 1998). 
  After his return to London, Manson was appointed Medical Advisor to the 
Colonial Office, where he found a ready collaborator in Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain. A staunch imperialist and keen supporter of a strong and expansive 
British Empire, Chamberlain was said to be the first English statesman "with 
imagination enough to apprehend the great part which medical science [plays] in the 
world" (Allbutt 1905). Chamberlain shared Manson’s conviction that developing the 
study of tropical diseases and training an imperial workforce skilled in these arts was of 
the highest importance for the expansion and maintenance of the empire. Chamberlain 
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thus lent great support to Manson’s efforts to establish a school that would focus on the 
diseases that effected colonists in tropical regions, which he saw as a desirable 
complement to the overall objectives of the Colonial Office.  
This intermingling of the field of tropical medicine and imperialist discourse are 
made clear in a toast given by Joseph Chamberlain at a fundraising dinner prior to the 
opening of Manson’s School. Delivered to an assembled audience of roughly 400 
members of Britain’s high society, Chamberlain’s speech is worth quoting at length. 
“My Lords and Gentlemen”, he began:   
I have now to propose to you the toast of the evening, “The London School 
of Tropical Medicine.” I hope that you will not be alarmed, and that you 
will not fear that I am about to lead you into the thorny paths of political 
controversy, when I say that we are met here to-night in order to promote 
Imperial policy. I am sure that when our object is fully explained we shall 
have the hearty sympathy and support of men of every party and of every 
shade of politics …  
 
Now the British Empire contains, I suppose, roughly, something like 300 
millions of coloured people, living mostly in tropical climates, and it is the 
government and control of the tropics which form the principal part of that 
“white man’s burden”… Now in this great work of civilization and 
government our greatest enemy is not the hostility of savage chiefs, nor the 
influence of barbarous customs, nor even the physical difficulties of 
countries in which primeval nature still holds full sway; but it is rather the 
insidious attacks of a deadly disease which weakens where it does not kill 
and which shortens the lives and careers of many of the ablest and most 
energetic of those who go out to represent us in these countries...  
 
We have to seek out and make clear the history and origin of these 
diseases. We have, if possible to find a cure for them, and with those 
objects we have to extend the study of these tropical diseases, and to 
create, it may be, a school of trained practitioners and investigators so that 
in future scientific research may go hand in hand with practical 
medicine…  
 
My lords and gentlemen, the man who shall successfully grapple with this 
foe of humanity and find the cure for malaria, for the fevers desolating our 
colonies and dependencies in many tropical countries, and shall make the 
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tropics livable for white men – who shall reduce the risk of disease to 
something like an ordinary average - will do more for the world, more for 
the British Empire, than the man who adds a new province to the wide 
dominion of the Queen (“Mr Chamberlain and the Colonies” 1899).  
 
Chamberlain’s toast makes explicit the centrality of the study of tropical diseases to 
colonialist endeavors and the appeal of its development as both a field of study and as a 
practice of empire to “men of every shade of politics”.  In it, we can see that tropical 
medicine was concerned ultimately with optimizing the life and health of only certain 
bodies, namely white, British ones, in foreign tropical lands. As such, the field of 
tropical medicine did not seek to constitute the inhabitants of colonial territories as a 
population, per se, but rather extended a concern with the vitality of the domestic 
population to include those who “represent us” in tropical lands. In this sense, tropical 
medicine can be seen not as de-territorializing health, but as re-territorializing health 
according to a very specific colonial geography. 
Chamberlain’s toast must have inspired the desired sentiments among the 
gathered, for the fundraising dinner was a success – sufficient funds were raised that, 
combined with ongoing support from the Colonial Office itself, Manson and 
Chamberlain’s vision could be realized. The London School of Tropical Medicine was 
thus opened five months later, accepting its first students in October 1899. The field of 
tropical medicine came to be institutionalized not only in the flagship London School 
that was so dear to the hearts of Lord Chamberlain and Sir Patrick Manson, but in other 
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schools both within Britain, as with the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine also 
founded in 1899, and abroad.7  
On the other side of the Atlantic, a slightly different approach to tropical 
medicine was taking root – one that espoused a less overtly colonialist orientation, but 
which retained its imperialist overtones nonetheless. In many ways, though, early 
American involvement with trans-border collective health began the shift towards 
international health that would gain increasing momentum after each of the World 
Wars, reaching its zenith in the geopolitical climate of the Cold War. 
  
US Imperial Medicine and the Beginnings of International health  
Having acquired tropical territories as spoils of the Spanish-American war in 
1898, the United States now had a vested interested in tropical diseases, at least those 
prevalent in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The experiences of the US Army in 
these regions, especially of the US Army Yellow Fever Commission working in Cuba 
in 1900, led to increased interest in tropical diseases within the continental US and 
resulted, eventually, in the founding of the American Society for Tropical Medicine in 
1903 (Burke and Fenton 2003; Howard-Jones 1980). 
At the same time, a concern with trade expansion overseas in the wake of the 
closure of the Western frontier turned North American sights on Latin America as a 
reservoir of raw materials and as a potential new market. However, a complex web of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The seats of power of other Western empires similarly became home to schools or institutes of 
tropical medicine, including the Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine, founded in 
Hamburg, Germany in 1900, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, Belgium in 1905, 
and the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in 1910 (Hotez 2010).   
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differing quarantine and sanitary regulations that varied from country to country 
obstructed commercial expansion southward. In order to overcome this obstacle, the US 
pushed for the creation of a Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (initially named the 
International Sanitary Bureau) in order to standardize quarantine laws and regulations 
and to collect and disseminate epidemiological data. Established in 1902, the new 
organization – the first official international health organization of any kind - consisted 
of 7 members, three from the US and one each from Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica and 
Chile.8	  However, because there were no funds available to assist with international 
travel, and because the organization was housed in Washington DC, the organization 
did not meet with sufficient members to constitute a quorum until 25 years into its 
existence . Instead, the task of imposing sanitary standards across the Americas was 
assumed by the Chairman of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, who happened also to 
be the Surgeon General of the United States (Burke and Fenton 2003; Howard-Jones 
1980).   
Far more influential than the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) was 
another US-based organization: the newly created International Health Division of the 
Rockefeller Foundation.9 Founded with the oil riches of John D. Rockefeller to advance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Five years later, the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau’s European counterpart, the Office 
Internationale Hygiene d’Publique would be established in Paris, formalizing a fifty-year 
tradition of sanitary conferences. The Paris office’s mandate was more modest, however, than 
the American Bureau, limiting its role to the collection and dissemination of public health 
developments in general, and epidemiological intelligence on a limited number of infectious 
diseases deemed a threat to maritime trade, namely yellow fever, cholera and plague (Borowy 
2009, 27). 
9 The Rockefeller International Health Division was, at its founding in 1913 initially called the 
International Health Commission. It was renamed the International Health Board in 1916, and 
again the International Health Division in 1927. Here, I refer to it by its longest serving and, 
incidentally, final name – the International Health Division. 
 	  
45 
 
the “well-being of mankind throughout the word”, and the first organization of any kind 
to identify itself as involved in “international health”, the Rockefeller Foundation drew 
inspiration from the kinds of disease eradication campaigns that had proved 
instrumental to the economic advancement of the US South.10 The International Health 
Division implemented similar campaigns around the world, befriending governments 
and paving the way for trade expansion and increased productivity worldwide (Farley 
2004; Cueto 2007; A.-E. Birn 1996; A.-E. Birn and Solorzano 1999). Not bound by any 
particular colonial geography, but rather focused on capitalist expansion in general, the 
Rockefeller International Health Division saw all countries as potential recipients of 
their assistance. 
Many of the Rockefeller Foundation campaigns – targeting hookworm, yellow 
fever, malaria, yaws, tuberculosis, and rabies, for example – met with great success, 
including the development, in 1936, of the Nobel-prize winning D17 yellow fever 
vaccine (Birn 1996: 51). These successes were achieved by strictly adhering to a 
particular model of international health assistance. Animated simultaneously by 
unwavering trust in scientific medicine and by a US progressive faith in the benefits of 
self-improvement and self-help, the work of the Rockefeller foundation was explicitly 
guided by two fundamental principles. First, it did not dispense “charity” or “relief”, but 
rather saw its work as an “investment” in public health infrastructure (Farley 2004).11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Public health historian Marcos Cueto argues that the Rockefeller Foundation also drew 
inspiration from US military-led eradication campaigns conducted in Cuba and Panama – and 
that the success of these campaigns convinced the Foundation of the benefit of campaigns 
conducted in a “military style” (Cueto 2007).  
11 Although the Rockefeller Foundation say their work as a type of investment, this version of 
investment is noteably different from the World Bank’s notion of investment articulated in the 
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The Health Division partnered with local authorities in order to implement disease 
eradication campaigns and sanitary measures that would outlast the finite assistance 
provided by the foundation. Second, it held that disease was “the determining factor of 
ill health and [that] health could be attained only by the control or elimination of 
communicable diseases” (Farley 2004:5).  
According to public health historian Anne-Emmanuel Birn, the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s strategies included: 
[R]apid demonstrations of specific disease-control methods based on 
proven techniques, a missionary zeal in its own officers, facilitating 
national commitment to public health through considerable cofinancing 
obligations, and using fellowship to mold a cadre of public health 
leaders. It also carefully avoided disease campaigns that might be costly, 
overly complex, time consuming or distracting from its technically 
oriented public health model (2009: 52). 
  
These principles resulted in a highly biomedicalized approach to international health 
focused on technical, disease-specific interventions, an emphasis on national 
governments as the proper locus of public health responsibility, and the creation of a 
class of Western-trained public health experts as leaders of the field. While it relied on 
the hegemony of Western scientific knowledge, this approach also “domesticated” 
Western medicine by coupling its seemingly universal prescriptions with national public 
health bodies, often using local administrators who had been trained through 
Rockefeller-funded fellowships in Western schools of medicine. The Rockefeller 
strategy thus extended the reach of international health beyond particular colonial 
territories while establishing the primacy of the nation state in public health 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health. I discuss the later conceptualization in 
greater depth in Chapter Two.  
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interventions. The Foundation’s emphasis on self-help was also directed towards the 
state rather than towards individual citizens; while the International Health Division 
encouraged the self-sufficiency of national public health authorities, the health 
interventions they promoted were largely technical fixes that required only minimal 
acquiescence or participation by local peoples.12  
The approach to trans-border collective health concerns that the Rockefeller 
International Health Division espoused flourished in large part because of its status as a 
philanthropic organization – putatively independent of government and business 
interests and with only limited accountability for its actions to anyone beyond the 
Foundation’s board. This autonomy enabled the Foundation to continue some of its 
work despite the geopolitical upheavals of the First World War while other international 
health work was brought to a virtual standstill. Thus at the war’s end, the Rockefeller 
Foundation was poised as the preeminent international health body.13 But with the 
emerging emphasis on internationalism in the wake of the war, the Rockefeller 
Foundation would not remain peerless for long. The League of Nations Health 
Organization, and later, the World Health Organization would formalize the kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 However, with increased attention to non-communicable diseases within the era of neoliberal 
global health, a greater degree of “subjectification” of the global population can be found in the 
sense that ways of conducting oneself, especially involving the consumption of alcohol, 
tobacco, food and exercise are increasingly coming to be regulated as matters of health. See 
Chapter Five. 
13 Though the Rockefeller Health Division deserves recognition for its preeminence here, it is 
also worth recognizing the field of contenders was small: the only other extant international 
health organizations at this time were the Pan-American Health Bureau, the Office International 
Health d’Publique and the International Committee of the Red Cross (initially the International 
Committee for Relief to the Wounded), which was founded in Geneva in 1863. On each of 
these, respectively see (Bashford 2006; Fee and Brown 2002; Hutchison 1995).  
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internationalism that the work of the Rockefeller Foundation had helped create, marking 
the beginning of a formally international approach to world health. 
 
THE MIDDLE YEARS – COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH  
The Interwar Years and the League of Nations Health Organization 
World War I caused enormous destruction across Europe and created conditions 
in which many previously contained diseases flourished. Louse-borne typhus in Eastern 
Europe, cholera across Western Europe, and the worldwide influenza pandemic of 
1917-1918 brought with them greater mortality than had been caused by the war itself. 
Controlling the spread of disease beyond the already-established domain of maritime 
quarantine regulation was thus taken up in the context of the inter-war years’ emphasis 
on international cooperation.14 International health came to be institutionalized within 
the newly founded League of Nations, first as a temporary epidemic commission tasked 
with addressing the ravages of typhus and cholera in Eastern Europe, then as the 
permanent League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), established in September, 
1923 under the universally recognized leadership on Polish bacteriologist Ludwik W. 
Rajchman . 
During its roughly twenty year existence, the LNHO carried out a range of 
activities centering around standardization, epidemiological intelligence, disease-
specific interventions and, during the 1930s, an exploration of the principles of social 
medicine including the influence of economic crisis, nutrition, housing, and infant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Maritime quarantine regulations was the primary concern of the Office International Health 
d’Publique (Bashford 2006).   
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welfare on health. The fledgling organization enjoyed the generous support of the 
Rockefeller foundation – especially its programs devoted to information exchange and 
disease-specific health interventions. Among its major accomplishments was the 
creation of an epidemiological database with a greatly expanded geographical reach. 
Whereas the epidemiological purview of the earlier Office International Hygiene 
d’Publique was restricted to a limited set of diseases and a particular geography 
determined by perceived threats to maritime trade, the LNHO epidemiological database 
came eventually to cover virtually the whole world and included an expanded range of 
diseases as well (A.-E. Birn 2009; A.-E. Birn, Pillay, and Holtz 2009; Farley 2004). 
This data was published on a weekly basis, in the Weekly Epidemiological Report and 
served as the informational base upon which many international health policies and 
priorities were decided.15 
However, despite its extended geographic reach and the new emphasis on 
international cooperation, the work of the LNHO was carried out in a context 
characterized by tensions and contradictions created by enduring colonial structures. 
While the LNHO’s basic outlook was committed to worldwide participation and 
representation, its backbone – both organizationally and financially – was made up of 
colonial powers; Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany.16 Further, any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This database was inherited by the World Health Organization and continues today. It 
represents the first steps towards the constitution of a global population as the target of 
biopolitical global health interventions. See Chapter Two.  
16 Despite US President Woodrow Wilson’s support for the League of Nations, the US Congress 
rejected America’s proposed membership. The US never did join the League of Nations nor, 
officially its Health Division. Nevertheless, US participation in the LNHO was accomplished by 
the generous funding provided to the new international body by the Rockefeller Foundation, as 
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work carried out in large parts of Asia and virtually all of Africa entailed cooperating 
with, and thereby further legitimizing, colonial authorities.  As historian Iris Borowy 
has argued:  
At the time, the omnipresence of colonialism and casual everyday racism 
obscured the difference between efforts to increase the health of [native 
inhabitants of colonial territories] in order to strengthen their 
independent societies or to increase their health in order to strengthen 
their input into European colonial performance. Thus, there was an 
inherent, though often invisible, ambivalence between the pursuit of a 
global order based on a perceived responsibility for world health or one 
based on colonial consolidation. In practical terms the difference was 
often negligible since the immediate aim, improving people’s health, was 
the same regardless of the long-term goal. Thus, theoretically even the 
ardent colonialist could cooperate with the ardent anti-colonialist (2010, 
3). 
 
Borowy suggests that this contradiction was dealt with, essentially, by ignoring it. 
Focusing instead on the technical aspects of health, the LNHO “created a credible 
illusion that the differences of power structures in and beyond Western societies did not 
matter and that policies were simply a question of defining and implementing intelligent 
health policies” (Borowy 2010: 19). In separating out the technical aspects of health as 
their focus, to the exclusion of contentious issues of colonialism and geopolitics more 
generally, the LNHO instantiated a tension that would come to characterize much of the 
work of its successor organization – the World Health Organization.  
With escalating tensions in Europe in the lead-up to World War II and the 
discrediting of the League of Nations for its inability to maintain the world peace it had 
been founded to protect, the LNHO suffered from diminished credibility and dwindling 
financial resources. World War II eventually disrupted every function of the LNHO, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
well as through the technical contributions of many individual US-based experts (Borowy 2010; 
Staples 2006; Weindling 1997). 
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and other international health bodies too. With only a skeletal staff remaining in 
Geneva, the LNHO came perilously close to extinction.17 Only the publication of the 
Weekly Epidemiological Report survived the turmoil of the war - albeit not always 
weekly, with its coverage greatly reduced, and printed, now, on war-quality paper 
(Borowy 2009). However, the basic premise of the organization – that health is a matter 
of international significance and that its promotion requires international cooperation – 
would be taken up with renewed vigor amidst attempts to institutionalize international 
cooperation and secure the future of world peace anew in United Nations system. 
 
The World Health Organization and Malaria Eradication 
In the wake of the failure of the League of Nations, the post-war conception of 
international cooperation placed greater emphasis on universal participation and 
representation among nations. This new approach was institutionalized in the United 
Nations (UN) system in 1945 and included, in its charter, provisions for the 
establishment for an international health organization.  In February 1946, the Economic 
and Social Council of the UN drafted the constitution of the new health body – it was 
ratified by July, inaugurating the World Health Organization (WHO).18 In choosing 
World Health, as opposed to International Health as its designator, the new organization 
sought to convey its aspirations for global reach and universal relevance as well as 
health, not just the absence of disease, as its goal . Adopting an incredibly broad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 By June 1940, only Reymond Gautier, a Swiss public health expert, Yves Biraud, a French 
epidemiologist and a small clerical staff remained in Geneva (Borowy 2009). 
18 Both the LNHO and the Office Internationale Hygeine d’Publique were subsumed into the 
new organization. 
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mandate – “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” – the 
WHO proclaimed that health was a fundamental right of every human being.  
This ambitious vision for post-war international health was grounded in a 
professed commitment to principles of universality, political neutrality and scientific 
and technical excellence. The early WHO was comprised primarily of physicians who 
identified as medical scientists and who considered their work to be above the messy 
realm of politics. According to historian Amy Staples:  
When these internationally minded doctors came together within the 
World Health Organization, they combined the scientifically based 
authority of their profession with a commitment to apolitical 
internationalism in order to garner a global authority that facilitated the 
often unquestioning acceptance of their recommendations and ensured 
that countries clamored for the organization’s advice and assistance 
(2006:137).  
 
The WHO’s commitment to internationalism and universality were such that the 
governing body of the WHO – the World Health Assembly (WHA) – invited 
participation from even those delegations that hadn’t yet ratified the WHO Constitution 
and included the eleven countries that didn’t belong to the UN General Assembly as 
equal voting members. As former colonies gained their independence, they too were 
welcomed in the World Health Assembly, where each country was allocated a single 
vote, regardless of size or relative might. The sense of optimism that surrounded the 
creation of the WHO was so great that the Rockefeller Foundation, the most important 
international health actor before the WHO, gradually withdrew from the world health 
scene, disbanding its International Health Division, convinced that the “well-being of 
mankind throughout the world” would be sufficiently attended to by the new WHO. The 
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Rockefeller Foundation redirected its funding and attentions towards laboratory-based 
scientific medical research instead (Farley 2004). 
However, the unbridled optimism that accompanied the founding of the WHO 
belied emerging tensions on the global scene – tensions that would inevitably influence 
international health despite its apolitical aspirations. Three developments, in particular, 
profoundly shaped the course of post-war international health: the advent of the Cold 
War, rising US hegemony within the UN system as a whole and WHO in particular, and 
the emergence of a “development” paradigm directed towards modernizing former 
colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. These developments, together with 
technical improvements in drugs and insecticides made during World War II would 
coalesce by the mid-1950s in the World Health Organization’s Global Malaria 
Eradication Program (Packard 1998). 
World War II had fundamentally shifted the terrain of world power, resulting in 
the emergence of the US and the USSR as the two great superpowers. The advent of the 
Cold War pitted these superpowers against one another and drew each and every nation 
into the orbit of one of three camps: the Western world led by the US and its NATO 
allies, the Eastern bloc comprised of the USSR, its satellite states and allies, and the 
Third World, made up of primarily poor, underdeveloped former colonies whose 
independence had often only recently been won. In addition to on-going military and 
political tensions, the Cold War encompassed considerable propaganda wars in which 
scientific advancements and technological achievements became important ideological 
victories. International health provided one avenue for the pursuit of such victories, 
largely within the geographical regions of the Third World. As Marcos Cueto observes: 
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“International health programs, though an apparent symbol of neutrality and rationality, 
were actually framed by political ends, especially in the rhetorical and symbolic uses of 
code terms that validated an ideology of anticommunism”(2007:7). Other historians 
have shown how both sides of the East/West divide employed metaphors of nature and 
disease in propaganda campaigns. US government officials, for example, characterized 
communism as an infectious “virus”, whereas Soviet officers characterized capitalism 
as “in decay”, “cancerous” or “rotten” (Barnet 1977). International health programs, 
especially disease eradication campaigns could be launched simultaneously at the levels 
of microbes and metaphor. Such programs, according to Cueto, were also intended to 
create political loyalties and were carried out, in part, to further the political agenda of 
winning “hearts of minds” in the Third World.  The US-led Malaria eradication 
campaign would constitute one such battle for hearts and minds in which there was 
considerable metaphorical alignment between the spread of the “enslaving” conditions 
of malaria and the spread of the “enslaving” effects of communist ideology (Cueto 
2007, 160).  
Cold War tensions quickly became evident within the institutional structure of 
the WHO, too. The United States, having refused to join the League of Nations and 
therefore the LNHO in the interwar years, emerged as a great supporter of the UN 
system and the WHO after World War II. The US sought to end its isolationism for a 
number of reasons including a desire to increase its humanitarian image and heighten its 
global economic and political hegemony. However, a self-interested foreign policy 
agenda was never far from its humanitarian endeavors: As one U.S representative to the 
UN put it, “to carry out our own foreign policies under the aegis of the United Nations, 
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helps America directly, as we then get credit for practicing altruism instead of power 
politics” (Lodge 1957 quoted in Cueto 2007, 20).  
The insertion of US foreign policy objectives into WHO and UN operations did 
not escape the attention of the Soviet Union, which accused the WHO of acting as an 
instrument of US imperialism (Cueto 2007, 21). The Soviet Union and a number of 
allies thus withdrew from the WHO – and the UN system – in 1949. The Director 
General of the WHO, Canadian psychiatrist Brock Chisholm, remained committed to 
universalist ideals and actually refused to acknowledge their withdrawal – going so far 
as to try and hold vacant the Soviet and Byelorussian seats on the executive committee. 
Later, when the withdrawn countries returned in 1957, the WHO accessed only 5 
percent of their dues over the “inactive period” - a gesture intended to encourage their 
return while maintaining that they had never really “left” the organization at all (Staples 
2006, 20,150). However, despite these gestures towards universalism and political 
neutrality, in reality the democratic and inclusive structure of the WHA was no match 
for the economic hegemony of the United States, and the agenda of the WHO very 
quickly came to reflect the foreign policy priorities of the United States.19  
Finally, the post-war period saw the emergence of a “development” paradigm in 
which industrialization, state building and modernization were seen as the sole path to 
progress for countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.20 Cold War competition for 
allies led to the strategic deployment of military support, health assistance, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 While the WHA might democratically decide to undertake certain initiatives, for example, 
funding was often dependent on the alignment of such initiatives with priorities of wealthy 
donor countries such as the US.  
20 For recent critiques of this development paradigm see (Escobar 2011; Rist 2002).  
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development aid. Very quickly, the US began to envision health assistance in the 
developing world as a desirable prophylactic against the spread of communism. This 
sentiment is captured in the welcoming address given by James Stevens, the Dean of 
Harvard’s School of Public Health, during a series of lectures on “Industry and Tropical 
Health”. “Powerful Communist forces are at work”, he cautioned:  
[T]aking advantage of sick and impoverished people, exploiting their 
discontent… to undermine their political beliefs. Health is one of the 
safeguards against this propaganda. Health is not charity, it is not 
missionary work, it is not merely good business – it is sheer self-
preservation for the United States and for the way of life which we 
regard as decent. Through health we can expand industrial production, 
strengthen our military forces, and maintain the high morale of all our 
people. Through it we can prove, to ourselves and to the world, the 
wholesomeness and rightness of Democracy. Through health we can 
defeat the evil threat of communism (Stevens1950 quoted in Cueto 
2007). 
 
Steven’s remarks make clear the perceived connection between sickness, poverty and a 
vulnerability to the ideas of communism and the importance of health, both 
domestically and abroad as an antidote to its spread.  Similar sentiments were expressed 
by President Eisenhower in his 1952 State of the Union address. Focusing on the 
importance of providing health assistance abroad, especially providing US financial 
support for the WHO, Eisenhower declared that world health was “essential to the fight 
on reds.”21  
Within this context of Cold War tensions, US hegemony within the UN and 
WHO, and a new emphasis on Third-World development aid, malaria provided an ideal 
target for a high profile disease eradication campaign that would produce great impact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This was reported in a New York Times article, aptly titled “Promotion of World Health 
Essential in Fight on Reds.” Quoted in (Cueto 2007, 22). 
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in the battle for hearts and minds. Firstly, malaria was uniquely associated with a 
vulnerability to communist ideas: “Malaria…”, a Rockefeller officer reported, “helps to 
predispose a community to infection with political germs that can delay and destroy 
freedom” (in Cueto, 2007, 34). Secondly, technical advances made during World War II 
had resulted in new armaments with which to combat malaria, namely the insecticide 
dichloro-diphenyl-tricholroethane (DDT) and the synthetic anti-malaria drug, 
Chloroquine. These “magic bullets” made malaria eradication seems like a feasible goal 
through vertically integrated, technocratic, disease-specific campaigns that required 
only the minimal involvement of local populations and public health infrastructure. 
DDT was to be sprayed semi-annually on the internal walls of residential dwellings in 
order to kill the vector of the disease, the female Anopheles mosquito, when she landed 
to rest upon the walls after feasting on the blood of the home’s inhabitants. Chloroquine 
was to be administered to malaria sufferers in order to eradicate the human reservoirs of 
the malaria parasite Plasmodium. Achieving, and maintaining for three years no 
infected humans and no infected mosquitoes was the basic hope of the malaria 
eradication campaign (Cueto 2007, 15). 
That the imprint of the military–style disease eradication model of the 
Rockerfeller Foundation was evident in the WHO’s Global Malaria Eradication 
Campaign is no coincidence. When the WHO campaign was initiated in 1955, the 
Director General of the WHO was Marcolino Candau – a Brazilian national who had 
been elected to the post just two years before. Candau had trained at the Rio de 
Janeiro’s School of Medicine before attending the Johns Hopkins University. After 
returning to Brazil, Candau worked directly with the Rockefeller Foundation on a 
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military-style malaria eradication campaign in the northeast of the country before 
moving to Washington DC to serve as the assistant director of the Pan-American 
Sanitary Bureau. Candau, with his close ties to both the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
US public health community, had little difficultly mustering support for the WHO’s 
uptake of Global Malaria eradication with US officials. The United States eventually 
contributed over 85% of the funds required implement the program (Birn, 2009). 
Very quickly, however, the goal of Global Malaria Eradication came to be 
redefined. Amidst concerns that eradication might not be attainable in some regions 
where malaria was particularly rampant and public health systems entirely absent, the 
WHA passed a resolution granting that malaria eradication “might not be feasible on 
every continent” (See Cueto, 2007, 45fn129) In particular, almost all of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the world’s most malarious region, was quickly excluded from the whole project 
of malaria eradication – “Global Eradication” turned out to be not-so-global after all 
(Birn, 2009). Cueto (2007) has observed how this redefinition of “global eradication” 
resulted in a “containment” strategy that mirrored the US foreign policy on “containing” 
communism. US foreign policy accepted the fact that part of the world was under 
Soviet control and that communism could not be completely eliminated, but held that 
communism could be contained to those already-contaminated regions. Similarly with 
malaria – the ultimate goal of malaria eradication was actually to “contain” it within 
certain areas of the globe – notably, those areas that were not seen as critical in the Cold 
War battle for the hearts and minds of the Third World. “As a result” Cueto argues, 
“what might appear as a fantastic operation covering the whole globe was really 
understood by health experts and politicians as a limited, and defensive intervention” 
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that was fundamentally intertwined with the Cold War battle against communism (2007, 
45). 
The reorientation of global malaria eradication towards a policy of containment 
demonstrates the way in which international health, despites its gestures towards 
universalism and political neutrality, was ultimately concerned with the vitality of those 
bodies perceived to be vulnerable to the political germs of communism within the 
geographic space of third world nation-state. International health did not seek to 
constitute a universal population as the target of its interventions, nor did it attempt to 
constitute target populations across all regions of the world equally. Instead, 
international health interventions were carried out according to a specific geography 
aligned with the US foreign policy of the “containment” of communism during the Cold 
War.  
The project of malaria eradication came to encounter other obstacles too. Insect 
resistance to DDT presented a major challenge to the scheme’s grand ambitions. 
Concerns were raised also with the campaign’s indifference to basic health 
infrastructure, its highly specific, vertically integrated design, and with the 
environmental effects of widespread application of DDT. Amidst limited success 
despite an enormous investment of budgetary funds, the WHO abandoned the 
eradication campaign in the late 1960s (Birn 2009; Cueto 2007; Packard 1998). 
 
From Malaria defeat to Smallpox success 
The failure of the malaria campaign left the WHO searching for another 
intervention through which to prove its capabilities and sure up its credibility. With 
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fewer technical complexities than malaria – no animal host, direct person-to-person 
transmission, and an easily administrable vaccine – smallpox came to be seen as the 
ideal candidate for such a campaign. A smallpox eradication campaign had been 
suggested by the Soviet Union when it returned to the WHO in 1957. But with US 
attention devoted almost exclusively to malaria, smallpox received no budgetary 
support. With the conspicuous failings of the US-backed Malaria program, and with the 
escalating war in Vietnam tarnishing image of the US in the developing world, 
President Lyndon Johnson sought to display the US’s commitment to international 
cooperation and Third world development by supporting the smallpox eradication 
campaign. The Soviets supplied the vaccine, the US supplied considerable funds, and 
the WHO eradicated smallpox from the earth in the late 1970s. 
The smallpox campaign has been hailed as evidence of Cold War cooperation 
and as the quintessential world health success for over thirty years. However, historian 
Erez Manela has recently demonstrated the campaign’s undercurrent of Cold War 
tensions despite the apparent cooperation between superpowers (Manela 2010). In 
addition, the campaign was enormously costly to the endemic developing countries who 
footed two-thirds of the bill, often at the expense of more immediate health needs 
including water and sanitation. It has also been shown that vaccination practices were 
“dangerously coercive” in some regions, including military style raids and forced 
vaccinations in South Asia, for example (Manela 2010; Birn 2009). Nevertheless, the 
successful eradication of smallpox marked a highpoint for the WHO and the last 
naturally occurring case of smallpox came to pass in 1977 (eradication was formally 
certified in October 1980).  
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Despite the successes of smallpox eradication, the failures of the WHO global 
malaria eradication prompted reflection on the style in which the WHO carried out its 
mission. Many of the shortcomings of the malaria program were attributed to its 
“vertical” orientation as opposed to a more “horizontal” approach favored by WHO 
officials such as Kenneth Newell (Cueto 2004; Litsios 2002; Newell 1975). Newell and 
his supporters began campaigning for a more horizontal approach to primary health care 
addressing the source of disease and ill health in a preventative frame instead of 
administering curative, technically oriented, vertical disease interventions.  
Throughout the 1970s, the WHO also had to contend increasingly with the 
consequences of decolonization, especially after UN-wide calls for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (Chorev 2012). After the successful political 
mobilization of the Group of 77 (G-77) and the founding of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the NIEO further emphasized the 
obligations of developed countries and the rights of developing countries to promote 
economic development. Newell’s primary health care agenda was embraced by the 
developing countries, which now numerically dominated the World health Assembly, as 
it aligned with NIEO-oriented principles of sovereign equity and justice, duties of 
developed states, economic and social development, economic sovereignty, and 
universal international organizations (Chorev 2012, 42).   
During the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union also adopted primary health care as a 
priority as they felt it was area in which they could serve as a model (Litsos 2002). They 
began lobbying the WHO to host a conference devoted to primary health care on Soviet 
Soil as early as 1970 – but the WHO was reluctant to abide. Director General of the 
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WHO, Halfdan Mahler, felt that the Soviet model of primary health care was overly 
centralized and overly medicalized and that there was little to learn from the Soviet 
system that could then be applied in the developing world (Litsos 2002, 718). 
Nevertheless, the Soviets persisted and eventually secured the privilege of hosting an 
international conference on Primary Health Care in late 1978. The conference was 
planned to coincide with the WHO’s thirtieth anniversary, which would be celebrated 
by a gathering at Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1978.
 The conference at Alma Ata marked a triumphant moment in the WHO’s 
history. After the defeat of the Malaria Eradication Campaign, the successful 
eradication of smallpox gave the WHO due cause for celebration. At the Alma-Ata 
meeting the WHO reaffirmed its commitment to a broad definition of health, laid out in 
the organization’s constitution as “a state of complete physical, mental and social 
wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” and, famously, 
committed the organization to a achieving “health for all by the year 2000”. This goal 
was to be achieved by the implementation of primary health care, i.e. essential health 
care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and made 
universally accessible to individuals and families, at a cost they could afford (WHR 
1998, 141).  
 
After Alma-Ata – the beginning of the end of international health 
Although the conference at Alma Ata represented a high point in the history of 
the WHO, it also marked the beginning of a long, slow decline in the organization’s 
prominence. After Alma Ata, the goal of “health for all” came to be seen by influential 
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parties such as the United States Government, UNICEF and the Rockefeller Foundation 
as overly ambitious and unrealistic (Cueto 2004; Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; A.-E. 
Birn, Pillay, and Holtz 2009). Without disavowing the goal of health for all, they began 
to advocate a different means by which to accomplish that goal. As opposed to the 
Alma Ata vision of what was now termed “Comprehensive Primary Health Care” 
(CPHP), “Selective Primary Health Care” (SPHC) was articulated as a vision of 
specific, low cost technical interventions that were limited in scope and easy to monitor 
and evaluate (Walsh and Warren 1979; Balabanova et al. 2013). Specifically, SPHC 
advocated a four-pronged approach to reducing child mortality known by the acronym 
GOBI: Growth monitoring (to ensure early detecting of childhood malnutrition), Oral 
Rehydration Solutions (for diarrheal diseases), Breastfeeding (for improved infant 
survival and natural family planning) and Immunization against certain communicable 
diseases. While successful in improving child survival, the SPHC approach drew 
criticism from advocates of a broader-based approach of CPHC and reignited old 
verticalist vs. horizontalist tensions among the world health community. The GOBI 
initiatives also did nothing to address the health of adults, leaving ill-health after the age 
of 15 more or less unaddressed. 
Also in the early 1980s, the World Bank began to involve itself in international 
health – initially with population control and then with lending for health and nutrition 
as a means to advancing economic growth. But as the Bank began to make direct loans 
for health, it demanded more “efficient” use of resources and called into question the 
balance between public and private sectors in financing for international health. The 
 	  
64 
 
pressure for efficiency came also from the global financial downturns of the 1980s and 
an increasing scarcity of resources for world health. 
Throughout the 1980s the prestige of the WHO started to diminish. It has been 
argued that the WHO was either unwilling or unable to respond to “the new 
international political economy structured around neoliberal approaches to economics, 
trade and politics.” (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006, 68). As conflicts over Comprehensive 
vs Selective Primary Health care models raged, W. Henry Mosely – a professor of 
population dynamics at Johns Hopkins University and consultant to the World Bank – 
proposed a “categorical” approach to health problems, a middle way between the two 
opposed primary health care approaches. “To give practical example where there has 
been much global experience”, he argued:  
[W]e have learned that addressing that problem involves far more than 
setting up clinics and delivering medical technologies. It requires a 
multi-faceted approach ranging from influencing top level policymakers 
and community leaders, to re- training and reorienting the medical 
profession, to assisting the communities in organizing for the pro- vision 
of contraceptive supplies and facilities, to providing a wide range of 
social support to families and women to help them in making informed 
choices for their own health and welfare and for that of their children. 
Those of us who have been in the family planning movement hardly see 
this as a program where we expect "relatively immediate and visible 
results". At the same time, looking at the situation on a global scale over 
a two-decade timeframe, one can hardly deny that this categorical 
program effort, coupled with the effective technologies we have avail- 
able, has truly achieved remarkable results in dozens of countries around 
the world…I would consider the family planning movement as a 
categorical program that clearly stands somewhere between what is 
defined as comprehensive primary health care and selective primary 
health care (W H Mosley 1988, 907). 
 
The categorical approach suggested by Mosely proposed a middle way between the 
debates of comprehensive and selective primary health care.  
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 The categorical approach also positioned the World Bank – which had carried 
out the vast majority of population control projects over the preceding decades – as the 
institutional actor with the most relevant experience for future categorical health 
interventions. Furthermore, it expanded the appropriate positioning of health projects 
vis-à-vis state governments beyond the ministry of health. As Mosely continued in his 
article: 
 [A categorical approach] takes a middle ground by defining a series of 
tasks or strategies that are focused and manageable. While individual 
government institutions such as health ministries necessarily operate in 
only one sector, taking a problem solving approach does not necessarily 
imply that the strategy will be a top-down effort though this may be 
appropriate in some circumstances where the intervention can be 
imposed as with smallpox eradication. The tasks may just as well include 
the establishment of community organizations to assure autonomous 
management of specific activities and inevitably must include 
information, education and communication programs where personal 
behavioral change is essential for effective implementation, as with 
immunization activities. The point is that a categorical program is 
problem-oriented that sets out some specific goals and tasks with 
measureable end- points and permits one to relate inputs to outputs and 
impact. 
 
Mosely’s efforts to develop a categorical approach to prioritization spurred a number of 
research at the World Bank, including the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study, the 
Disease Control Priority (DCP Project) and the World Development Report 1993: 
Investing in Health. I detail the significance of each of these in the following chapter.  
The debates that riddled WHO during the late 1970s and 1980s were not only 
ideological. Disputes over budget contributions, especially in the wake of the essential 
medicines list eventually led the Health Assembly to freeze member state contributions 
to the budget all together (Greene 2011; Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; Chorev 2012). 
This budget freeze remains in effect today – although extra-budgetary contributions 
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made by wealthy “donor” countries and organizations like the World Bank have greatly 
increased. Critically, however, the democratically structured Health Assembly has 
retained authority only over the regular budget, while “donors” countries, like the US 
unilaterally decide how their contributions are dispersed. The increased use of 
extrabudgetary funding has thus created a way for wealthy donors to bypass the 
democratic process of the Assembly, which is numerically dominated by low and 
middle-income countries.  
 
CONTEMPORARY NEOLIBERAL GLOBAL HEALTH  
The closing decades of the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st century 
witnessed the meteoric rise of “global health”. In contrast to the earlier designations 
“international public health” and “tropical medicine”, global health has emerged over 
the last few decades as the preferred authoritative term for attempts to address matters 
of health and disease on a transnational scale (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006; Fried et al. 
2010; Bashford 2006; Kleinman 2010; Anderson 2014; Banta 2001; Lakoff 2010; 
McGoey, Reiss, and Wahlberg 2011; Koplan et al. 2009). Taken up by organizations 
ranging from universities and research institutions to philanthropic foundations and 
government departments, global health encompasses diverse, sometimes competing, 
objectives including health promotion, economic growth and poverty alleviation, 
increased domestic security and strategic foreign policy (Dwyer 2005; Institute of 
Medicine 1997; Janes & Corbett 2009; McCoy, Chand, & Sridhar 2009). The diversity 
of global health makes delineating its emergence and subsequent rise a difficult task. 
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Nevertheless, one quantitative measure is indicative: references to “global health” in the 
PubMed database.22 
Hosted by the United States’ National Library of Medicine at the National Institute of 
Health, the PubMed database includes over 23 million citations from the US and 
international biomedical, life science and public health literature. Searching for variants 
of “global health” reveals the following trend: after emerging in the late 1980s, 
references to global health grew steadily throughout the 1990s before taking off in the 
2000s (see Graph 1). 
Graph 1.1: References to “global health” in the PubMed database 
 
 
 “Global health” has now accumulated the same number of citations during the first four 
years of this decade as it did during the previous decade and more than five times the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This exercise updates and extends a similar one carried out by (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006). 
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number of citations during the first fourteen years of this century than during the entire 
second half of the last (see table 1.2).23 
Table 1.2: Reference to “global health” by decade  
Produced with data drawn from PubMed 
Year range References to  
“Global Health” 
1940-1949 14 
1950 – 1959 67 
1960 – 1969 190 
1970-1979 1,248 
1980-1989 7,250 
1990-1999 27,170 
2000 - 2009 90,684 
2010 – May 2014 89,487 
 
Another illustrative representation of this shifting terminology comes from the 
Google Ngram application, which tracks the relative incidence of terms among the 
approximately 20 million English language works that comprise the Google library 
corpus (see Figure 1.1).  We can see that from the turn of the 20th century, the term 
“tropical medicine” increased in popularity, followed, especially during the 1940s, by 
the term “international health”. The third term, “global health” was virtually unused 
throughout most of the twentieth century, but exploded onto the scene with exponential 
growth beginning in the early 1990s. “Global health” has now surpassed the popularity  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Of course, the total number of publications included the PubMed database has also increased 
each year. The rate of increase, though, has been much slower.  
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Figure 1.1: Tropical medicine, international health, global health. See 
(www.books.google.ngrams). 
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of both “international health” and “tropical medicine”, even when the two earlier 
designations are combined. 
While the shifting terminology is interesting in itself, the accompanying 
historical and organizational changes have rightly received more scholarly attention. 
The declining role of the WHO dating from the budget freezes of the 1980s and the 
relative ascendance of the World Bank and its associated structural adjustment policies 
in world health affairs are often flagged as heralding the transition from international to 
global health. Early in the decade, the extra-budgetary funding for the WHO actually 
surpassed the organization’s regular budget  - skewing the balance of power over global 
health priorities towards wealthy donors. Against this backdrop, the World Bank 
“moved confidently into the vacuum created by an increasingly ineffective WHO” 
(Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006, 86). Although the Bank’s initial interest in health 
extended only to population control, by the early 1980s the newly founded Population, 
Health and Nutrition Department began lending for stand-alone alone health programs 
on the rationale that enhanced health and nutrition would lead to increased economic 
growth (World Bank 1980). However, with World Bank money came their associated 
structural adjustment policies, which, in the domain of health focused on more efficient 
use of available resources and an increased role for the private sector in financing health 
services – all in service of promoting health for economic growth. While this approach 
drew much criticism, it did not stem the influence of the Bank and by 1990 World Bank 
lending for health surpassed the entire WHO budget (Brown, Cueto and Fee 2006).  
From the late 1980s to the late 1990s, Bank lending for health, nutrition and 
population projects grew sevenfold – with a growing proportion of these loans made 
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with the explicit intention of reforming the structure of health systems. During the late 
1970s, fewer than 10% of World Bank Population, Health and Nutrition loans included 
“systemic” objectives. By the late 1990s, this number had risen to well over 50% (Fair 
2008, 10). Finally, a new player entered the world health scene radically altering its 
dynamics: the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Gates Foundation began its 
global health operations in 1994 bringing with it an initial endowment of $30 billion 
dollars.24 Since then, the Gates Foundation has dispersed grants worth over $15 billion 
dollars for global health. With these three developments, institutional transformation to 
global health was complete.  
The transition from international to global health is usually attributed to 
processes of neoliberal globalization, especially to the rise of a set of neoliberal 
economic policies known collectively as the Washington consensus (Brown, Cueto, and 
Fee 2006; Koplan et al. 2009; Thomas and Weber 2004; Chorev 2012). The 1993 
publication of the World Bank’s World Development Report Investing in Health is 
frequently identified as a key moment in this historical shift (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 
2006; Chorev 2012; World Bank 1993). The legacy of Investing In Health has been 
hotly disputed: it is both praised for having initiated an “unprecedented era of growth 
and innovation in development assistance for health”, and reviled for having prompted a 
program of neoliberal reform of health systems, often to the detriment of the health of 
the poor in developing countries (Blanchet et al. 2013,1; Jamison et al. 2013). However, 
both of these evaluative stances, though contradictory, focus on the impact of the report 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Crucially, Bill and Melinda Gates made the decision to devote their philanthropic billions to 
the cause of global health upon reading the World Development Report 1993: Investing in 
Health, which is the subject of the next chapter (Norheim 2014).  
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on the structure of the field of world health, i.e. on the dominant institutional actors, the 
structures of global health delivery, and the financing of health care services. Frequently 
left out in these accounts is attention to the epistemological importance of Investing in 
Health, that is, to how it has shaped the mode of rationality that underpins the health of 
the global population as a scientific and political problem. As I argue in the next 
chapter, this new mode of rationality can be seen in a lesser-known but equally 
important dimension of the Investing in Health report: its introduction of the Disability 
Adjusted Life Year (DALY) metric. 	  
Even though it is frequently cited as a landmark global health intervention, at 
first glance, the FCTC treaty doesn’t seem to fit comfortably with the characterization 
of the contemporary global health landscape given above. It was negotiated under the 
auspices of the now-decentered WHO and operates through the national governments of 
its member-state parties – making it very much an international intervention. It also 
deals with non-communicable or lifestyle diseases (at least those caused by tobacco 
use), all in a public health frame in which questions of privatization or structural 
adjustment are largely peripheral. In light of my general characterization of the field of 
global health, the FCTC presents a puzzle: Why tobacco? And why now? The chapters 
to come will seek to make sense of this puzzle. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have presented a history of attempts to deal with collective 
health concerns through the eras of colonial tropical medicine and Cold War 
international health as critical antecedents to the contemporary era of global health. 
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Throughout, I have remained attuned to the key elements of Foucault’s concepts of 
biopower by attending to the historically specific and geographically embedded forms 
of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that were seen as 
legitimate in each of these eras of world health. Put differently, I have focused on how 
in each of these eras the science and practice of world health have been coproduced. 
During the first era, colonial tropical medicine drew on the new fields of 
parisitology, germ theory and epidemiology and coupled them with extant colonial 
structures of authority in order to attend to the vital needs of white bodies in tropical 
lands. The founding of the London School of Tropical Medicine captures the essence of 
this era. Not long after the establishment of the London School, the creation of the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division began to shift the emphasis of 
world health away from tropical medicine towards a more internationalist approach – 
one that would gain increasing momentum after each of the World War, reaching its 
peak in the geopolitical climate of the Cold War. Cold War international health quickly 
became aligned with US foreign policy objectives and focused on the vitality of those 
bodies perceived to be vulnerable to the spread of communism within the geographic 
space of the Third World. The tensions within the World Health Organization’s Malaria 
Eradication Program are emblematic of this era. In the chapter that follows I advance 
the argument that one of the key features of the contemporary global health era is its 
particular economization of life that can be observed in its quantification of health and 
disease, valuing of life and governing of health according to a logic of cost-effective 
interventions. The rise of neoliberalism as the global health era’s guiding philosophy, 
the constitution of a “global population” comprised of economically productive bodies 
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as the target of global health interventions, and the modes of subjectification produced 
by this new approach to governing global health are the subject of the following 
chapters. 
 
	  75 	  	  
CHAPTER 2: 
QUANTIFYING DISEASE, ECONOMIZING LIFE: NEOLIBERAL 
RATIONALITY AND THE DISABILITY ADJUSTED LIFE YEAR 
METRIC 
My own expectation is that this series will, over a decade or two, initiate a 
transformation of health policy analysis analogous to that initiated for economic policy 
by the introduction of NIPAs in the late 1930s.25 
- Dean Jamison, lead author of the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health  
in his foreword to the Global Burden of Disease and Injury Series  
 
In the previous chapter, I sketched the history of attempts to deal with the 
problem of health on a transnational scale through three eras: colonial tropical 
medicine, cold war international health and contemporary neoliberal global health. I 
illustrated how, during each of these eras, developments in the practice of world health 
were intimately tied to the science of health and hygiene, to geopolitical transformations 
at both the national and transnational level, and ideological contests on the world stage. 
The period of cold war international health, for example, saw the promotion of a 
seemingly universal campaign against malaria that was cast as a technical intervention 
against a parasitic scourge. But, as I demonstrated, beneath this public face lay the 
subterranean machinations of East-West geopolitical tensions, capitalist-communist 
ideological contests and socio-technical recalcitrance in the form of insecticide 
resistance. Even in this broad overview, the fundamental interconnectedness of science 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 NIPA is the common acronym for National Income and Product Accounts, the double-entry 
system of accounting for national level income and expenditures in which Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) features prominently (Hirschman, forthcoming). 
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and politics of world health is apparent. In this chapter, I return to examine in greater 
depth the coproduction of science and politics in the contemporary global health era 
using the case with which this dissertation is centrally concerned: the World Health 
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).  
The adoption and ratification of the FCTC treaty has received much publicity. 
The treaty was unanimously endorsed in the World Health Assembly in May 2003 and 
entered into force in February 2005, ninety days after the fortieth member-state 
ratification. Since then, a further 140 member states have become parties to the 
convention making it one of the most widely - and rapidly - adopted treaties in the 
history of the United Nations. The success of the treaty is almost universally attributed 
to its “overwhelming evidence base”; in forums from treaty negotiations and public 
speeches to official reports and press releases, the noun “treaty” is almost always 
modified by the adjective “evidence based”. Much like the term “scientific”, “evidence 
based” here functions to confer legitimacy on the treaty by appearing to remove it from 
the sordid world of politics and to bestow upon it the mantle of scientific objectivity. 
The picture that then emerges is that the science behind global tobacco control is 
unequivocal and that the strength of the scientific evidence has been sufficient to 
triumph over any political resistance to the treaty’s passage. As Brundtland put it: 
“Tobacco control can be achieved when scientists communicate with policymakers, 
when policymakers act on science, and when the media and NGOs are effective. It 
doesn’t matter if a country is a major tobacco producer or a consumer, from the North 
or the South, or from the developing or developed world” (J. de Beyer and Brigden 
2003). 
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In contrast, much work in the field of Science and Technology Studies has 
demonstrated how science and policy – or more generally, knowledge and power – are 
coproduced (see Introduction). In this chapter I begin my analysis of the coproduction 
of global tobacco science and policy by focusing on the creation of the evidence base of 
global health, in general, and of global tobacco control, in particular. In the chapters that 
follow, I focus on how this evidence base was mobilized in support of the FCTC. I also 
advance my argument that attempts to govern the health of the global population in the 
contemporary era of global health are underpinned by a particular economization of life.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, the publication of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report in 1993: Investing in Health is frequently identified as a key 
moment in the transition to the contemporary global health era (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 
2006; Chorev 2012; World Bank 1993). And the report has had considerable impact of 
the structure of the field of global health, i.e. the dominant institutional actors, the 
structures of global health delivery, and the financing of health care services. However, 
less attention has been paid to the epistemological importance of Investing in Health, 
that is, to how it has contributed the mode of rationality that underpins the health of the 
global population as a scientific and political problem. Here I argue that the mode of 
rationality that the Investing In Health report codified can be seen in its introduction of 
the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) metric.  
The DALY metric is a summary measure of population health developed to 
calculate the incidence of health and disease at the global aggregate level: the so-called 
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“global burden of disease” (Murray and Lopez 1996a).26 It is a decremental measure 
equivalent to the loss of one year of life lived in perfect health.  The DALY metric was 
designed to fulfill two primary purposes. First, it was intended to account for the “full 
loss of healthy life” due not only to death, but to disease and disability as well, by 
measuring both mortality and morbidity in the same unit of analysis. Second, it was 
intended to facilitate the use of cost-benefit analysis in prioritizing potential health 
interventions in the units of dollars spent per DALYs gained. In this way, the DALY 
metric would facilitate the optimization of global health by aiding national governments 
direct scarce health resources towards “essential health services” in the most 
economically rational way (Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993). But far more than just 
facilitating cost-benefit calculation and economic rationalization, I argue that the DALY 
metric accomplishes an economization of life by imagining health as a form of human 
capital and, as the very title of the World Bank report suggests, as a site of investment.27  
Investing in health then becomes an economic project that is oriented towards 
the speculative future, known through a range of forecasting techniques and concerned 
with optimizing rates of return on investment in life itself, especially through practices 
of self-investment. Crucially, the logic of investing in health prioritizes those public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It is worth emphasizing that the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study for which the DALY 
metric was developed explicitly sought to ascertain the health of the global, rather than national 
or subnational, population – an undertaking that was unprecedented at that time. Thus the GBD 
study and DALY metric are key moments in the constitution of a biopolitics that is truly global 
in its reach. See (Christopher J.L. Murray and Lopez 2013) for a history of the GBD study. 
27 By claiming that the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life, I do not mean to 
suggest that before the DALY metric, life was not also economized in various ways. The social 
insurance mechanisms of the welfare state are but one example. Nevertheless, the form of 
economization under neoliberalism is distinct: it replaces state investment via social insurance 
with individual self-investment.  
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health strategies, like tobacco control, that attempt to intervene upon the health 
behaviors of individuals in order to make them more health-maximizing, i.e. its primary 
governmental strategy is self-governance. I argue that in addition to the semantic shifts 
and neoliberal structural reforms, this new way of knowing and governing the health of 
the global population is key in understanding the transition from international to global 
health at the end of the 20th century. Put differently, the introduction of the DALY 
metric by the Investing in Health report represents both one instantiation of a neoliberal 
mode of rationality and the creation of a novel biopolitical technology of power that has 
reshaped the governance of global health over the last 25 years. Crucially for the case of 
the FCTC, the DALY metric also brought the “tobacco epidemic” into sharp relief. As a 
result, DALY calculations provided much of the “evidence base” for the evidence-based 
FCTC treaty. The development of the DALY metric bolstered global tobacco control 
efforts – as I describe in the following chapters - and contributed indirectly but 
significantly to the eventual passage of the FCTC treaty. 
 
Quantifying the Tobacco Problem: Epidemiology and Economics  
As I argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, the linear picture of a 
progression from unequivocal science to incontrovertible policy has been destabilized 
by much work within the field of Science and Technology Studies. Drawing on a range 
of empirically grounded studies, scholars working in the “idiom of coproduction” have 
argued that despite the public presentation of “objective” science, the ways in which we 
come to know the world are fundamentally inseparable from how we chose to live in it 
(Latour 1993; Jasanoff 2004; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005). Knowledge and power, 
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science and policy or the natural and social orders are mutually implicated at every 
level.  
Nevertheless, when presented in public, the political dimensions of scientific 
evidence are frequently erased. And nowhere does the public presentation of science 
seem more objective - and therefore more detached from any social or political 
dimensions - than when the science in question is presented in the form of numbers. 
Numerical representations embody what Daston and Galison call the “view from 
nowhere” - the archetypal form of mechanical objectivity (Lorraine Daston and Galison 
1992; Porter 1996).28 Yet even numbers contain an important social dimension. 
Sociologist Wendy Espeland and colleague Mitchell Stevens, building on earlier 
work by STS scholars such as Theodore Porter, have drawn attention to the social and 
political dimension involved in processes of quantification and commensuration 
(Espeland and Stevens 2008; Espeland and Stevens 1998. See also Porter 1996). The 
proliferation of numbers, they argue, often serves to sustain the dual pretense that facts 
and values can be separated from one another and that politics can be rendered purely 
technical through processes of quantification. In contrast to this pretense, they argue, 
quantification and commensuration radically transform the world by creating new 
categories, new relations of authority and new interpretive frameworks and by backing 
them with the weight of powerful institutions (2008, 323). Taken together, co-
production and the sociology of quantification draw our attention to the simultaneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In his history of the emergence of standardized forms of measurement and their role in 
securing different types of public accountability, Theodore Porter differentiates  between 
‘mechanical objectivity’ – secured through impersonal rules and quantitative calculations – 
from ‘disciplinary objectivity’ arrived at through professional consensus and ‘absolute 
objectivity’ i.e scientific realism. See (Porter 1996, 3-4).  
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contribution of social and political dimensions to the production of scientific knowledge 
as well as the erasure of these same elements from the public face of regulatory science.  
The production of numbers by global knowledge-based institutions presents a 
particularly fruitful site, then, for studying the often invisible social and political 
dimensions with which they are co-produced. 
In the case of the FCTC treaty, even though the treaty is frequently justified by 
the rhetorical power of its “evidence based”, what, precisely, this “evidence base” 
consists of is chronically underspecified. During my fieldwork for this project, certain 
pieces of evidence were repeatedly invoked in support of the treaty and the cause of 
global tobacco control more generally. At international tobacco control conferences, in 
negotiation sessions of the FCTC treaty Conference of the Parties, and in presentations 
at various tobacco control events, I observed a range of arguments demonstrating both 
the severity of the threat presented by the global tobacco epidemic and the necessity of 
interventions to curb its further spread. Although there were variations in the exact 
evidence presented, they clustered around two types of threats: epidemiological and 
economic.  
  Both of these types of arguments are powerful, in part, due to their sheer scale. ⁠29 
Tobacco is now said to be the leading preventable cause of death and disease 
worldwide, with dramatic increases in tobacco-related mortality anticipated for the near 
future. By the late 1990s, the World Bank proclaimed: 
Smoking already kills one in 10 adults worldwide. By 2030, perhaps a 
little sooner, the proportion will be one in six, or 10 million deaths per 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interestingly, though, I found that during my fieldwork I gradually became numb to the 
desired affect of these numbers, due largely to their repetition ad nauseam  
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year—more than any other single cause. Whereas until recently this 
epidemic of chronic disease and premature death mainly affected the rich 
countries, it is now rapidly shifting to the developing world. By 2020, 
seven of every 10 people killed by smoking will be in low- and middle-
income nations (World Bank 1999, 1). 
 
These World Bank numbers were still routinely referenced in the late 2000s, often as 
almost obligatory opening remarks to conference talks, public lectures, and in 
arguments during treaty negotiations. That “tobacco is leading preventable cause of 
death and disease worldwide”, that “tobacco kills one in 10 adults” and that this disease 
burden “falls disproportionately on low and middle income countries” were frequently 
remarked (Field notes 3/9/2009; 6/11/2009; 1/21/2010; 11/3/2010; 11/10/2010). The 
future scale of tobacco mortality was also used as a call to action; “100 million people 
were killed by tobacco during the 20th century”, one common refrain went. But without 
adequate tobacco control interventions, “an additional one billion tobacco-induced 
deaths are expected during the 21st century (Proctor 2011).  
In addition to the burden of death and disease caused by tobacco, the economic 
burden of tobacco was also invoked. Tobacco was frequently cited as a “net loss” to 
both national economies (plural) and the global economy (singular). A 1999 WHO 
report entitled “Confronting the Epidemic” argued that tobacco use contributes to net 
economic losses – with health care costs for tobacco related illnesses costing between .7 
to 2% of GDP (WHO/NCD/TFI/99/12). More recently, a World Economic Forum 
report into the economic impact of non-communicable diseases suggested that diseases 
caused by tobacco, alcohol and poor diet will contribute losses to the world economy of 
US $30 billion over the next 20 years (From Burden to ‘Best Buys’ 2011). These 
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figures were routinely mobilized to justify governmental intervention in the tobacco 
epidemic.  
Finally, epidemiological and economic figures were intermingled, for example 
to make the argument that global tobacco control was underfunded as a global health 
priority. Compared to the global burden of disease caused by tobacco, the amount of 
funding devoted to countering tobacco use was claimed to be dismal. (See Figure 2.1). 
While these numbers are overwhelming in their scale, the fact that these types of 
numbers - death tolls and economic costs - are presented alongside one another is no 
accident. Instead, as I show in this chapter, the particular intermingling of disease 
projections, economic predictions and governmental strategies that we see in attempts to 
combat the global tobacco epidemic is the result of a particular way of quantifying the 
global burden of disease, valuing life according to an economic logic, and governing 
health through cost-effective interventions that has emerged over the last three decades. 
The intermingling of epidemiology and economics or, more broadly speaking, or the 
vital properties of populations and their effect on population productivity, is not specific 
to tobacco control. Instead, this intermingling has been theorized in more general terms 
by Michel Foucault under the rubric of “biopolitics” and “biopwer” (see previous 
discussion in the Introduction and Chapter 1).  
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Figure 2.1: Global health funding vs global burden of disease 
This version from 
http://www.researchamerica.org/uploads/Frieden.Hillbriefing.presentation.11.18.08.ppt. 
 
BIOPOLITICS, GOVERNMENTALITY, NEOLIBERALISM 
In his lectures at the College de France in 1978-1979, French philosopher 
Michel Foucault proposed to develop a genealogy of his analytic category “biopolitics” 
(Foucault 2010). Quickly, though, his analysis turned to liberalism and neoliberalism 
using “governmentality” as a guiding concept (Foucault 2010; Lemke 2001). While this 
shift is often interpreted as a change in focus, Stephen J. Collier has argued that 
Foucault’s analyses of biopolitics and liberalism are fundamentally interconnected: 
Foucault found in liberalism the initial articulation of a “new kind of governmental 
reason that understood individuals and collectivities not as legal subjects (of 
sovereignty) or docile bodies (of disciplinary power) but as living beings” (2011, 16).30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Importantly, the bio- of biopolitics refers not only to the biological characteristics of 
populations, but to their economic and social properties as well – to the figuration of man (sic) 
at the ‘finitudes of life, labor and language’. See (Collier 2011, 17; Foucault 2010, 79). 
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Biopolitics, Collier concludes, is neither a form of governmental reason nor a logic of 
power, but a novel “problem-space” upon which the political reason of liberalism came 
to bear: a problem-space concerned with the vital characteristics of populations (Collier 
2009; Collier 2011).  
Central to Foucault’s analysis of liberalism is the concept of “governmentality”. 
At its core, governmentality encompasses two interrelated ideas. The first is that 
techniques of power and forms of knowledge are mutually constituted and co-determine 
each other’s existence. This mutual entanglement is captured in Foucault’s use of the 
term “power-knowledge” but also in his idea of a “political rationality”. As Thomas 
Lemke puts it, “a political rationality is not pure, neutral knowledge which simply “re-
presents” the governing reality; instead, it itself constitutes the intellectual processing of 
the reality which political technologies can then tackle” (2001, 191). The implication 
here is that it is not possible to study any particular technology of power or form of 
knowledge without also analyzing the associated mode of reasoning or governmental 
technique. They are co-produced, co-determined, intermingled, interdependent etc.31 
The second key idea behind governmentality is that in modern societies “government” 
does not occur exclusively through the state – although this how the term is frequently 
used in common speech – but through processes of self-government as well. Thus 
Foucault defines “government” as the “conduct of conduct”, which incorporates 
everything from the government of others all the way through to the government of the 
self (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 2; Foucault 2003,191).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This aspect of Foucault’s argument I see as congruent with more recent work in the idiom 
coproduction (Jasanoff 2005; Jasanoff 2004; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2005; Latour 1993). 
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While his 1978 lectures traced the genealogy of governmentality back to the 
Ancient Greeks, in 1979 he turned his attentions to neoliberal governmentality 
(Foucault 2010). The neoliberal form, he argued, includes a distinctly American version 
articulated through the work of a range of Chicago School thinkers but most centrally 
by economists Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker (Schultz 1961; Becker 1962). 
According to Foucault, Chicago-style neoliberalism is characterized by the consistent 
expansion and application of economic thinking to all spheres of social activity. He 
argues, “American neo-liberalism seeks…to extend the rationality of the market, the 
schemas of analysis it offers and the decision-making criteria it suggests, to domains 
which are not exclusively or not primarily economic: the family and the birth rate, for 
example, or delinquency and penal policy” (Foucault 2010, 323). Instead of seeing the 
economy as one domain among many, American neoliberalism depends on the 
application of an economic lens across the entirety of human existence – including the 
biopolitical domain of the living characteristics of populations. Within a neoliberal 
political rationality, the primary mode of decipherment of the world, that is, the way 
that reality, social activity and human action are all rendered both intelligible and 
governable, is economic.32 
This expansion of the economic form holds consequences not just for the objects 
of neoliberal governmentality but for its subjects as well – for the particular figure of 
the human that it envisions. Just as all domains of social activity and human life come 
to be deciphered through an economic lens so too does the individual come to be seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 A similar argument has more recently been made by a range of scholars carrying out 
interdisciplinary empirical work on quantification and economization. See (Çalışkan and Callon 
2009; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Mitchell 2006; Murphy 2013; Espeland and Stevens 2008) 
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primarily as an economic agent (Foucault 2010). However, under the neoliberal thought 
of the Chicago School, human action isn’t seen as driven by the immediate gains of 
economic exchange, which had been the case with the homo oeconomicus of classical 
economics. Instead, the neoliberal vision of rational action incorporates a re-jigged 
temporality such that future benefits are brought into the present weighting of costs and 
benefits through a logic of self-investment. The site of self-investment is one’s own 
human capital, defined by Gary Becker as consisting of the embodied attributes of 
individuals that make them economically productive (Becker 1962, 9). Instead of the 
worker of classical economics who sells their abstracted labor for a wage, the agent of 
human capital invests in their own embodied knowledge, capabilities and importantly 
for my argument, their health, to secure a future return-on-investment in the form of an 
income stream. Social activity is still viewed in economic terms, human behavior still 
predicated on cost-benefit calculating rational actors, but under the logic of 
neoliberalism, homo oeconomicus becomes a future-oriented self-investing entrepreneur 
of the self, concerned with optimizing the return on investment in his or her own 
embodied human capital.  
Governing the conduct of this neoliberal homo oeconomicus then, consists in 
altering costs and benefits in such a way as to “make rational” the desired form of 
future-oriented self-optimizing conduct (Lemke 2001, 200).33 Of course, governmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 David Reubi has used the case of the FCTC and tobacco taxation to raise questions about the 
scholarly reliance on theories of neoliberalism in analyses of contemporary global health (Reubi 
2013). Reubi seems to see taxation and neoliberal rationalities as mutually exclusive whereas I 
understand taxation to be neoliberal strategy when conceptualized, as in the case of tobacco 
taxation, as correcting for market failure and as altering the cost and benefits in such a way as to 
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rationalities have always incorporated certain prescriptions for the behavior of 
populations. What is distinct about neoliberal governmentality is the alignment it 
achieves between its prescriptions for individual conduct and its prescriptions for 
minimal state provision. Neoliberalism as a political rationality, then, configures the self 
as an entrepreneur and the state as a firm and prescribes the conduct for both according 
to a logic of optimizing future rates of return on investment, especially through 
practices of self-investment. In the biopolitical domain, this equates with an emphasis on 
those (cost-effective) health interventions directed towards encouraging individuals to 
enact health-maximizing behaviors. 
In the sections that follow, I analyze the DALY metric as one instantiation of 
this neoliberal political rationality. I show how the DALY metric is itself a technology 
of power that inscribes a neoliberal political rationality into the evidence base of the 
contemporary global health regime. First, I explain the particular historical context out 
of which the DALY metric emerged and the problems to which it was proposed as a 
solution. I then turn to the metric’s technical dimensions to illustrate how DALY 
calculations not only quantify the global burden of disease, but also accomplish an 
economization of life. I then discuss in greater detail the political rationality that 
underpins DALY calculations, focusing on its reconfiguration of life as life/time and the 
particular figure of the human as homo oeconomicus that it presupposes. I conclude by 
illustrating how the DALY logic brought tobacco control onto the global health agenda. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
make rational the desired form of self-optimizing behavior. I discus this point further in Chapter 
5.  
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THE WORLD BANK AND WORLD HEALTH  
As I discussed in the previous chapter, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the field 
of international health was beset by a number of tensions: debate over comprehensive 
vs. selective primary health care, vertical vs. horizontal approaches to health 
interventions, and budgetary crisis as well as crises of legitimacy at the World Health 
Organization. Against this backdrop, the World Bank, whose involvement in world 
health initially extended only to population control, began making stand-alone loans for 
health programs on the rationale that enhanced health and nutrition would lead to 
increased economic growth (World Bank 1980; World Bank 1991; World Bank 1993).  
However, the World Bank was also concerned to define a set of “essential health 
services” – designed to address the major causes of disease in the most cost effective 
way as part of its “categorical” détente between comprehensive and selective primary 
health care approaches to world health. But in trying to determine which diseases to 
target and which health services to finance, the Bank encountered a high degree of 
uncertainty due to concerns about an impending “epidemiological transition”. In the 
decades after World War II, the attention of development demographers was focused 
largely on ideas about demographic transition, especially at the nexus of population 
control, fertility decline and “modernization”. By the 1980s and early 1990s, 
considerable interventions had been made into the demographic profiles of many post-
colonial nations. Fertility was largely falling and child survival, rising. But this set of 
successes raised concerns over the coming of an “epidemiological” or “health 
transition” (Omran 1971). A pre-transition environment dominated by high fertility and 
high mortality was seen to be giving way to a population profile of low mortality and 
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low fertility with an accompanying shift in disease profile from pandemics of infection 
to chronic non-communicable diseases.34 This transition was seen as heralding in a new 
era, which would require new ways of knowing and administering the life and health of 
the global population (Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993; Feachem et al. 1992; Jamison, 
Mosley, et al. 1993).  
While the health transition held general implications for the orientation of the 
world health agenda – away from population control and towards diseases of old-age – 
the precise consequences of the transition for the global incidence of disease and for the 
exact interventions necessary to curb its spread were unknown . This knowledge-deficit 
presented a two-fold problem for the Bank. First, it hampered the Bank’s efforts to 
define a set of “essential health services”. Second, in the absence of systematic 
estimates of the global incidence of disease, statistics on disease prevalence were 
frequently provided by disease-specific advocates and health activists. These numbers 
were viewed with deep suspicion by World Bank experts (Murray and Lopez 1996a; 
Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993; World Bank 1993). The Bank thus undertook a wide-
reaching Health Sector Priorities Review that yielded a constellation of studies in 
descriptive epidemiology, epidemiological forecasting and health systems planning in 
the hopes of reducing the uncertainty caused by the anticipated epidemiological 
transition. The most significant of these studies - the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 
Study and the Disease Control Priorities (DCP) Project - served as background papers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Although the HIV/AIDs epidemic grew considerable throughout the 1980s and into the early 
1990s, World Bank demographers, epidemiologists and health economists anticipated that the 
epidemic would wane after reaching a peak in the early 2000s. These projections proved to be 
overly optimistic (Murray and Lopez 1996, 347). 
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to the landmark World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health . Importantly for 
my purposes here, the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health (WRD 
1993) also introduced the Disability Adjusted Life Year metric.35 
 
THE QUANTIFICATION OF HEALTH AND DISEASE 
Although the World Bank’s Health Sector Priorities Review began in the late 
1980s (in response to the comprehensive vs selective primary health care debates that 
beset the field of world health during that decade – See Chapter 1), it received renewed 
attention under Lawrence Summers’ tenure as chief economist of the World Bank 
beginning in 1991. Head of the Health Nutrition and Population Division of the Bank, 
US health economist Dean Jamison was then commissioned as lead author of the 
Investing in Health Report and subsequently recruited fellow US health economist 
Christopher Murray and Australia statistician Alan Lopez to undertake a study of the 
incidence of ill health world-wide. According to Alan Lopez, the overarching research 
question was proposed by Dean Jamison. Jamison contacted Christopher Murray and 
requested that he study not only what kills people, a research agenda that was already 
being undertaken by WHO (by Alan Lopez, in particular), but what ails them: “what is 
the non-fatal component of disease” (Lopez 2013). Jamison reasoned: “…people get 
sick from Malaria, infection or from a stroke, but they don’t die. They’re not in full 
health. Shouldn’t we be measuring that?” (Lopez 2013). Jamison’s thus sought to 
determine the global burden of disease, incorporating both mortality and morbidity, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The GBD study created the DALY metric while the DCPP project adopted cost effectiveness 
analysis (based on dollar expenditures for health gains measured in DALYS) as the criteria for 
prioritizing categorical health packages as essential health services.  
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what could be done to reduce that burden through cost-effective interventions. Lopez 
characterizes it as such: “Jamison wanted to do two big things.  He wanted to measure 
the burden of disease, not just mortality, but the burden of fatal and not fatal events. 
And what you can do about them, the cost effectiveness” (Lopez 2013). The immediate 
purpose of the GBD study was to discern the “global burden of disease” while the DCP 
project was to recommend evidence-based packages of cost-effective “essential health 
services” as part of the World Bank’s categorical approach to health sector financing in 
the developing world. Importantly, both studies used the newly created DALY metric to 
discern both disease burden and cost-effectiveness.   
Murray and Lopez hoped to account for the “full loss of healthy life” due to 
disease, death and disability on a global scale, but also and to “disentangle evidence 
from advocacy” (Lopez 2005). Murray and Lopez characterized the problem of health 
advocacy in the following way:  
All too often, health statistics are provided to decision-makers, the 
scientific community and the public by advocates. These advocates, 
although well intentioned have specific agendas, and the information 
they provide is often filtered or biased… Public health policy 
formulation desperately needs independent objective information on the 
magnitude of health problems and their likely trends, based on standard 
units of measurement and comparable methods (Christopher J. L. 
Murray and Lopez 1996b, 740). 
 
The GBD study and DCP project were intended to aid in more “objective” global health 
priority setting by eliminating the role of health activists in determining the world 
health agenda and facilitating, instead, the creation of an evidence-base consisting 
primarily of cost-benefit analyses. Previous attempts to gauge the relative importance of 
different diseases used mortality statistics, disease prevalence rates, or risk of death 
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calculations to determine the number of deaths due to various diseases (Feachem et al. 
1992). The DALY metric, in contrast, sought to account also for the chronicity of 
diseases and conditions that may not be fatal, but by virtue of their duration and 
disabling effects contributed to economic losses in the form of diminished productivity 
and strain on health systems. The DALY metric thus used “life-years” as a smaller and 
more commensurable unit than calculations made in individual human lives.  
 
DALY forerunners – the QALY and HDLLs 
Although the DALY metric has become a popular tool for measuring of the 
global burden of disease and evaluating the cost-effectiveness of health interventions, it 
was neither the first, nor is it the only, metric designed for the purposes of economic 
evaluation of health interventions. Its primary innovation consisted in drawing together 
two distinct lines of thought in health economics. The first strand originated in the 
“denominator problem” of cost effectiveness analysis of medical interventions. From its 
inception in the 1960s, the field of health economics struggled to come up with an 
appropriate denominator for cost-benefit calculations without appearing to place a 
dollar figure on life itself. The Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) was the first 
solution to the denominator problem and was proposed within the context of the British 
National Health Service (NHS) (Fanshel and Bush 1970; Zeckhauser and Shepard 1976; 
Ashmore, Mulkay, and Pinch 1989). The QALY measures the output of medical 
treatments in the units of individual years of life gained. These life years are then 
weighted for “quality of life”, as gauged by subjective patient ratings scales along a 
continuum from 0 (death) to 1 (full health). The QALY metric, then, helped health 
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administrators answer the question: how much health will a certain intervention or 
treatment yield? (Wahlberg and Rose 2015, 73).36 
The second line of thinking on which the DALY metric drew originated in a 
problem of vital statistics in Ghana. Despite a threefold increase in health spending over 
the previous two decades, by the late 1980s, very little change could be seen in the 
country’s vital statistics – in infant mortality, life expectancy, maternal mortality or the 
birth rate (Ghana Health Assessment Project Team 1981, 73). The Ghana Health 
Assessment Project Team proposed a measure of “healthy days of life lost” (HDLL), 
through illness, disability or death to more accurately measure the impact of certain 
diseases of the health of the country’s population. World Bank economist Howard 
Barnum later refined the healthy days of life lost concept by adding an “age-
productivity profile” and applying the standard economic convention of discounting to 
calculate “healthy days of life gained” (HDLG) from potential health interventions 
(1987). HDLGs could then be incorporated into cost benefit calculations for the 
purposes of health sector planning. 
The DALY metric drew on both of these traditions of thinking of order to solve 
problems of the rational allocation of health resources at the population level. If the 
QALY metric helped answer questions about the health yields of particular health 
interventions, then the DALY metric helped health systems planners answer questions 
about which diseases (and corresponding health interventions) should be prioritized at 
the population level. The DALY was then incorporated into the GBD study and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Nikolas Rose and Ayo Wahlberg position both the QALY and DALY metric within a 
fascinating analysis of a longer history of endeavors to “governmentalize” living (Wahlberg and 
Rose 2015). 
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DCP project to ascertain the total incidence of health and disease worldwide as well as 
the potential to optimize the health of the global population through cost effective 
health interventions.  
 
The DALY Metric 
In its simplest presentation the DALY metric “expresses years of life lost to 
premature death and years lived with a disability of specified severity and duration” . 
That is:  
DALYs = YLL + YLD 
where YLL are the years of life lost to premature death and YLD are years of life lived 
with disability. One DALY is equivalent to one year of healthy life lost, either wholly 
to premature death, or fractionally to disease or to disability. DALYs are a “health gap 
measure” that measure “loss of health” from an imagined state of ideal health. They are 
thus a “global health bad”, something to be added up and it was hoped, minimized 
through the implementation of cost effective health interventions. DALYs represent an 
internationally standardized quantum of life measured as a unit of time i.e. as life-years. 
Unlike older health statistics, which used either prevalence data or incidence rates to 
determine aggregate disease incidence, the DALY metric uses time, in either days or 
years, to render intelligible not just the incidence of death and disease but their relative 
burden, as well. Unlike vital statistics, which measure life as a coherent unity from birth 
through adolescence and adulthood until death, DALYs disaggregate life from death 
and measure the loss of life only in terms of the loss of its component units of time. 
Instead of lifetimes, DALYs measure life/time – life as time in the unit of individual 
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life-years. And unlike mortality statistics, which were difficult to incorporate into cost-
benefit calculation without breaking the taboo of putting a dollar figure on life itself, 
DALYs, like QALYs before them, could be incorporated unproblematically as a 
denominator in cost-benefit calculations.  
The DALY metric thus disaggregates the temporal coherence of lifetimes into 
commensurable units of life/time. But it incorporates a reworked temporality in another 
way too, by purporting to measure in terms of its present value the future impact of 
life/time units lost to death and disease. According to the initial presentation in the 
Investing in Health report, DALYs measure “the present value of the future stream of 
disability-free life lost as a result of death, disease, or injury” (World Bank 1993, 27). 
Life is here imagined in distinctly economic terms, as something the essence of which 
can be captured in terms of its present value, and located in the speculative future. The 
anticipatory move of determining the present value of future losses of life-years 
depends on two interrelated steps. First, one must determine the ideal against which 
death and disease can be measured as losses. As Murray and Lopez put it, “Disease 
burden is, in effect, the gap between a population’s actual health status and some 
‘ideal’, or reference status” (Murray and Lopez 1996c, 7). In determining this ideal state 
of health, Murray and Lopez adopted the broadly egalitarian principle that good health 
is a universal. Only sex and age are taken into account as variables in calculating 
disease burden; ideal life expectancy, for example, is assumed to be the same across the 
entire global population. Second, the present value of future losses of life-years must be 
quantified and calculated. This is accomplished through a number of technical 
calculation incorporated into the DALY metric; an age weighting function, a time–
 	  
97 
 
based discounting function, a set of disability severity weights and the use of an 
internationally standardized life expectancy. I address each in turn, drawing attention to 
the political presupposition with which each of these technical dimensions is co-
produced.  
   
Age Weighting 
Age weighting is performed according to a function that gives different value to 
years of life lost at different stages of the life course. It was incorporated by Murray and 
Lopez by “consensus judgment” in order to reflect the idea that “most societies attach 
more importance to a year of life lived by a young or middle-aged adult than to a year 
of life lived by a child or an elderly person” (World Bank 1993, 26, 213). However, as 
they go on to explain, even if life was held to have the same intrinsic value at every age, 
they might still “attach greater importance to years of productive adult life” because of 
the importance of adults as “net producers” i.e. for their increased human capital and 
resulting increased contribution to economic growth. The different age weights are 
defined by the exponential function ka^(-βa) where a is age, β is the constant value 0.04 
and constant k is chosen so that the total number of DALYs output by the calculation is 
the same as though uniform age weights had been used (World Bank 1993, 213). As a 
result of this function, the relative value of life rises steeply from zero at birth to its 
peak at age 25 before falling gradually with advancing age (see figure 2.3). Its effect is 
to redistribute the burden of DALYs away from the early and later years and 
concentrate them on the middle, economically productive years of life, those years most 
critical to the Bank’s priority of economic growth.  
 	  
98 
 
Discounting 
In addition to age weighting, the DALY metric incorporates a discount rate of 
3% to account for the temporal dimension of measuring the present value of future 
health states. Future years of healthy life are valued at progressively lower levels 
according to an exponential decay function. Discounting was incorporated to reflect a 
so-called “general societal preference” and fairly standard economic convention of 
prioritizing immediate over future gain by discounting the future at a steady rate. As 
Murray and Lopez explain “…societies typically prefer to have a given amount of 
consumption today rather than tomorrow” (World Bank 1993, 213). However, the 
inclusion of this purportedly typical social value also holds consequences for the 
distribution of the burden of disease. In combination with age weighting, discounting 
results in the relatively greater valuing of economically productive middle years of life. 
Because the future stream of life lost from childhood deaths is discounted over a longer 
period, the additional years count little as each additional year is discounted more 
heavily. The contribution of childhood deaths to the global burden of disease is thus 
given less significance relative to deaths that occur in middle age than in the absence of 
discounting: “…higher discount rates reduce the importance of premature deaths at 
young ages in relation to those at older ages” (World Bank 1993, 214).  
The incorporation of age weighting and discounting functions into the DALY 
metric minimizes the contribution of childhood deaths to the global burden of disease 
and puts relatively greater value on the middle economically productive years of life – 
precisely those years deemed most important by the Bank for increasing economic 
 	  
99 
 
growth. Figure 2.3 illustrates the age weighting function and the combined impact of 
age weighting and discounting the resulting DALYs from death across the life course 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Effect of age weighting and discounting on DALYs lost by death at age X. 
Reproduced from (World Bank 1993, 26) 
 
Disability Severity Weighting  
The third technical dimension of the DALY metric is the set of disability 
severity weights that it employs. These were included to capture the contribution of 
morbidity to the global burden of disease, in addition to more traditional measures of 
mortality. Disability severity weights range from zero, reflecting perfect health, to one, 
reflecting totally disability equivalent to death. The fractional weighting of 
compromised health-states results in years of life lived with disability being valued less 
than years lived in perfect health. The disability weighting feature of the DALY metric 
has been subject to extensive critique – inspiring the so-called “DALY wars” - because 
it, quite literally, dis-counts the lives (or at least, life years) of the disabled. This critique 
has been framed in a number of different ways: as universalizing a particular (Western) 
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conceptualization of suffering, as decontextualizing health and illness from highly 
variable social conditions and as violating United Nations sanctioned disability rights  
(Bastian 2000; Arnesen and Nord 2000; Anand and Hanson 1997; Anand, Peter, and 
Sen 2004; Christopher J L Murray, Salomon, and Mathers 2002). What is most salient 
for the argument here is gleaned from the very definitions of the disability severity 
weights. In addition to the activities of daily living (e.g. dressing, eating, bathing, 
toileting), the dimensions of functional capacity deemed relevant are recreation, 
education, procreation and occupation (World Bank 1993; Christopher J. L. Murray and 
Lopez 1996c). The inclusion of education and occupation – and thus indirectly of 
productivity – couple these disability severity weights to potential contributions to 
economic growth (see figure 2.3). Life is discounted insofar as it is compromised in its 
economically productive potential.37 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Definitions of disability weighting Reproduced from (Murray and Lopez 
1996a: 40) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 However, GBD co-author Alan Lopez was careful to point out to me that “if you are going to 
measure non-fatal outcomes…you’re going to have to weight on a scale of 0 to 1 what 
disabilities people have. We’re not saying disabled people are of less value, absolutely not. 
What we’re saying is if you care about prevention - what it is that caused health loss in those 
people - then you should measure it. And that’s what we did.” (Lopez 2013). 
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Standard Life Expectancy 
Finally, the DALY metric incorporates the use of a standard life table for 
calculating years of life lost at any given age. In measuring “premature death” one must 
define a natural limit to life or a point at which death is, no longer, premature. But 
instead of using actual life expectancies – as these vary considerably from place to place 
– the GBD study employed a standard life table for all populations with the life 
expectancies at birth of 82.5 for women and 80 years for men. As mentioned earlier, the 
impetus for using standard life expectancy was the egalitarian principle that death and 
disease that occur at any particular age should contribute equally to the global burden of 
disease regardless of where they occur. That is, the death of a woman at the age of, say 
57, should contribute equally to the burden of disease whether than woman dies in San 
Diego or Soweto. But by universalizing a standard life expectancy, the DALY metric 
effectively decouples the calculation of the global burden of disease (measured in 
DALYs) from the actual health conditions experienced by populations in various 
corners of the globe. While the impetus for doing so is broadly egalitarian, its 
consequences (as I will describe shortly) may be decidedly less so. The main point for 
my discussion here, though, is that it moves life, and the limit to life experienced 
through death, out of the realm of actually existing material conditions and locates it 
instead in the speculative future of potential life/time.  
When combined, these technical dimensions of the DALY metric yield the 
following formula:  
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Figure 2.4: DALY Formula including technical dimensions. Adapted from (Prüss-üstün 
et al. 2003) 
 
The various intricacies of these functions are less important than the fact that their 
incorporation into DALY calculations demonstrates the application of an explicitly 
economic lens to the quantification of the global burden of disease. Furthermore, the 
economization of life accomplished by the DALY metric - through its distinctly 
economic figuring of health, disease, death and life/time – is masked by the seeming 
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objectivity of numbers when the DALY metric is presented in its simplest form as the 
counting and addition of years of life lost to premature death, disease and disability.  
 
THE ECONOMIZATION OF LIFE 
Each of the technical dimensions of the DALY metrics is underpinned by a 
general conceptualization of health as a form of “human capital”– that same Nobel-
prize winning concept most fully developed by the Chicago School’s Theodore Schultz 
and Gary Becker (Becker 1962; Schultz 1961). Although human capital theory met with 
resistance and controversy upon its initial introduction and development in the 1950s 
and 1960s, by the 1990s, it had become a central tenet of both micro and macro 
economic theory and key to the rapid expansion of the field of economics through so-
called economic imperialism (Becker 1997; Fourcade 2006; Fourcade-Gourinchas 
2001; Mitchell 2006). Becker defined human capital as those “activities that influence 
future real income through the imbedding of resources in people” including the 
knowledge, skills, dispositions and health that are embodied in people that make them 
economically productive (1962, 9). Some of the ways to invest in one’s human capital, 
Becker argued “include schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin 
consumption, and acquiring information about the economic system” (1962, 9). These 
investments vary in their relative effects on earnings, that is, in their relative return on 
investment. “But all improve the physical and mental abilities of people and thereby 
raise real income prospects” (Becker 1962, 9). The epistemic underpinnings of human 
capital theory, then, inevitably invoke a neoliberal political rationality in which an 
economic lens is applied across the entirety of human existence. 
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While Becker acknowledged the importance of health as a form of human 
capital, the concept was more fully theorized by Becker’s student Michael Grossman  
(Grossman 2004; Grossman 1972). He conceptualized health as something consumers 
demand for two reasons. First, as a consumption commodity it “enters into their 
preference functions”, that is, people prefer a state of health over a state of ill health. 
Second, and importantly for the argument being developed here, health is 
conceptualized as an investment commodity because it “determines the total amount of 
time available for market and nonmarket activities… [such that] an increase in the stock 
of health reduces the time lost from these activities” [i.e. time away from market and 
non-market activities](Grossman 1972, 225).  Health as a site of investment yields life, 
here configured as a form of time. The return on investment in health as human capital 
is an increased dividend of time. The monetary value of increased life-as-time, or, 
conversely, the “monetary value of the reduction  [of lost productive time]” Grossman 
continued, “is an index of the return to an investment in health” (Grossman 1972, 225). 
Investing in one’s health extends the duration of possible participation in market and 
non-market activity and maximizes the term over which investment in one’s human 
capital can be realized. Premature death represents the foreshortening of the term of 
investment, whereas health extends life.  
With health as human capital, and lifetimes disaggregated into life/time, life 
itself is reassembled as a revenue stream. But perhaps more worryingly, premature 
death becomes not just a foreshortening of time, but a form of failed investment – or, 
more accurately, a failure to self-invest. Grossman explains:  
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[I]t is assumed that individuals inherit an initial stock of health that 
depreciates over time – at an increasing rate, at least after some stage in 
the life cycle – and can be increased by investment. Death occurs when 
the stock falls below a certain level, and one of the novel features of the 
model is that individuals “choose” their length of life (Grossman 1972, 
225).  
  
With health imagined as a form of human capital, the length of one’s life becomes the 
result of investing, or failing to invest, in one’s own health (that investment commodity 
that yields units of life/time). Death is no longer a disease-outcome, it is rendered a 
decision-outcome – a decision outcome that the future-oriented, risk-minimizing 
economically maximizing rational actor should, obviously, avoid through self-
optimizing practices of investing in one’s own health. This rendering of health as 
human capital, the disaggregation of lifetimes into life/time and reassembly of life as a 
revenue stream presupposes a neoliberal homo oeconomicus who must optimize their 
own health in the present in order secure future life/time.  
This conceptualization of the length of life as a consumer choice can be seen in 
the DALY metric’s use of a standard life expectancy table. Despite the egalitarian 
principle behind the standard life expectancy, when the duration of life is 
conceptualized as resulting from individual investment choices, entire high-mortality 
populations are recast as failed investors; as having failed to invest adequately in their 
own stock of health capital. Of course, individuals choose their length of life to 
approximately the same degree that they choose where they are born. Any rational actor 
would chose to be born amidst a low mortality population; every homo oeconomicus 
should invest in their own health so as to ensure maximal life expectancy. But recasting 
life expectancy as an investment choice takes life expectancy out of the realm of 
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structural determinants of health and locates it firmly within the territory of individual 
agency, with the result that individuals born amidst high-mortality populations are 
immediately rendered failed investors. When cast in the light of human capital theory, 
the “egalitarian principle” involved in the DALY metric’s use of a standard life table 
starts to look far less egalitarian.  
The DALY metric was conceived in a broadly egalitarian spirit and designed for 
the purposes of carrying out cost-benefit analyses of potential health interventions so as 
to design emerging health systems according to a logical of economic optimization. But 
more than just facilitating cost-benefit analyses, the DALY metric accomplishes an 
economization of life itself by disaggregating lifetimes into component units of life-as-
time and reassembling life as revenue stream to be maximized through practices of self- 
investment in one’s own health – configured here as human capital. Death, on the other 
hand, results from a failure to self-invest appropriately. Death is not a disease outcome 
but rather a decision outcome: it results from the unsuccessful entrepreneurial 
management of the self; from inadequate future-oriented cost-benefit calculating, risk 
minimizing, economic optimizing rational action. Death, on the logic of the DALY 
metric, becomes the ultimate failure of neoliberal homo oeconomicus.  
 
GBD STUDY AND DCP PROJECT FINDINGS  
Using the DALY metric, the GBD study compiled, for the first time  “a 
comprehensive, internally consistent and comparable set of estimates of current patterns 
of mortality and disability from disease and injury for all regions of the world, with 
projections to the year 2020” (Murray and Lopez 1996a, 1). Similarly, the DCP project 
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reported on “the significance to public health of individual diseases (or related clusters 
of diseases) and of what is now known about the cost and effectiveness of relevant 
interventions for their control [using] estimates of marginal cost per disability-adjusted 
life year (DALY)” (Jamison et al 1993, 3).  Because of the higher valuing of 
economically productive middle years of life in DALY calculations, disease of middle 
age – notably NCDs – achieved greater prominence in the GBD results (Murray and 
Lopez 1996; World Bank 1993). The GBD reported that NCDs represented the single 
largest category of DALYs lost worldwide – greater than either communicable diseases 
or injuries (Murray and Lopez 1996). Furthermore, it predicted that by 2020 NCDs 
would account for more than 70% of deaths in developing regions (Murray and Lopez 
1996). At the same time, the Disease Control Priorities Project (DCPP), also sponsored 
by the World Bank, made a strong case for the cost effectiveness of health interventions 
designed to mitigate NCD risks – notably those directed towards personal behavior 
change (Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993).  
Each study reported its findings in a slightly different way. The GBD study 
reported on global mortality (deaths), global morbidity (disability), global disease 
burden (DALYs), the contribution to the global burden of disease of ten “risk factors”, 
and projections of the global burden of disease to the year 2020 (Murray and Lopez 
1996). Causes of death and disease were categorized into three broadly defined groups: 
Group I, consisting of Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions; 
Group II, consisting of Noncommunicable Diseases; and Group III, Injuries. The GBD 
study found that the epidemiological transition was already well advanced “suggesting 
that public health policy, with its traditional emphasis on infections disease, has not 
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kept pace with events”( Murray and Lopez 1996c, 3). From 47.4% of the global burden 
of disease in 1990, noncommunicable disease were anticipated to grow to 68.7% of the 
global burden of disease by 2020 (See figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5: DALYs by cause group (Murray and Lopez 1996a, 37) 
The DCP Project similarly reported: 
[N]ot only will the number of deaths rapidly increase in developing 
countries [due to population growth and aging], but there will also be a 
substantial (although incomplete) shift in the distribution of causes to the 
relatively expensive noncommunicable diseases of adults and the elderly. 
This shift, and the epidemiological diversity likely to result from a 
lingering heavy burden of communicable disease, will challenge health 
systems to mount a broader range of preventive interventions (Jamison et 
al 1993, 693).  
 
The DCP project thus classified disease control priorities according to the “Unfinished 
Agenda” of infectious disease, reproductive health and malnutrition and “Emerging 
Problems” comprised of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases, noncommunicable 
disease (including mental health) and injuries. It urged countries to attend to emerging 
health problems while finishing the unfinished agenda. Crucially, both reports 
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highlighted tobacco-related disease as an area of particular concern and tobacco control 
as a particularly high priority.  
Tobacco was highlighted as one of four “startling” observations in the GBD 
summary volume. “By 2020” it reported, “tobacco is expected to kill more people than 
any single disease, surpassing even the HIV epidemic” (Murray and Lopez 1996c, 3). 
Furthermore, whereas the prevalence of HIV was anticipated to increase through the 
mid-2000s, then stabilize, the tobacco epidemic was anticipated to continue growing at 
an alarming rate (see Figure 2.6). Murray and Lopez drew an important distinction 
between current and projected disease burden for the purposes of public health planning 
and prevention, emphasizing that current disease burden (especially for diseases due to 
past exposures) cannot be altered, the future disease burden may be prevented by 
judicious health interventions: 
An important distinction needs to be made between the current burden of 
diseases attributable to past expose to a risk factor and the future burden 
that may arise from current exposure to that risk. Much of the literature 
on the attributable risk, such as the estimates of smoking-attributable 
mortality by Peto et al (1994), is based on estimating current burden 
attributable to past exposure. Calculating future burden due to current 
exposure is inherently more complicated, given secular trends in 
diseases, expected socioeconomic changes and likely advances in 
technology. On the other hand, the future burden of disease and injury 
due to current exposure is more important for public health planning and 
prevention than current burden due to past exposures, since the latter 
cannot be altered (Murray and Lopez 1996, 297). 
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Figure 2.6: Tobacco in the GBD results  
Reproduced from (Murray and Lopez 1996c, 5).  
  
The DCP Project also emphasized the importance of anticipatory action on non-
communicable disease and highlighted the case of tobacco as an exemplar:  
 Smoking provides an excellent illustration of an emerging health 
problem….The relation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer 
illustrates a vitally important feature of chronic noncommunicable 
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diseases – the long latent period between exposure and onset of the 
disease…These data highlight the importance of taking action to prevent 
chronic diseases decades before the epidemic appears. Regrettably, the 
rate of tobacco consumption in developing countries is increasing 
(Jameson et al 1993a, 6).  
 
Tobacco then featured among the report’s conclusions for national and international  
 
action: 
 
“Of particular importance here is the prompt national and international 
action to control tobacco use. Acquisition of tobacco addiction by 
today’s youth generates the dynamic for lung cancer, COPD, and 
cardiovascular disease epidemics in fifteen to thirty years. Taxes, 
prohibition on job promotions, and other effective interventions are 
available, and their prompt implementation is high priority” (Jamison et 
al 1993a, 33).  
 
The stark projections of tobacco related death and disease prompted immediate action at 
the World Bank in terms of its tobacco policies and its research into tobacco economics. 
Immediately the Bank ceased lending for tobacco production (World Bank 
1993, 89). It also commenced further research into the economics of tobacco. Early 
results of this research appeared in Appendix A to the completed DCPP volume. There, 
Kenneth Stanley of the Harvard School of Public Health provided statistical analyses 
the health effects of tobacco consumption as well as on its effects of the family, the 
workplace, and the environment. He also covered tobacco production and consumption, 
the tobacco manufacturing industry, advertising and promotion, and tobacco control 
strategies. Stanley observed “As the debate on the control of tobacco worldwide 
matures, it is turning more to economic analyses” (Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993, 718). 
While economic analyses of tobacco were still in their nascent stage, Stanley 
nonetheless concluded:  
 	  
112 
 
When all the economic costs and benefits of tobacco use are summarized 
and compared, the single element that emerges as determining the 
conclusion is the simple fact that male smokers are more than twice as 
likely to die during their working years (before age sixty-five) than 
nonsmokers. The energy and productivity of these people has been 
wasted… The control of tobacco is one of the most important public 
health issues facing mankind, if not the most important. Future 
generations will look back and wonder why it took so long for us to ban 
such an obvious hazard (Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993, 721). 
 
The DALY metric, the GBD, the DCP Project and the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 1993: Investing in Health all flagged tobacco as a particularly 
serious impending health threat – helping to constitute the global tobacco epidemic as 
an object of epidemiological and economic knowledge. Over the next two chapters I 
show how that knowledge was mobilized in support of regulatory action to combat the 
epidemic. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health is 
frequently identified as a key moment in the transition from international to global 
health and the rise of neoliberalism in the field of world health. In this chapter, I located 
the epistemological roots of this historical shift in a different aspect of the Investing in 
Health report: its introduction of the DALY metric. While my focus has been on these 
epistemological roots, I do not mean to suggest that they are completely independent of 
the structural changes that have accompanied the rise of global health. Indeed, the 
interconnectedness of political rationalities, material forms, institutional arrangements 
and technologies of power can be seen in the extensive uptake of the DALY method 
within the contemporary global health regime. For example, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland 
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adopted Investing in Health upon taking up her position as Director General of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1998 as her “roadmap” to reforming the WHO 
amidst the changing terrain of world health. And Bill Gates – who was initially inspired 
to direct his philanthropic billions towards global health by Investing in Health – has 
subsequently directed considerable funding towards successive iterations of the Global 
Burden of Disease study in order to refine the DALY methodology and determine 
funding priorities for the Gates Foundation’s global health initiatives.  
The DALY metric, GBD study and DCP project all provided a set of flexible 
epistemic resources with which a range of actors have advocated for different global 
health initiatives. Advocates of global tobacco control, in particular, adopted the GBD 
numbers and evidence of cost-effectiveness of tobacco control interventions (calculated 
in DALYs gained for dollars spent) as in the efforts in support of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. Of course, the GBD findings did not initiate the 
tobacco control movement – national and international anti-tobacco efforts predate the 
GBD study by at least three decades. Nevertheless, the creation of the “evidence base” 
that I’ve described in this chapter turned out to be a pivotal point in the movement for 
international tobacco control. Before the GBD study, the movement for international 
tobacco control relied primarily of a moral outrage framing of its grievances and 
targeted the tobacco industry as its primary antagonist. This framing, however, found 
little resonance and gained little traction. The movement underwent considerable 
professionalization during the 1980s and 1990s, which contributed, in part, to the work 
of the GBD study and its focus on tobacco mortality. In turn, the anti-tobacco 
movement adopted epidemiological and economic forecasts as an important epistemic 
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resource with which to advocate for a legal regulatory approach to international tobacco 
control. I trace the history of the international tobacco control movement, and its 
eventual success in forging the FCTC treaty, over the following two chapters.  
 
Parts of Chapter 2 of this dissertation appear in Kenny, Katherine. “The 
biopolitics of global health: Life and death in neoliberal time”. Journal of Sociology, 
vol. 51 (1), 2015. The dissertation author was the sole investigator and author of this 
paper. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE EARLY MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO 
CONTROL: MORAL OUTRAGE AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
The size of the public health threat, the need for the widest possible 
support for decisive action and the urgency for serious action make the 
FCTC more then just another treaty: it is a global public health 
movement!38 -  Derek Yach,  
 
In the last chapter I traced the problematization of a global tobacco epidemic 
back to efforts by the World Bank to quantify the global burden of disease for the 
purposes of health systems planning according to a logic of economic rationalism in the 
face of an anticipated health transition. The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study and 
the Disease Control Priority (DCP) Project both helped to throw the scale of current and 
future tobacco related illness into sharp relief (Jamison et al. 1993; Murray and Lopez 
1996; World Bank 1993). However, the newly recognized burden of the tobacco 
epidemic was not the first warning of an impending tobacco threat. Nor did the World 
Bank’s problematization of the global tobacco epidemic lead directly to the creation of 
global tobacco control interventions in any linear fashion.  The World Bank’s burden-
of-disease characterization of tobacco and the World Health Organization’s solution to 
that problem in the form of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control did proceed 
chronologically: the DALY metric was first published in 1993, the DCP Project results 
in 1993, and the full results of the GBD study in 1996 (World Bank 1993; Jamison, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Speech by the Executive Director, Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health Cluster, 
World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, June 15 2000. 
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Mosely, et al. 1993; Murray and Lopez 1996d). The initial idea for a WHO Treaty was 
also conceived in 1993 and the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted resolutions to 
pursue a legally binding international instrument of tobacco control in 1995 and 1996 
(Taylor and Roemer 1996; Ruth Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005; Mackay 2003). 
And although these became complementary and mutually reinforcing developments, 
each was motivated by slightly different epistemological, organizational and political 
concerns.  
In the previous chapter I traced the historical developments that led to the GBD 
study, the DCP project, the creation of the DALY metric and to World Bank support of 
global tobacco control efforts. These were all necessary conditions for the eventual 
passage of the FCTC but were not, in themselves, a sufficient cause. In this chapter, I 
begin to trace various other factors that contributed to the eventual passage of the treaty. 
I detail the slow growth of a public health movement for international tobacco control, 
the development of the idea for a legally-binding regulatory approach by Allyn Taylor 
(then a doctoral student in international law); and the uptake of her ideas by Professor 
of health law and public health activist Ruth Roemer. In the next chapter I outline the 
promotion of the treaty-idea by Roemer and other tobacco control activist; the 
appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as Director General of the WHO; and the 
continued involvement of the World Bank in issues of global tobacco control, especially 
in economic analyses of proposed tobacco regulation. Only after the confluence of these 
varied ideas, events and activities did the conditions for the successful passage of the 
FCTC treaty emerge. Put differently, in the previous chapter I focused on the creation of 
the FCTC treaty’s scientific evidence base. In the next two chapters, I focus on the 
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FCTC as a political accomplishment. However, the analytic separation of these foci 
should not be taken to mean that I take these processes to be independent of one 
another. Far from it – I maintain that the science and policy of global tobacco control 
have been coproduced. In this chapter and the next, I try to highlight how the movement 
for international tobacco control helped motivate and develop the scientific evidence 
base, especially the GBD study, and how the GBD results, in turn, shaped the 
international tobacco control movement and contributed to the eventual passage of the 
FCTC treaty.  
 Importantly, this chapter does not recount the history of national-level tobacco 
control movements, the successes and failures of national tobacco control policy, nor 
the history of the tobacco industry’s activities at the national or international level 
(except insofar as they pertain to the international tobacco control movement). Much 
careful scholarship has been devoted to these topics by historians, sociologists, and 
cultural theorists in national settings such as the United States, Canada, Australia, 
France, Japan, China, Brazil and India (A. Brandt 1990; A. Brandt 2007; Proctor 2012b; 
Proctor 2012a; Proctor 2001; Reid 2005a; Reid 2005b; Studlar 2002; Studlar 2004; 
Wolfson 2001; David and da Costa e Silva 2004; Reddy and Gupta 2008). Instead, I 
focus on the movement for international tobacco control as related, but distinct from, 
national-level mobilizations. I also emphasize the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of the FCTC treaty rather than the negotiating process that immediately 
preceded the treaty’s passage. Various scholars of law and political scientists have 
examined the treaty negotiations as a case study in global health governance, focusing 
especially on the role of civil society, health diplomacy and intersectoral collaboration 
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(Collin, Lee, and Bissell; Collin, Lee, and Bissell 2002; Gostin and Taylor 2008; 
Magnusson 2007; Mamudu and Glantz 2009; Collin 2012; Lee 2010; Novotny and 
Adams 2007; Adams, Novotny, and Hannah 2008). I focus, instead, on how the idea for 
the treaty become thinkable, actionable and, eventually, acceptable (Foucault 1970, 
1972, 1984). 
I show how the international tobacco control movement initially framed their 
grievances in terms of moral outrage and positioned the tobacco industry and as its 
relentless pursuit of profits at the expense of human lives as the movements primary 
antagonist. The industry’s disregard for human health was seen as particularly egregious 
in light of the emerging epidemiological evidence on the extent of smoking-related 
disease and growing awareness of tobacco industry marketing practices in the global 
South. Of course, a similar moral-outrage frame animated much national-level anti-
smoking activity during this same period. However, on its own, the moral outrage frame 
did not find resonance within the discursive context of the field of world health at the 
time. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the international tobacco control movement 
underwent considerable professionalization, helped develop epidemiological and 
economic forecasts of the tobacco threat, and subsequently adopted these forecasts as an 
important epistemic resource in advocating for international tobacco control. The 
tobacco threat was reframed as a depersonalized impending epidemic with dire 
anticipated consequences for both human health and national economies. This 
reframing coincided with a change in the discursive context of the field of world health 
with the transition from “international” to “global health” during the 1990s. With 
neoliberal economic rationalities ascendant in the field of world health and with the 
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tobacco epidemic now framed in economic terms, the international tobacco control 
movement began to gain traction. With the appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as 
Director General of the WHO in 1998, the international tobacco control movement 
found a powerful ally and important transnational political opportunity and fast progress 
towards the was FCTC achieved. During the negotiating process, the WHO helped 
reignited the moral outrage frame in the wake of the publication of formerly secret 
tobacco industry documents released after the Master Settlement Agreement in the 
United States. This moral outrage frame helped unify and mobilize renewed efforts 
among the tobacco control movement, which at this stage and with help from the WHO 
became a transnational or global public health movement. 
 I begin by briefly reviewing the social movements literature outlining my 
approach to the international tobacco control movement. I draw on various concepts, 
especially framing and discursive opportunities to make sense of the origins and growth 
the movement for international tobacco control. I begin by sketching the pre-history of 
international tobacco control, including increased concern with tobacco related illness 
as early as 1967 following on from the publicity about the harms of smoking in the 
United States after the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report. These early tobacco control 
investigations were inspired by recent epidemiological studies into the harms of 
smoking. But they were also driven by a sense of moral outrage and anti-corporate 
critique that aligned with the social justice orientation of the broader New International 
Economic Order movement of the time (Chorev 2012). Mike Muller’s Tobacco and the 
Third World: Tomorrow’s Epidemic (1978) and the activities of Australian activist 
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group BUGA-UP illustrate the moral outrage framing of the early international tobacco 
control movement.  
 However, throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the attention of the 
international health community shifted almost exclusively towards infant mortality and 
child survival. This reflected the scaling back of the Alma-Ata primary health care 
agenda and its re-articulation through the lens of selective primary health care. The 
focus of selective primary health care was on specific interventions (Growth 
monitoring, Oral Rehydration, Breastfeeding and Immunization (GOBI), later expanded 
to also include Female Education, Family Spacing and Food Supplements, i.e. GOBI-
FFF) that were discrete, easy to implement and whose outcomes were measurable 
(Mosley and Chen 1984. See also Wahlberg 2007). The debate between horizontally-
oriented comprehensive primary health care and more vertically-oriented selective 
primary health care that raged throughout the 1980s and early 1990s added to the 
tensions and schisms that characterized the field of world health at this time and 
contributed to the declining prominence of the WHO (Cueto 2004; Walsh and Warren 
1979; Gish 1982; Bryant, Richmond, and Project 2009; W H Mosley 1988; Godlee 
1994; Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006). Within this landscape, tobacco was not a priority at 
the WHO. Progress towards to the eventual FCTC would have to wait until the 
confluence of an additional set of conditions: the appointment of Gro Harlem 
Brundtland as Director General of the WHO, a program of WHO reform initiated 
throughout the 1990s that emphasized the role of health law in the WHO’s adaptation to 
the changing discursive structure of world health, and the closer alignment of the WHO 
with the World Bank’s economic approach to world health that Brundtland helped 
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achieved. I address these additional conditions of possibility for the FCTC treaty in the 
following chapter. 
 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, FRAMING AND OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Social movements have long been of interest to sociologists for at least two 
reasons - for their role in bringing about social change and because of their tendency to 
serve as a bellwether for the functioning of the extant political structures in society 
(Nick Crossley 2002). Prior to the 1960s, studies of social movements were carried out 
under the loosely grouped “collective behavior” approach, in which episodes of mass 
protest, much like panics, crazes and fads, were assumed to be spontaneous, 
disorganized and ultimately irrational (Blumer 1951; Blumer 1971; R. Turner and 
Killian 1987; Smelser 1962). However, with the emergence of the so-called “new” 
social movements - civil rights, the antiwar movement, the women’s and gay rights 
movements, and the environmental movement - the assumed irrationality of social 
protest became untenable. These movements were well organized, strategic and largely 
durable and as the decades progressed newly minted scholars that were sympathetic to 
(and often involved in) their causes began to extend more favorable treatment to the 
sociological analysis of collective action (McAdam 1982; Jenkins 1983; Morris 1984; 
Rupp and Taylor 1987; Gamson 1989; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994). 
 Subsequently, North American social movement theory came to be dominated 
by a new paradigm that emphasized the organizational and rational aspects of collective 
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action.39 Whereas the collective behavior approach assumed that social protest was a 
reflex-like reaction to social strain, this new paradigm held that strain, grievances and 
discontent are omnipresent in society. Instead, changes in the political opportunities 
available to express such discontent were seen as the catalyst for the formation of social 
movements (Mccarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). What became known as resource 
mobilization (RM) theory (Mccarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983) and political process 
(PP) theory (McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986) directed attention to the availability of 
resources, opportunities and constraints and how these were mobilized by rational 
organizers. Implicit in this paradigm was a conception of power as operating almost 
always through, or in relation to, the structures of the formal state. Social movements 
were thus defined as deinstitutionalized challenges to institutionalized power (Tarrow 
1998) - politics by other means.  
 While early RM/PP approaches were criticized for their narrow 
conceptualization of power, newer, multi-institutional approaches have gained some 
currency within social movements theory over the past decades. Building on the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Michel Foucault (1978, 1980), some scholars have 
adopted the terminology of “fields of protest”, “fields of contention”, (Ray 1999; E A 
Armstrong 2002; Nick Crossley 2002; N Crossley 2006) or “multi-institutional politics” 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008) to differentiate their new theoretical approaches from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The main European counterpart to the North American paradigm came to be known as New 
Social Movements (NSM) theory. While NSM theory was developed to address some of the 
shortcomings of the American approach, especially its sometimes narrow conceptualization of 
power, it has drawn criticisms of its own. For example, it is often seen as overstating the 
uniqueness of identity-oriented movements and as totalizing in its tendency to view NSMs as 
indicative of a shift to post-industrial society. See (Buechler 2000; Pichardo 1997; Polletta and 
Jasper 2001). 
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earlier paradigms. Similarly, political process theorists have expanded the notion of 
opportunity structures beyond the formal structures of the state to incorporate economic, 
corporate, industry, intellectual and cultural opportunities and constraints as well 
(Waidzunas 2013; Frickel and Gross 2005; Wahlstrom and Peterson 2006; McDonnell, 
King, and Soule 2014; Ferree et al. 2002). Despite the terminological differences, these 
various perspectives collectively reject the view of politics as pertaining only to the 
structures of formal governance of nation-states and the accompanying view that power 
functions in society through these channels alone. Instead, they hold that domination is 
organized around multiple sources of power, each of which is simultaneously material 
and symbolic.  
 Social movements theory has since been characterized by fragmentation and 
hybridization of these approaches, in part to better account for the role of culture in 
explaining movement mobilization and success. Drawing on the work of Erving 
Goffman (1974) “framing” processes have become a popular way to include culture and 
the perception of shared purpose, especially by theorists who have “softened” their 
approaches and attempted to account better for the “ideational factors and interpretive 
processes” involved in the operation of social movements (Snow et al. 1986; Snow 
1992; Benford and Snow 2000; Hunt and Benford 2004; Benford and Hunt 1992). 
Similarly, Benford and Hunt draw on the dramaturgical metaphor to detail the 
construction and communication of power in social movements. Through such 
processes as scripting, staging, performance and interpretation, movement actors define 
the social situation in need of redress, identify actors including protagonists and 
antagonists, frame grievances and align interests, manage the symbolic dimensions of 
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movement performances (1992). 	  
 I draw on various strands of this social movements literature in order to attend to 
the multiple institutional bases of power involved in the field of world health as well as 
the discursive context in which the international tobacco control movement has 
operated (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Ferree et al. 2002). I also draw on certain 
strands of political process theory. Scholars differ in their characterization of political 
opportunities: some use the concept quite broadly to refer to “all the institutional and 
cultural access points that actors can seize upon to attempt to bring their claims into the 
political forum” (Ferree et al. 2002, 61). Within this broad characterization of political 
opportunities, Ferree and her colleagues use the idea of discursive opportunity 
structures to highlight the more cultural access points – those having to do with ideas, 
knowledge and meaning-making processes. Others take a narrower view. Synthesizing 
the work of a range of scholars, McAdam characterizes four highly consensual 
dimensions of political opportunities:  
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically 
undergird a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The states capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996 ,26). 
  
However, as Tamara Kay points out, while these four dimensions may facilitate analysis 
of the enabling or constraining environment of national social movements, they don’t 
simply scale up to the transnational arena. Kay argues that the first and last dimensions 
of McAdams’ characterization do not apply at the transnational level because “global 
governance institutions have neither democratic electoral accountability nor repressive 
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capacity” (2005, 722). Instead, Kay offers three primary dimensions of transnational 
political opportunity structures: “(1) the constitution of transnational actors and 
interests (2) the definition and recognition of transnational rights, and (3) adjudication 
of rights at the transnational level” (2005, 722). 
 Following Ferree and colleagues, I use the term discursive opportunity structure 
to describe the background context against which framing, scripting and movement 
performances occur and without which it can be hard to understand why some find 
resonance and others fall flat.40 In my case, the transition from international to global 
health that I discussed in Chapter 1 constitutes the discursive opportunity structure 
against which the economic framing of the tobacco problem, especially, found 
resonance. I draw on aspects of McAdam’s and Kay’s characterizations of political 
opportunity structures by attending to the constitution of an international tobacco 
control movement, the presence, absence and alignment of elite allies within the field of 
world health (especially the alignment of WHO tobacco control efforts with the World 
Bank), and the formal recognition and adjudication of rights through the creation and 
passage of a legally binding FCTC treaty.  
 
EARLY INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL EFFORTS  
 Anti-tobacco sentiments can be found throughout history for almost as long as 
tobacco products have been in existence. For example, in a widely quoted treatise from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In their book on the different abortion discourses found in the United States and Germany, 
Ferree and colleagues point to the shift from the Weimar Republic to the Nazi Regime as one 
example of a changed discursive opportunity structure that profoundly influenced the unfolding 
of abortion debates in Germany. See (Ferree et al. 2002, 61) 
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1604, King James I of England wrote of smoking: “A custome lothsome to the eye, 
hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, dangerous to the Lungs, and in the blacke 
stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is 
bottomelesse”  (James I 1604, D3). Tobacco has been found, at various times and by 
various people, to be undesirable for a number of reasons: aesthetically, religiously, 
morally, olfactorily, etc. It was primarily on these grounds that tobacco was critiqued 
until the mid-20th century.41  
 Concerns about tobacco consumption based on scientific or medical grounds 
began to coalesce in the 1950s and 1960s in the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America as the result of a number of now-famous epidemiological studies. In the 
United Kingdom, the publication of the British Doctor Study by Richard Doll and A. 
Bradford Hill in 1954 and the publication of the British Royal College of Physican’s 
report in 1962 helped to solidify both the scientific status of field of epidemiology and 
the causal relationship between smoking and deleterious health effects such as lung 
cancer and cardiovascular disease (Doll and Hill 1954). But it was the release of US 
Surgeon General Luther Terry’s Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory 
Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, complete with a 
nationally televised press conference, that marked what is now seen as a watershed in 
the history of tobacco control (“Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 However, historian Robert Proctor has detailed how the Third Reich developed both 
extensive tobacco epidemiology and anti-smoking campaigns in Nazi Germany during the 
1930s and 1940s. Although this is a fascinating episode in the history of global tobacco control, 
because it was so little know and had little impact beyond Germany until Proctor’s historical 
scholarship, it is not central to the analysis provided here (Proctor 2012b).  
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Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service” 1964). The New York 
Times began an editorial covering the event with the statement “Now it’s official”, 
while its front-page story reported that there remained “no doubt about the role of 
cigarette smoking in causing cancer of the lungs” (Gusfield 1993, 57).  
 Although the Surgeon General’s Report achieved unprecedented symbolic 
significance, its findings were neither novel nor unexpected. The report was comprised 
entirely of previously published scientific findings. It reviewed 7,000 publications but 
contained no new information concerning the relationship between smoking and cancer 
(Brandt 1990, 165). Nevertheless, the report’s regulatory consequences soon became 
clear. Within a fortnight, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had proposed that every 
cigarette pack, carton or advertisement include a warning stating that smoking 
endangers health (“The Word On Cigarettes” 1964). The following year the proposal 
came to be realized in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. The 
warning “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health” was required 
to appear in small print on one of the side panels of each cigarette package (“Warning 
Labels” 2000). 
 The wording of the warning label was considerably more tentative, and thus 
considered much weaker than the causal claim elaborated in the Surgeon General’s 
Report – that smoking causes lung cancer. Allan Brandt attributes the disparity to two 
important influences: a powerful tobacco lobby on Capitol Hill and “the relative lack of 
experience most legislators had had with scientific findings”(Brandt 1990, 165). The 
tobacco lobby was able to critique the “soft science” of epidemiology on which the 
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report relied, while legislators were insufficiently used to dealing with scientific 
uncertainty as to be dissuaded from insisting on a stronger causal claim.  
 Anti-smoking activists quickly found another means through which to inform 
the public about the hazards of smoking. In 1967, a young consumer lawyer, John F. 
Banzhaf III, attempted to persuade the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
apply the now-defunct “fairness doctrine” to cigarette advertising. He formed the 
(subsequently highly influential) anti-smoking group ASH – Action on Smoking and 
Health – which successfully petitioned the FCC to require national network 
broadcasters who aired cigarette commercials to devote equal airtime to anti-smoking 
counter-advertisements and public service announcements ( Brandt 1990; Kagan and 
Nelson 2001; Rabin and Sugarman 2001; P. Jacobson, Wasserman, and Anderson 1997; 
P. D. Jacobson and Warner 1999). As a result, upwards of 1300 anti-smoking messages 
were broadcast in 1968, and anti-smoking advertisements received approximately $40 
million of free airtime. The following year Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act of 1969, which, although it introduced stronger cigarette pack warning 
labels, spelled the end of national anti-smoking counter-advertising. The act prohibited 
cigarette advertising on television and radio, eliminating the need for networks to air 
anti-smoking counter-advertising messages.42 However it did require that the cigarette 
packs carry the following, slightly enhanced warning label: “Warning: The Surgeon 
General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health” 
(“Warning Labels” 2000; Kagan and Nelson 2001).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Allan Brandt argues that anti-smoking counter advertising was so effective in dissuading 
people from smoking that the tobacco industry preferred to acquiesce to a ban on their own 
advertising than to endure continued counter-advertising (Brandt 2007, 80).  
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The Emergence of a Moral Outrage Frame 
 The 1964 Surgeon General’s Report sparked developments on the international 
scene as well. In September 1967, the report’s author, Dr. Luther Terry, opened the 
inaugural World Conference on Smoking at Health in New York City. “We have come 
to the end of one era in the smoking and health field”, he proclaimed. “The period of 
uncertainty is over… We know for certain that lung cancer, which is climbing to almost 
epidemic proportions throughout the world, is directly associated with cigarette 
smoking… And we know that a considerable amount of chronic disability is resulting 
annually from cigarette smoking.” “Today”, he continued “armed with the facts that 
come from careful scientific inquiry, we are on the threshold of a new era, a time of 
action, a time for public and private agencies, community groups and individual citizens 
to work together to bring this hydra-headed monster under control” (Terry 1967, 1). To 
over 500 delegates who had traveled to New York from 35 different countries he 
announced: “The Time of questioning is over. The time for action is now. Let this 
conference be the starting point for a concerted worldwide attack on this menace which 
is taking far too great a toll of the world’s valuable human resources” (Terry 1967, 3-4 
emphasis added).43   
 Dr. Terry’s comments painted the smoking problem as a “menace” and as a 
“hydra headed monster” but stopped short of characterizing the tobacco industry as, 
itself, the problem. Instead, the many heads of this monster took the form of different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Although 35 countries were represented by the delegates, the vast majority came from North 
America and Western Europe, notably from the United States, England, Canada and Norway. 
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types of diseases caused by smoking. In this, Dr. Terry’s comment were similar in tone 
to the paper sessions of the First World Conference on Smoking & Health, which were 
devoted largely to reviews of the emerging scientific evidence regarding the negative 
health effects of smoking in areas ranging from cardiovascular disease, cancer and 
respiratory disease, to questions of addiction, of the role of the physician in their 
patient’s attempts to quit smoking and to potential regulatory action.  
 But if most of the paper sessions, and indeed, Dr. Terry’s opening comments, 
were focused on the scientific dimensions of the tobacco problem, the more overtly 
political dimensions were more directly invoked by Senator Robert F Kennedy of New 
York in his opening address to the conference. He said: 
I need not rehearse the terrible facts about smoking… nor the urgency of 
action in any detail… [Instead] let me make my position about them 
clear: Every year cigarettes kill more Americans than were killed in 
World War I, the Korean War, and Vietnam combined; nearly as many 
as died in battle in World War II. Each year cigarettes kill five times 
more Americans than do traffic accidents. Lung cancer alone kills as 
many as die on the road. The cigarette industry is peddling a deadly 
weapon. It is dealing in people’s lives for financial gain” (Terry 1967, 6 
-7 emphasis added). 
 
Kennedy’s critique of the tobacco industry for “pedaling a deadly weapon” and for 
prioritizing its own profits over people’s lives illustrates a framing of the tobacco 
problem that has subsequently animated much of the tobacco control movement at both 
the national and international level: moral outrage.  
 Ranging from mild to more intense in its tone, this moral outrange frame has 
become a frequently used rhetorical strategy in advocating for tobacco control action 
ever since. However, although presented at what was billed as a “World Conference”, 
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and to an audience comprised of attendees from a range of different countries, 
Kennedy’s political remarks about the tobacco industry and the implied need for 
industry regulation were focused exclusively on the United States. This is illustrative of 
how the inaugural World Conference on Smoking and Health focused on the 
international science of smoking and health but only the national politics of tobacco 
regulation. While the science was seen to be universal, the politics of tobacco control 
and regulatory approaches to the tobacco problem were framed at the national level.  
 National policy responses to the tobacco problem began to be enacted 
throughout the late 1960s and 1970s in countries such as Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Norway and Singapore (Yach and Wipfli 2006). The development of tobacco control 
strategies in the global north, however, was anticipated to have negative consequences 
for the global south: the neocolonial expansion of the tobacco market. Reflecting on the 
proceedings of the Second World Conference on Smoking and Health that was held in 
London in 1971, an editorial in the British Medical Journal put it the following way:  
While the beginnings of effective control of smoking are being seen in 
some Western countries, many others have virtually no programmes for 
the prevention of the cigarette-induced diseases. There is a real danger of 
this deadly habit being exported to the younger countries of Africa and 
Asia, and the Western world has a responsibility to see that this is not 
done. We have already produced millions of slaves to cigarettes in our 
own lands. To export this slavery to the developing countries would be 
very wrong (“World Action on Smoking” 1971; Richardson 1971). 
 
The concerns flagged in this post-conference editorial soon made their way onto the 
conference agenda, itself.  
By the Fourth World Conference, held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1979 (and 
attended by 550 delegates from 67 countries) Dr Halfden Mahler, Director General of 
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the WHO, used the occasion of his keynote address to draw attention to the predicted 
grave consequences of tobacco consumption in the developing world:  
Unless we act very quickly, this sinister trend [of increasing smoking-
related illness] will soon become generalized not only in the developed 
countries, but in the developing countries too. For the sad fact is that in 
those countries where people have the least to eat, where poverty is 
greatest, where the illiteracy is most widespread, in those countries more 
and more people are beginning to smoke each year, adding quite 
gratuitously to their already intolerable burden of ill-health and to their 
enormous problems of social and economic development  (Ramström 
1980, 10). 
 
Mahler continued his address by highlighting the social justice dimensions of the 
tobacco problem:  
It is tragic that most of the time, the people in these countries do not have 
a chance to know the harm they are doing to themselves. Cigarettes are 
advertised in their news media as if they were a “liberation movement”. 
Their cigarette packets carry no health warnings; and if they did, many 
of the smokers could not read them or would never see them because 
they are sold these cigarettes by ones and by twos – since the poor 
cannot afford to buy them by the packet. They do not know that very 
often they are being sold cigarettes with a far greater tar and nicotine 
content than the same brand in Europe or North America (Ramström 
1980, 10). 
 
 The injustices perpetrated by an unregulated (and unscrupulous) tobacco industry, that 
was selling more harmful cigarettes in the global south than in the global north, and the 
exacerbation of existing health, social and economic inequality between the developed 
and developing world were central to Mahler’s remarks. 
 
Moral outrage, infant formula and cigarettes 
 Many of Mahler’s observations about tobacco in the Third World had been 
publicized the year earlier in Mike Muller’s exposé Tobacco and the Third World: 
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Tomorrow’s Epidemic (Muller 1978). Muller had been commissioned by the British 
non-profit War on Want (who had received funding from the UK branch of anti-
smoking group ASH) after having written the highly successful “Baby Killer” four 
years previously(Muller 1974). In “Baby Killer” Muller critiqued the misleading 
marketing practices used by Nestlé and other infant formula manufacturers when 
promoting their products in the developing world.44 The Baby Killer sparked an 
international boycott of the transnational food corporation and prompted action at the 
WHO, which eventually adopted an international code specifying acceptable and 
unacceptable marketing practices for infant food supplements (or replacements).  The 
WHO’s International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes was formally 
adopted by the WHA in 1981 (International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes 1981; Shubber 1998). Although it was a voluntary (i.e. non-binding) code of 
conduct, it did provide a kind of precedent for the FCTC that would eventually follow. 
As the author of the two exposés, Mike Muller, told me, “I like to think that the baby 
milk issue, clearly emotive and difficult to oppose, helped open the door for global 
regulatory action on the much tougher areas of pharmaceuticals (WHO on essential 
drugs lists) and tobacco control” (personal communication, March 2014). Although the 
“Baby Killer” resulted in considerable public outcry, the tobacco exposé received less 
attention, and it would be the best part of three decades before the WHO would attempt 
international regulation devoted to tobacco control.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 While I opt for the more neutral terms “global South” or low and middle-income countries in 
my own prose, I use “developing” or “Third world” countries here to retain fidelity to the 
actors’ own use of terms. 
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 Muller’s “Baby Killer” exposé resonated within the broader world health 
context of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As I showed in Chapter 1, during this time, 
tensions were emerging between the comprehensive primary health care approach 
enshrined in the WHO’s Alma Ata declaration of “health for all by the year 2000” and 
the selective primary health care approach that envisioned health for all as best achieved 
through specific interventions directed largely towards improving the measurable 
outcome of child survival rates (Walsh and Warren 1979; Mosley and Chen 1984). 
Because the use of infant formula in the global South was shown to increase rates of 
diarrhea, malnutrition and infant death, there was considerable resonance between the 
infant formula issue and the discursive context of world health at that particular 
historical moment. The infant formula issue – and it attendant emphasis on the benefit 
of breastfeeding – also resonated with the World Bank’s promotion of breastfeeding (as 
natural birth control and child spacing) as a form of population control. World 
population control was a theme that was particularly near and dear to the heart of the 
President of the World Bank from 1968 – 1981: Robert Strange McNamara (McNamara 
1970). Of course, the infant formula issue was also extremely evocative (and, in 
Muller’s words, emotive) – babies were dying in the global South because of 
unscrupulous marketing practices of a Northern transnational corporation. Consumer 
outrage manifested in the boycott, which originated in the United States before 
spreading to Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and across Europe (Field 
Notes 13th WCTOH, 3/12/2009). Although the US boycott ended in 1984, its UK 
counterpart has continued, intermittently, to this day (see www.babymilkaction.org).   
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 What is important for my purposes here is to point out that, like the infant 
formula issue, early international tobacco control grievances were framed by a sense of 
moral outrage and directed towards the tobacco industry which was portrayed as 
ruthlessly pursuing profits at the expense of human health. “The facts of tobacco 
today”, Muller wrote in Tomorrow’s Epidemic, “are that the countries where 
consumption is growing fastest are the world’s poorest and hungriest” (Muller 1978, 
13). “The trouble with multinational companies,” he continued, “is that they are too 
good at doing the wrong things. And nowhere is this more clear than in the Third World 
tobacco business…The spread of cigarettes to the Third World is part of a wider 
problem – some call it ‘Coca-Cola Colonialism’… tobacco just helps the rich get richer 
while the poor stay poor” (Muller 1978, 9,87,102). The moral outrage frame, when 
paired with the child survival themes of the infant formula issue found resonance and 
led, eventually to the WHO Breast-milk Code. However, a similar moral outrage frame, 
paired with the anti-capitalist neo-colonial critique of the tobacco problem, did not 
result in the same kind of policy outcome.45 It did, however, extend the smoking and 
health debate beyond the strictly medical field into the realm of development. This 
extension was eventually incorporated by the international tobacco control movement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Of course, the moral outrage framing of the tobacco problem was tempered by a widespread 
counter-frame that emphasized the personal choice and individual assumption of the risk 
involved in the decision to smoke. As Allan Brandt and others have shown, this individual 
choice counter-frame was particularly strong in places, like the United States, where the 
political culture tends more towards the libertarian than the communitarian (Brandt & Rozin 
1997; Brandt, 1990. See also Gusfield 1993). 
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for example when Muller was invited to present his findings to the 5th World 
Conference on Smoking and Health in Winnipeg, Canada in 1983.46  
 
Anti-tobacco Activism 
 Even though the moral outrage framing of a global tobacco epidemic didn’t find 
traction in the same way that the infant formula issue did, Muller’s expose was 
nonetheless inspiring to a host of tobacco control activists. Australian tobacco control 
leader and future editor of the international journal Tobacco Control, Professor Simon 
Chapman, dedicated one of his early textbooks on tobacco control to Muller in 
acknowledgement of his pioneering work in the area (Chapman and Wong 1990). 
Chapman wrote: “There are only a few people whom you come across during your life 
who you later know with absolute clarity had a major influence on your thinking. I 
heard Mike [Muller] talk about the tobacco industry in Africa at the Winnipeg 
Conference in 1983 and his perspectives has shaped mine ever since” (Chapman and 
Wong 1990, iv).47 Tomorrow’s Epidemic was also cited in key reports, conference 
proceedings, scientific publications and other documents of the early tobacco control 
movement (Roemer 1982; Ramström 1980; Chapman et al. 1994).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Muller recounted his experience of tobacco industry surveillance at that meeting: “I recall 
having to throw a tobacco industry representative out of a meeting of the Africa group caucus; 
what that demonstrated was just how active and professional the industry was in monitoring and 
responding to the emerging campaigns” (Personal Communications, March 2014). Below I 
discuss the resurgence of the tobacco industry as a unifying antagonist in later efforts of the 
international tobacco control movement.  
47 Funded by the American Cancer Society and Produced in associating with the International 
Organization of Consumers Unions, Champan’s text, “Tobacco Control in the Third World: A 
Resource Atlas” was prepared for the Seventh World Conference on Tobacco and Health, held 
in Perth, Australia in April 1990 to promote one of the conference themes: smoking in the 
developing world (Chapman and Wong 1990).  
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 The early tobacco control movement, then, was animated by a moral outrage 
frame, driven by a social justice mission and often carried out by anti-tobacco 
“crusaders”. In an oral history interview with Senior Advisor to the World Lung 
Foundation, Senior Consultant to the WHO and seasoned anti-tobacco campaigner 
Judith Mackay, she characterized the scene of early international tobacco control during 
the 1970s and through the 1980s in the following way:  
… there was a motley crowd [working in tobacco control], actually.  A 
motley crowd of academics and a few people who were … working in 
public health.  And people who had rather specific interests.  Very few 
people, certainly in the lower and middle income countries. There was 
nobody working full time, it was more or less a part time job, sort of 
sandwiched in between their teaching duties and stuff like that (Mackay 
2010). 
 
Going on to characterize the motivation for individuals to undertake such work, she  
continued: 
I think, first of all there was the actual information about the havoc that 
smoking was causing.  You know, 50% of people were dying from 
smoking.  Half of those in middle age. So I think there was a recognition 
that this was huge huge problem. After the studies [done during the] 50's 
and 60's…the doctors' studies in the UK, studies that were being done in 
America, I think there was a recognition that this was a problem. And 
then it very quickly transpired that you actually had a fight on your 
hands. It wasn't like TB. It wasn't like trying to even solve malaria. We 
had a very powerful opponent in the tobacco industry. So it … selected 
out people who, I think, were probably Trojans (laughter). They were 
born warriors and fighters and were not going to take this [lying down]. I 
think there was an element of unusualness in all of the people, who, in 
my age, who started off (Mackay 2010).  
 
The fact that the tobacco industry was not like TB or malaria – that this “vector” of 
disease actually fought back against intervention efforts – served as a source of 
motivation for these early anti-tobacco activists and provided the early international 
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tobacco control movement with a readily identifiable antagonist (Benford and Hunt 
1992).  
 Mackay continued:  
When I think of all of them, they [all had] quite a strong ethical streak in 
them [about] what was right and wrong. And [were] determined to 
challenge a very formidable industry.  They were quite an interesting 
group of people.  Some were surgeons, some physicians, some were 
working in public health.  There was all manner of different people 
[who] seemed attracted to this. And they had a kind of passion, I would 
say, that if you were working in TB it didn't seem so evident there... 
groups would go around and be noisy and be troublesome. They'd go 
around in Australia re-facing billboards, with the BUGA-UP group.  The 
billboard-utilizing-graffitiists-against unhealthy promotions.  They 
would go and re-spray the billboards so there were cheeky messages and 
things like that.  You don't sort of get that with people working with 
diabetes or working with TB.  So I think it attracted a rather unusual 
group of people in the early days (Mackay 2010). 
 
The Australian activist group that Mackay highlights as exemplifying the spirit of early 
anti-tobacco activists, BUGA-UP (Billboard Utilizing Graffitists Against Unhealthy 
Promotions), further illustrates the moral outrage anti-tobacco frame. 
 
BUGA UP 
 BUGA UP began as a splinter group of activities coordinated, in part by 
Emeritus Professor of Public Health and the University of Sydney in Australia, Simon 
Chapman. Then employed in community health education by the New South Wales 
(NSW) state government, Chapman and three colleagues formed a public interest group 
called MOP UP (Movement Opposed to Promotion of Unhealthy Products) to “provide 
an uncompromised alternative media voice to the staid and cautious equivocations of 
government officials” (Chapman 1996, 179). At the initial meeting, which was 
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convened somewhat theatrically in the lecture theatre of the Sydney city morgue, two 
members of the audience became impatient with what they saw as the terribly tame 
tactics envisioned: letter-writing and demonstrations. They urged more direct action by 
defacing (or “re-facing”) billboard advertising promoting tobacco (and to a lesser 
extent, alcohol, sexist advertising and “conspicuous consumption”) (Chapman 1996, 
179). Chapman observes that the acronymic name of the group had the virtue of 
invoking the pidgin English expression meaning “to make a mess of, or to destroy”. 
“Being mildly risqué”, Chapman argues, “the expression and so the group’s name took 
on added appeal to those who delighted in the Australian penchant for irreverence” 
(Chapman 1996, 179).	  (Chapman’s own penchant for irreverence can be observed in his 
former Twitter-profile picture, reproduced in Figure 3.1). 	  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Professor of Public Health Simon Chapman, Reproduced from 
https://twitter.com/simonchapman6 (accessed 2014). 
 
In what can be considered an early form of culture jamming, members of BUGA 
UP would re-appropriate advertising messages, often by changing the letters in cigarette 
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brand names and slogans to disrupt the intended meaning portrayed on billboards 
(Walton 2012; Deitz 2014). Over the next decade, the group grew to include doctors, 
teachers, environmentalists, artists, health care workers, religious clergy and parents 
who, together, graffitied tens of thousand of billboards across every state in Australia 
signing their work with the acronym BUGA UP (Chapman 1996).  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Dr. Arthur Chesterfield-Evans performs “surgery” on a billboard (1979) 
Image Reproduced from www.bugaup.org (accessed January 2015) 
 
Popular re-appropriations included:  
• Sterling/Stinking 
• Benson & Hedges/Burnson & Stenches 
• Dunhill/Dunghill (or Lunghill) 
• Longbeach/Lungleach 
• John Player Special/ Lung Slayer Special 
• Rothman King Size/Rotman’s Lung Sizzle 
• “New, Mild and Marlboro”/ “New, Vile and a Bore” 
• “The Taste of Marlboro”/ “The taste of stale farts” 
• “You’re laughing/You’re coughing” 
• “Anyhow… have a Winfield”/ “Anyhow…have a Wank… it’s healthier!”48 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “To wank” is a common Australian colloquialism for masturbation 
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Figure 3.3: “It’s a bore” on Oxford Street in Sydney 
 Image Reproduced from www.bugaup.org (accessed January 2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: “Anyhow…” Winfield Billboard 
Image reproduced from www.bugaup.org (accessed January 2015) 
  
 The activities of BUGA UP members occasionally led to arrests, which provided 
for additional publicity opportunities including lengthy dock statements during which 
defendants would explain their motivations. Dr. Arthur Chesterfield-Evans, a Sydney 
doctor, pleaded not guilty to the charge of malicious damage, explaining that his crime 
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was justified by his intent to prevent a higher order wrongdoing. “If I saw someone 
about to tip cholera germs into the water supply, I would try to stop him, even if it 
meant stealing the flask”, he reasoned (Chapman 1996, 181). As Chapman recounts it, 
“He went on to argue that, as a doctor, he found the intent and consequences of tobacco 
advertising equally reprehensible and felt justified in breaking what he argued was a 
trivial law in the hope of preventing the disease that would result from the success of 
tobacco advertising” (1996, 181).  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Peter Jackson You’re laughing/You’re coughing billboard 
Image reproduced from www.bugaup.org (accessed January 2015) 
 
The arrests, subsequent court cases, and various other publicity stunts garnered 
extensive media attention including feature articles in the magazine and commentary 
sections of national newspapers, lead stories on current affairs television programs and 
an hour-long QED special for the British television network, the BBC. Other BUGA UP 
activities involved: 
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• staging a satirical advertising “awards” evening, 
• skywriting “Cancer Country” in the skies above the 1984 Marlboro-sponsored 
Australian Open tennis championships  
• publicly shaming advertising companies with tobacco accounts through targeted 
demonstrations outside their buildings 
• entering an elderly, wheelchair-bound man who still smoked through a 
tracheostomy in a Philip Morris competition for an Australian Marlboro Man. 
BUGA UP produced a poster supporting their candidate which was placed on 
hundreds of street lamps throughout Sydney and even appeared on the cover of 
the Medical Journal of Australia. (Chapman 1996, 183). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: “Frank” – BUGA UP’s entrant in Philip Morris’  
Australian Marlboro Man Competition  
Image reproduced from www.bugaup.org (accessed January 2015) 
 
 
According to Chapman, the press extended sympathetic treatment to the coverage of 
BUGA UP’s activities: 
Media coverage invariably focused on what is best described as the 
Robin Hood phenomenon. BUGA UP activists were people, often 
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revealed as entirely normal and respected citizens, who risked a criminal 
record in order to make their point. As those active in BUGA UP often 
said, “What is the worse crime? To vandalise the paper sheeting on an 
advertising [board], or to meekly accept the right of wealthy corporations 
to promote carcinogenic products to children? (1996, 182).  
 
 In addition to prompting international media coverage, members of BUGA UP 
promoted their work internationally by participating in international conferences and 
professional meetings. For example, Dr. Arthur Chesterfield-Evans presented the case 
of BUGA UP at the 5th World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Winnipeg – the 
same meeting to which Mike Muller had been invited to present his work. A version of 
his talk was later published in the New York State Medical Journal and reportedly 
received considerable attention in international media reports of the conference 
(Chesterfield-Evans 1983; Chapman 1996). The activities of BUGA UP also inspired 
similar billboard re-facing efforts overseas - especially in the UK and the USA.49  
 Finally, the transnational tobacco companies were attentive to the activities of 
Australian anti-tobacco activists, too. In a 1992 Corporate Affairs plan, Philip Morris 
executives observed:  
Australia has one of the best organized, best financed, most politically 
savvy and well connected anti-smoking movements in the world. They 
are aggressive and have been able to use the levers of power very 
effectively to propose and pass draconian legislation…The implications 
of Australian anti-smoking activity are significant outside Australia 
because Australia serves as a seedbed for anti-smoking programs around 
the world (“Corporate Affairs Plan: Philip Morris (Australia) Limited” 
1992).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For example the early 1980s saw the emergence of COUGHUP (Citizens’ Organisation using 
Graffiti to Halt Unhealthy Promotions), COUGHIN (Chitizens’ Organisation Using Graffiti for 
Health in Neighborhoods) and TREES (Those Resisting an Early End from Smoking) in Great 
Britain. In the USA, instances of “billboard re-facing” were carried out in New Jersey, New 
York City and Philadelphia, Chicago and San Diego adopted similar tactics (Chapman 1996).  
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Similarly, a Representative for the Asian Tobacco Council observed:  
In Australia…we have perhaps the most virulent and nasty-edged anti-
tobacco lobbies to be found anywhere in the world. There is nothing less 
than a battle raging in Australia and New Zealand, and all the guns are 
out, on both sides…they have seen it all down there, and there is more of 
that to come. It is a bear garden. It is a zoo, and aggression, political in-
fighting, dirty tricks by the opposition, and all manner of hassle and 
public argument is a feature of the business in Australia (A. Turner 
1990). 
 
The activities of BUGA UP intensified over the 1980s and early 1990s until billboard 
advertising of tobacco products was banned in Australia in September 1994.  
 Because of the nature of BUGA UP’s activities, it is hard to evaluate their 
precise impact – it would be impossible, for example, to attribute any particular tobacco 
control policy and tobacco advertising restrictions directly to the group. Nevertheless, 
BUGA UP’s reputation spread throughout Australian and internationally and they 
remain a frequently reference touch point in the history of international tobacco 
control.50 Simon Chapman believes that “the legacy of BUGA UP’s actions is 
considered by many who have both participated in and observed tobacco control policy 
to have been profound” (1996, 179).  
 The peak years of BUGA UP’s anti-tobacco activism coincided with a growing 
international movement for tobacco control. However, as this nascent international 
movement solidified, it embraced strategies that one key figure described as advocacy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Judith Mackay referenced the activities of BUGA UP in her comments above. But I also 
encountered frequent mentions of the group and their tactics in conference presentations and 
tobacco control events in Australia and internationally throughough my fieldwork.  
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as opposed to the activism of BUGA UP and illustrate the growing professionalization 
of the international tobacco control movement.  
 
From Activism to Advocacy 
 In recounting the history of international tobacco control, anti-tobacco 
campaigner Judith Mackay drew a distinction between the “early days”, characterized 
by the “activism” of BUGA UP and a later era of anti-tobacco “advocacy”. When I 
asked her to elaborate on the distinction between the two, she drew on her personal 
experience to illustrate the difference: 
I think I changed [from an activist to advocate] when I realized that there 
were actually very few people who were actually working with 
governments.  And who were, in a sense, sort of trusted advisors by 
governments and I could see there was a need for that… for me, the best 
role was to use the weight and wealth of my professional background 
and become a trusted government advisor.  And especially working with 
World Health Organization. With WHO there was a need to, in a sense, 
behave rather like a WHO person (Mackay 2010). 
 
Working with governments, rather than targeting the state through exogenously-initiated 
action, is key in this transition from activism to advocacy, as is the role of 
professionalization in the tobacco control movement.51 This professionalization was 
aided, throughout the 1980s and 1990s by a number of key events. Firstly, the 
continuation of the World Conference on Smoking and Health (later Tobacco or Health) 
provided a quadrennial (later triennial) forum in which both the science of tobacco-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Mark Wolfson has used the term “state-movement interpenetration” to characterize the high 
degree of interaction between the state and the tobacco control movement in Minnesota and the 
United States more generally (Wolfson 2001). 
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related disease and the emerging field of tobacco control policy could be advanced. 
Second, the American Cancer Society sponsored a meeting devoted exclusively to 
tobacco control policy (distinct from the science of the health effects of smoking). Held 
in 1985 in Washington DC, this meeting helped to consolidate and foster a sense of 
community among those working in tobacco control. As Mackay puts it:  
I think [one] key event was in 1985, when many of us were working 
separately all over the world in tobacco control. The American Cancer 
Society (ACS) held a meeting in Washington, DC, which in true 
American style, was called the First International Summit of World 
Smoking Control Leaders [laughter], which slightly amused the non-
Americans in its grandiose terminology. But many of us met together 
then for the first time and realized what was happening in other countries 
(Reynolds and Tansey 2012, 29). 
 
“It was a turning point”, she says “because it was the first time ever, really, that the 
international tobacco control community got together” (Mackay 2010). Finally, the 
international peer-reviewed journal Tobacco Control, published by the British Medical 
Journals group, was founded in 1992 in order to “help foster communication, 
cooperation, and cohesion among the many organisations and individuals working in 
this field” (Davis 1992, 1). In his opening editorial, founding editor Ronald Davis 
emphasized the intended international orientation of the journal. He also rhetorically 
aligned tobacco control with the longer-standing terrain of international health: 
infectious disease control. “Similar to the control of infectious diseases”, Davis argued, 
“the prevention and control of tobacco use require an understanding of the causative 
agents (tobacco products), the vectors (those who manufacture, advertise, distribute, and 
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sell tobacco products), the host, and the environment” (Davis 1992, 2).52 Positioning the 
tobacco industry as the vector of disease incorporated the moral outrage frame of earlier 
anti-tobacco activism within a more familiar public health approach to disease 
prevention: the agent-vector-host triad. 
 According to some, the WHO also played an important role in the both the 
professionalization and the internationalization of tobacco control (Derek Yach 2014). 
Others, however, have argued that until the late 1990s, the WHO did not give sufficient 
attention to the transnational dimensions of tobacco control – i.e. that they failed to 
recognize “that you can’t …regulate at a domestic level alone” (Reynolds and Tansey 
2010, 12). What is widely agreed upon, however, is that prior to the confluence of a 
range of events culminating in the appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as Director 
General of the WHO in 1998, tobacco was not a priority for the WHO. 
 
TOBACCO AT WHO 1970-1998  
Early action on tobacco 
 The first formal action on tobacco at the WHO was a WHA resolution on 
tobacco passed in 1970 (WHA23.32). Its main interventions were to request that 
delegates of the WHA refrain from smoking at the assembly or in committee meetings 
and to call for further research into the tobacco problem. The 1970 resolution was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The comparison to infectious disease went further: Davis claimed it was “baffling” that it had 
taken so long for a journal on tobacco control to be launched when, for example, “several 
journals devoted to AIDS were launched six or so years after then first published description of 
the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome” (Davis 1992, 1). “Does it make sense” he asked, 
“that the yearly world conference on AIDS attract 8000 participants, whereas the biennial world 
conferences on tobacco and health attract 1000?” (Davis 1992, 1 emphasis in original) 
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adopted in response to a report prepared by Dr. S. M Fletcher, Professor of Clinical 
Epidemiology at the Royal Postgraduate Medical School in London, and Dr. Daniel 
Horn, Director of the US National Clearinghouse for Smoking and Health (responsible 
for the Surgeon General’s reports) (Fletcher and Horn 1970). Building on the 
experiences of their home countries, Fletcher and Horn warned “In countries where 
deaths and disability associated with cigarette smoking are already at high levels much 
more preventive action is needed. In developing countries where cigarette smoking is 
rapidly taking hold, measure are needed to arrest the growth of the habit and thus to 
prevent the increasing premature deaths and disablement it would inevitably cause” 
(“Smoking and Its Effects on Health” 1975).  The report recommended that steps be 
taken to promote the reduction or discontinuation of cigarette smoking and to 
discourage young people from initiating smoking, especially through public education 
campaigns and cigarette package warnings (1975, 39, 70-71).  
 Further reports of Expert Advisory Panels (WHO 1975, 1979, 1982, 1988) and 
WHO resolutions followed, each urging member states to implement incrementally 
stronger tobacco control policies at the national level. Table 3.1 lists all WHO 
resolutions concerning tobacco from the initial resolution adopted in 1970 until the 
adoption of the FCTC in 2003 (hyperlinks to the text of each resolution are embedded 
in the resolution number).  
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Table 3.1: Resolutions of the World Health Organization’s World Health Assembly 
Twenty Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 5-22 May 1970 
WHA23.32 Health Consequences of Smoking 
Twenty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 4-20 May 1971 
WHA24.48 Health consequences of smoking 
Twenty-Ninth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 3-21 May 1976 
WHA29.55 Smoking and health 
Thirty-Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 5-23 May 1980 
WHA33.35 WHO's programme on smoking and health 
Thirty-First World Health Assembly, Geneva, 8-24 May 1978 
WHA31.56 Health hazards of smoking 
Thirty-Ninth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 5-16 May 1986 
WHA39.14 Tobacco or health 
Forty-First World Health Assembly, Geneva, 2-13 May 1988 
WHA41.25 Tobacco or health 
Forty-Second World Health Assembly, Geneva, 8-19 May 1989 
WHA42.19 Tobacco or health 
Forty-Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 7-17 May 1990 
WHA43.16 Tobacco or health 
Forty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 6-16 May 1991 
WHA44.26 Smoking and travel 
Forty-Fifth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 4-14 May 1992 
WHA45.20 Multisectoral collaboration on WHO's programme on "tobacco or 
health" 
Forty-Sixth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 3-14 May 1993 
WHA46.8 Use of tobacco within United Nations system buildings 
Fortieth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 4-15 May 1987 
WHA40.38 7 April 1988: a world no-smoking day 
Forty-Eighth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 1-12 May 1995 
WHA48.11 An international strategy for tobacco control 
Fifty-Second World Health Assembly, Geneva, 17-25 MAY 1999 
WHA52.18 Towards a WHO framework convention on tobacco control 
Forty-Ninth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 20-25 May 1996 
WHA49.17 International framework convention for tobacco control 
WHA49.16 Tobacco-or-health programme 
Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 14-22 May 2001 
WHA54.18 Transparency in tobacco control 
Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 19-28 May 2003 
WHA56.1 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
Fifty-Third World Health Assembly, Geneva, 20 May 2000 
WHA53.16 Framework convention on tobacco control 
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 The Expert Advisory Panels drew on a range of professionals experts: anti-
tobacco activists, academics and those active in the World Conferences on Tobacco and 
Health. For example, the WHO Expert Committee on Smoking Control that met in 
October 1978 and prepared the 1979 Controlling the Smoking Epidemic report consisted 
of 26 members from 19 different countries (“Controlling the Smoking Epidemic” 1979). 
Only one – Dr Roberto Masironi – was a full-time employee of the WHO. The 
remaining members of the group were academics, employees of national health 
ministries and health associations, and members of civil society organizations such as 
Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) (1979, 5-6). The various reports consistently 
emphasized advertising restrictions, health warnings on tobacco products and public 
education campaigns as methods for curtailing the tobacco problem.  
 Following on from the 4th World Conference on Smoking and Health held in 
Sweden in 1979 (Ramström 1980), the WHO’s next annual World Health Day was 
devoted to tobacco control (World Health Day 1980 -Tobacco or Health: You decide). 
That same year, WHO’s programme on smoking and health was established. However, 
the programme consisted of only one staff member – Masironi himself – had only a 
small budget and enjoyed little organizational support. (Reynolds and Tansey 2012, 
xxiii). At the urging of various anti-tobacco activists, WHO Director General Halfdan 
Mahler agreed to convene another group of experts to prepare a Global Action Plan on 
Tobacco or Health in 1988, for which Judith Mackay served as rapporteur. This helped 
launch World No Tobacco Day, held on 7th April 1988 – the 40th anniversary of the 
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founding of the WHO – and repeated annually since (Reynolds & Tansey 2012, xxiii). 
The WHO tobacco unit was also modestly expanded by one staff member (WHO 1988).  
 The year 1988 also marked the beginning of Dr Hiroshi Nakajima’s decade-long 
tenure as Director General of the WHO – a period characterized by significant decline 
in the organization’s credibility and prestige (See Chapter 1). And as the general 
fortunes of the WHO declined, so too did those of tobacco unit. When Roberto Masironi 
retired from WHO in 1991, Canadian public health official Neil Collishaw took over as 
Programme Director of the tobacco unit. In an oral history interview, Collishaw 
described the situation of tobacco at the WHO during these years in the following way: 
[The tobacco unit] was always very small, including when I was there. 
The very first efforts of WHO to do very much about tobacco came in 
1970 when they adopted a resolution. Then there were a number of 
expert reports that were issued [and] technical reports on tobacco that 
were issued in the 70's and 80's.  But the secretariat was woefully small 
and underfunded… WHO in general is woefully underfunded…And 
because tobacco was kind of a Johnny-come-lately (the first resolution 
wasn't until 1970 and by then a lot of other programs had been well 
established) it really has never been able to command much [funding] 
(Collishaw 2013).  
 
Collishaw has elsewhere noted that the relative neglect of tobacco control by the WHO 
was not due to a lack of interest in the issue by the Director General, pointing out that 
“Dr Nakajima – the DG for most of my tenure in WHO – was always very interested in 
tobacco control. He was supportive of what we were doing” (Reynolds and Tansey 
2010, 34). Instead, the lack of support came from the member-states themselves: 
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“[Nakajima] was not particularly successful in attracting funding from member states 
for tobacco control” (Reynolds and Tansey 2010, 34).53 
 
Figuring the Numbers 
 In addition to convening Expert Panels and preparing Reports, the main activity 
of the tobacco unit during the late 1980s and early 1990s was to prepare estimates for 
global tobacco-related mortality. As Collishaw recounts: 
[O]ne of the things we did was, we prepared the first sound scientific 
estimates of the number of deaths in the world due to tobacco use… 
[O]ur first estimate for the 1990's were about 3 million deaths a year.  
And I used to say well, you know...that's one million deaths per staff 
member… Counting the secretary. (Laughing)… So we felt like we had 
a lot of responsibility but very little in the way of means to deal with it. 
(Collishaw interview) 
 
In preparing these estimates, Collishaw drew considerably on the work of WHO 
colleague and co-author of the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study: Australian 
statistician Alan D. Lopez.  
Lopez had a long-standing interest in changing patterns of disease using 
historical descriptive epidemiological data –mortality and causes of death statistics – as 
well as a growing in interest in tobacco epidemiology (Lopez 2013).  According to 
Lopez, the motivation for producing sound tobacco mortality estimates stemmed from a 
lack of reliable numbers at the global level:  
WHO's authority in tobacco was weakened by the fact that the tobacco 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 As a tobacco industry document reported: “It would appear that WHO is unwilling to boost 
the [Tobacco or Health] programme significantly, either in terms of budget or status within the 
Organization for fear of offending its biggest budgetary contributor, the USA, whose pro-
tobacco lobby is still powerful in Congress, a body that loses no opportunity to threaten the UN 
system with cuts in funding” (Lindheim 1994). 
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industry was making fun of WHO estimates where one day you say this, 
one day you say that, you can't be serious, therefore tobacco can't be 
harmful…WHO was a very weak advocate in those days because it 
didn't have good science (Lopez 2013). 
 
In Lopez’s view, the efforts of the international tobacco control movement were 
constrained because of a lack of reliable scientific estimates of tobacco-related 
mortality.  Lopez continues:  
…[W]hen I came over there [and] linked up with [Sir Richard] Peto to 
produce those estimates [it] immediately changed the landscape.  The 
tobacco industry went quiet after that.  There was no longer that kind of 
challenge of whether these numbers are right or not…So suddenly the 
tobacco advocates in countries had estimates for their country.  They had 
them from the great respectability of the very wise old man at Oxford 
Richard Peto and his sidekick Alan Lopez of WHO… 
 
And I think that the work that Richard and I did helped bring coherence, 
reduce uncertainly, allow people to be more confident in what they were 
saying and doing about the harms of tobacco and the need for tobacco 
control measures.  WHO then started to use those and disseminate those 
numbers and the projections that Peto and I were making about what's 
going to happen if we don't do something serious about tobacco control.  
3 million deaths today, 10 million deaths in our lifetime by I think we 
predicted for 2025 or 2030. (Lopez 2013, emphasis added). 
 
By producing reliable numbers – i.e. good science – Lopez and his collaborators hoped 
to equip in-country tobacco control advocates with a powerful tool with which to argue 
for tobacco control measures. Lopez thus points to the interdependence of tobacco 
control science and tobacco control policy at the international level: members of the 
international tobacco control movement helped motivate the WHO to undertake 
scientific studies of the tobacco problem. The results of these studies then helped further 
catalyze in-country tobacco control activities. In other words, the science and policy of 
tobacco control were being coproduced. Importantly, Lopez’s numbers captured not just 
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the current state of tobacco mortality but the future impact of the tobacco epidemic “if 
we don’t do something about it”. This equipped tobacco control advocates with an 
important epistemic resource that was based in good science, oriented towards the 
speculative future and aimed at preventing these avoidable deaths.  
 In producing these numbers, Lopez worked with two different collaborators: 
with US health economist, World Bank consultant, and fellow GBD study co-author 
Christopher Murray (see Chapter 2) and with famed tobacco epidemiologist Sir Richard 
Peto.54 Peto was then employed by Oxford University and had recently been 
undertaking work on tobacco deaths in China as part of the World Bank’s Disease 
Control Priority Project (Lopez 2013; Peto et al. 1992).55 Lopez explained the different 
collaborations in following way:  
[The estimates] were made essentially two ways… Peto and I made 
estimates and then Murray and I made estimates in [the GBD study].  
Part of the global burden of disease was for 10 risk factors (a 
disappointingly, laughingly, small number of risk factors compared to 
what we do today), one of which was tobacco.56  And then we also…did 
risk factor projections after 2020, including [for] tobacco.  So Murray 
and I had a completely different method, statistical method, based on 
multiple regressions, basically, for modeling the impact of tobacco.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Lopez initially worked in the health statistics unit of the WHO only moving to the tobacco 
unit after his involvement with Christopher Murray and the GBD study make him deeply 
unpopular at WHO (Lopez 2013). 
55 The Disease Control Priority Project which, like the GBD study, served as background to the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, applied W. Henry 
Mosley’s categorical approach to health systems planning using disease burden and cost-
effectiveness analysis as criteria for prioritizing health interventions. See Chapters 1 & 2 for 
further discussion of the categorical approach and DCPP, respectively.  
56 The risk factors assessed in the GBD study included malnutrition; poor water supply, 
sanitation and personal/domestic hygiene; unsafe sex; tobacco use; alcohol use; occupation (that 
is, exposure to hazards through work); hypertension; physical inactivity; illicit drug use; and air 
pollution (Murray and Lopez 1996b, 27). 
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Peto and I had another method, which was essentially built around 
looking at the volume of smokers in the world today, [and asking] how 
many of them are likely to continue?  Of those who continued how many 
of them [would be] killed by the habit, and when [would they] be killed?  
And we just did these series of predictions of cohort after cohort, and 
then just took vertical slices to add out what we thought would happen at 
a particular point of time.   
 
We choose 2030 because we said that's roughly the time (on current 
tobacco projections) when the current hazards that we see in Australia, 
the UK, US, [would] happen in China and India and in big, large 
populations…of smokers in developing countries… Murray and I 
predicted, I think, about 8 million tobacco deaths in 2020.  Peto and I 
predicted about 10 million tobacco deaths in 2030. 
 
Whether it's 8 or 10 million, that's annual deaths, it's an enormous, 
absurd volume of preventable mortality… And so those numbers started 
to be increasingly used in the global tobacco dialogue.  Peto and I would 
give talks at tobacco conferences and global epidemiology conferences. 
There was often this partnership where I’d go first and present the latest 
global burden of disease results. Peto would then come next to take those 
results and say how much was due to tobacco.  So we had this very 
interesting, powerful partnership I think in various places (Lopez 
Interview). 
 
In both of these collaborations, Lopez, working at the WHO, collaborated with 
World Bank-sponsored researchers: Christopher Murray through the GBD Study 
and Richard Peto, whose work on tobacco mortality and China had been 
sponsored as part of the World Bank’s DCPP projects. These numbers were then 
circulated widely at international tobacco and epidemiology conferences i.e. the 
very same venues in which the international tobacco control movement was 
undergoing professionalization and coalescence.  
I asked Lopez about the impact of these mortality estimates on the international 
tobacco control movement, proposing that his descriptive epidemiology was critical to 
the eventual success of the FCTC. He was careful to give due credit to early 
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international anti-tobacco activists, but also agreed that the numbers were crucially 
important: 
[W]hen we entered the fray, which was the late 1980's, early 1990's (I 
said “we” as Murray and Lopez on one hand through the Burden of 
Disease including tobacco as a risk factor and Peto and Lopez…through 
the sort of Peto-Lopez method), when we entered the fray I'd say in early 
1990's there were already very good people – Judith McKay in China, 
the Australian people like Simon Chapman and others - they were doing 
very good work in getting the hazards of tobacco as best they were 
known into the public arena for tobacco control.  Tobacco control in 
Australia started in the 1970's, two decades, basically, before Peto and I 
were active in our work. [E]nough was known about the individual 
epidemiology…[but] What was not known was the population health 
effects… what does it mean for Australia, what does this mean for the 
US, what does this mean for the world? 
 
That only started to unravel, basically, when we started to derive these 
global numbers…so there was already a nascent effort, absolutely…We 
came along and said we've got a way to quantify this now. This is what 
it's going to mean today and this is what's it's going to mean in the future.  
That had, I think, a pretty catalyzing impact (Lopez 2013).  
 
Two aspects of Lopez’s response are worth highlighting. First, these “global numbers” 
provided a way to quantify the tobacco problem, which had a “catalyzing impact” on 
the international tobacco control movement. Second, Lopez and his colleagues’ 
methods captured not only the current state of the tobacco problem, but the anticipated 
future impact of the tobacco epidemic.57 They thus proposed a model of the cigarette 
epidemic that followed the broad contours of the epidemiological transition, concerns 
about which had motivated much work in health systems planning at the World Bank 
(See Figure 3.7). In their paper, A Descriptive Model of the Cigarette Epidemic in 
Developed Countries (1994), Lopez, Collishaw and WHO colleague Tipani Pha 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Chapter 2 for the future-orientation of the broader project of Investing in Health 
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concluded that “The arithmetic of the tobacco epidemic is simple and stark. Cigarettes 
kill half of their lifelong users”(246).   
 
 
Figure 3.7: A model of the cigarette epidemic. 
Reproduced from (Lopez, Collishaw, and Piha 1994) 
 
Without comprehensive regulatory action to discourage tobacco use, they warned, “this 
epidemiological transition, with tens of millions of premature deaths which result form 
it, is virtually certain to happen” (246).  
 While these numbers had what Lopez called a “catalyzing impact”, they also 
served to significantly reframe to global tobacco threat. Instead of being framed 
primarily in terms of moral outrage at a neocolonial capitalist tobacco industry, the 
global tobacco threat was characterized as an impending epidemic of avoidable death 
and disease. After later investigations undertaken by the World Bank into the 
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economics of tobacco, the global tobacco threat came also to be characterized as a net 
economic loss. Importantly, it was this characterization of the impending global tobacco 
epidemic – couched in the seemingly neutral language of numbers produced via 
epidemiological and economic calculation – that eventually gained traction with the 
important multilateral organizations involved in world health: the World Health 
Organization and World Bank. 
 
Budgetary crises and inadequate resources 
Despite the stark warnings of the coming tobacco epidemic contained in these 
data, tobacco control did not immediately become a priority at the WHO. As Neil 
Collishaw recounts it:  
[W]e certainly made the best use of that material that we could.  And we 
used the mortality estimates plus other estimates that Alan and I worked 
up on the number of cigarettes consumed and the number of smokers 
around the world...we used all that in our public communications. But, it 
didn't make people sit up and take notice and say, well, my goodness 
there are so many dead people here we should shower money at these 
people so they can get on with their job (Collishaw 2013). 
 
“In fact”, Collishaw goes on to say, “things went the other way... for a while the 
tobacco program kind of lost bureaucratic influence in that we were combined with the 
program on substance abuse and for a time I had to take on additional responsibilities 
for alcohol control and illicit drug control” (Collishaw 2013). 
 Collishaw links the lack of support for tobacco control at WHO during the 
1990s to ongoing problems of budget allocation within the organization. As noted 
above, while Nakajima was supportive of tobacco control in principle, he was not 
particularly successful in attracting funding from member states for tobacco control. He 
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was, Collishaw notes, “somewhat successful” in attracting funding, “with respect to his 
home country, but other than that… not so successful. (Reynolds and Tansey 2012, 32). 
Collishaw’s reference to being “successful with respect to his home country” here refers 
to Nakajima’s distribution of extra-budgetary funds from the Japanese Shipbuilders 
Foundation (now the Nippon Foundation) to the tobacco unit. Collishaw recounts the 
problems of the tobacco control unit’s dependency on extra-budgetary funding:   
So [tobacco control] has largely depended on voluntary contributions.  
Well voluntary contributions are based on various forms of whimsy 
and....they come and they go right?  
 
[So] the director general at the time was Dr.  Nakajima, who was 
Japanese, and Mr. Sasakawa who was a Japanese industrialist and head 
of the Japanese Ship Building Foundation gave some money to WHO. 
Dr. Nakajima deployed the money as he saw fit, and for a while he 
deployed some of it to us. Then after a while he deployed less of it to us, 
because he had other priorities to meet. And I think Sasakawa changed, 
he decreased the amount he was giving, in any case…[B]ut just going 
back to the dynamic of how WHO is funded; everything these days that 
gets funded in WHO has to depend on these voluntary contributions. 
Well... you know the world is mostly poor right? There's 75% of the 
world's population lives in developing countries that really can't afford to 
spend more than the minimum for public health. So the contributions 
mostly come from the 15 or 20 countries that can afford it and are 
interested in making voluntary contributions. And they'll only make 
voluntary contributions to things that they are interested in. 
 
The other problem is, if you've only got two or three staff members and 
an organization with 9000 people, you don't have a lot of bureaucratic 
weight to throw around.  Even though I'm a big guy and I got sharp 
elbows.  There's just a reality that 3 people just isn't very many.  
 
If other people had more bureaucratic weight to throw around … despite 
the size of the tobacco problem, tobacco gets shoved aside. That's kinda 
what happened there.  
 
Here Collishaw identifies the same problems of budgetary scarcity and reliance on 
extra-budgetary funding that scholars of world health have indicated as a cause and 
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consequence of the WHO diminished credibility and legitimacy during the transition 
from international to global health during the 1990s.  
 Collishaw goes on to explain that despite inadequate funding and limited 
bureaucratic weight “we persevered and managed to make progress and I think the key 
then occurred around 1993, 94 in there” (Collishaw 1993). Originating from outside 
both the WHO and the international tobacco control movement, the key event to which 
Collishaw refers was the development of the idea for a legally-binding approach to 
international tobacco control. Collishaw describes it as such: 
I was approached by a couple of American colleagues, Ruth Roemer 
who was from California and [former] head of the American Public 
Health Organization and was a lawyer by profession, and her colleague 
Allyn Taylor, another law professor. And Allyn had written a thing about 
how international law could be used to better effect health regulation in 
general. And Ruth Roemer was quite taken by this and came to see me 
and said, ‘well...this is a great idea! We should have an international 
convention on tobacco control.’  And I said ‘that sounds like a wonderful 
dream’… Undaunted she said, ‘Oh...if we build it they will come’.  
 
And so began the process of building Roemer’s dream. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that the creation of the DALY metric and the findings of 
the GBD Study and DCP Project were necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the 
eventual passage of the FCTC treaty. In this chapter, I began to trace the various other 
factors that contributed to the eventual passage of the treaty. Here, I detailed the early 
movement for international tobacco control. Ignited by scientific findings about the 
negative health effects associated with smoking and animated by a sense of moral 
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outrage that the tobacco industry could recklessly pursue its own profits at the expense 
of human health, the early movement espoused an anti-corporate ethos that can be seen 
in Mike Muller’s work on Tobacco in the Third World and in the activities of the 
Australian anti-smoking BUGA UP. However, this moral outrage frame did not achieve 
resonance with the discursive context of field of world health at the time, which was 
focused primarily on themes of infant mortality and child survival. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s the international tobacco control movement underwent considerable 
professionalization – launching an international journal, continuing international 
conferences, working with national governments and gaining a foothold at WHO in the 
Programme on Smoking and Health. However, without dedicated budgetary support and 
with little institutional weight amidst a large number of often competing priorities, 
tobacco control was not a priority for WHO during these years. 
 With the publication of the GBD study and Alan Lopez, Richard Peto and Neil 
Collishaw’s continued work on global tobacco mortality, the global tobacco threat came 
to be characterized in terms of the current and projected future burden of tobacco 
related disease i.e. as an impending global tobacco epidemic. Framed in the seemingly 
objective language of disease burdens and, later, health economics, the global tobacco 
epidemic then began to gain prominence at the WHO. In this next chapter, I show how 
tobacco was adopted as a WHO priority in the late 1990s following the appointment of 
Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland as Director General of WHO.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE MAKING OF A WHO TREATY: GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND, 
WHO REFORM AND THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I traced the development of the early movement for 
international tobacco control through its inception in the late 1960s, its mobilization of a 
moral outrage frame during the 1970s and 1980s, it growing professionalization during 
the 1980s and into the 1990s and finally, the characterization of the tobacco threat as an 
impending epidemic in the early to mid 1990s. Having sketched the history of 
international tobacco control up until the 1990s, in this chapter I turn more specifically 
to the history of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control itself.  
 
 I begin with its initial conceptualization by Allyn Taylor and the uptake of 
Taylor’s idea by public health activist and Professor of Health Law at UCLA Ruth 
Roemer. Roemer enthusiastically promoted the idea within the international tobacco 
control community and at the ninth World Conference on Tobacco or Health in Paris in 
1994, which led to the creation of the WHO resolution in support of a tobacco treaty 
soon after. However, the idea for a FCTC was initially met with skepticism and even 
hostility at the WHO, especially from the WHO’s legal department. It was eventually 
embraced by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland upon her election as Director General of the 
	   164 
 
 
WHO in 1998. Importantly, Brundtland adopted the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 1993: Investing in Health as her “roadmap” to reforming the WHO and was 
guided by its recommendations for structuring national health systems according to a 
logic of economic rationalization, i.e. DALYs gained for dollars spent. Tobacco control 
presented an opportunity for the WHO to: 1) demonstrate its technical leadership by 
mobilizing epidemiological evidence in support of a legally-binding approach global 
tobacco control and 2) re-assert its moral voice regarding health equity, especially in 
light of the disproportionate burden of tobacco-related illness that was projected to fall 
on countries of the global south. It also gave the WHO an opportunity to position itself 
as the lead coordinating body within the field of global health by enacting Article 19 of 
its constitution and negotiating an unprecedented legally-binding health treaty. Tobacco 
control became a WHO priority at this point: Brundtland created the Tobacco Free 
Initiative (TFI) and appointed South African epidemiologist and anti-smoking 
campaigner Derek Yach as its head. With Brundtland at the helm of the WHO and Yach 
as head of the TFI, negotiations for the FCTC quickly got underway.   
 During the treaty-making process a number of developments helped speed its 
passage: public hearings in advance of treaty negotiations, the creation of an active 
transnational NGO movement, the deployment of various rhetorical strategies and, 
crucially, the publication and dissemination of the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic 
(1999) report during the negotiations. I detail the significance of each of these 
developments in turn. Throughout this history, I pay particular attention to the 
relationship between science and politics and to the persuasive power of the putatively 
objective evidence base of global tobacco control in the history of the FCTC treaty.  
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 I argue that the transition from international to global health during the late 
1980s and early 1990s constituted a change in the political and discursive opportunity 
structures in the field of world health (Ferre et al. 2002, 62; McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald, Koopmans etc ). Amidst the newly altered global health landscape, the results of 
the GBD study and DCP Project, as well as the World Bank’s economic framing of the 
tobacco epidemic became compelling evidence in support of international tobacco 
control. Here, the threat posed by tobacco could be framed in the seemingly objective, 
scientific language of health economics. This economic framing found resonance with 
important constituencies – with the World Bank, of course, and with representatives of 
national Ministries of Finance of WHO member-state delegates.  The implicit political 
rationality of the DALY-method (its particular way of quantifying disease and 
economizing life that I discussed in the previous chapter) and the associated burden of 
disease concept and cost-effectiveness emphasis achieved resonance amidst the 
neoliberal transformation of the field of world health during this era.  
 At the same time, the appointment of Gro Harlem Bruntdland as Director 
General of the World Health Organization in 1998 provided a crucial transnational 
political opportunity structure (Kay, 2005, 722) for the tobacco control movement. At 
this point, the international tobacco control became, itself, transnationalized. With key 
allies in transnational actors such as the WHO and World Bank the international 
tobacco control movement became a global tobacco control movement.  
 In her role as Director General, Brundtland was tasked with reforming the WHO 
and with reasserting the centrality of the languishing organization within a newly 
crowded field of global health actors. By adopting the FCTC as a WHO priority, 
 	  
166 
 
Brundtland was able to partially realize her vision for the WHO as “the moral voice and 
the technical leader in improving the health of the people of the world” (1998 Speech to 
General Assembly). The epidemiology of the tobacco threat, especially the DALY-
characterization of tobacco as a ranking cause of global disease burden that would 
disproportionately affect the global south, served as an epistemic hinge between the 
moral outrage framing invoked by the international tobacco control movement and the 
epidemiological/economic characterization of the tobacco epidemic adopted by the 
WHO and World Bank. Brundtland effectively brokered across the moral outrage frame 
and epidemiological/economic characterization, garnering support for the treaty among 
a wide variety of individuals, organizations and movement actors.  
 While Brundtland was no doubt central to the successful passage of the FCTC, 
her accomplishments were made neither alone nor in a historical and political vacuum. 
Instead, as I try to highlight here, Brundtland mobilized a particular set of constraints 
and opportunities that emerged at the intersection of a changing world health context, 
the creation of an epidemiological and economic characterization of an impending 
global tobacco epidemic and an evolving movement for international tobacco control. In 
other words, the FCTC treaty was not produced by Brundtland alone, but was 
coproduced with the changing characterization of the tobacco threat and context of 
world health during the 1990s.  
 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FCTC: TAYLOR & ROEMER, THE PARIS WORLD 
CONFERENCE AND INITIAL RESISTANCE AT WHO 
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 The idea for the FCTC treaty was initially developed in more abstract form by 
American Allyn Lise Taylor who, at the time, was working on a doctoral dissertation in 
international law at Columbia University. Taylor was concerned with the relative 
neglect of instruments of international law in advancing health policy (Taylor 2013. See 
also Taylor 1992). Drawing inspiration from other areas of international regulation, 
especially from environmental law, Taylor argued that WHO should use the long-
neglected treaty-making function enshrined in Article 19 of its constitution to advance 
the Alma-Ata agenda of Health-for-all by the year 2000. She also identified what she 
saw as a shortcoming of the WHO: that in dealing only with ministries of health, the 
WHO lacked sufficient political power to effect change at the national level: 
The primary participants in WHO’s policy debate and strategy 
development in the national and international arenas are state ministers 
of health, technocrats who generally lack significant influence or power 
in national political systems. WHO’s organizational policy of working 
directly within national ministries of health often falls short of focusing 
the discussion of Health for All to include political elites, or expanding it 
to encompass the public. In many countries, this approach has resulted in 
inadequate consideration of Health for All by political leaders (Taylor, 
1992 pp. 335-336). 
    
Taylor argued that if WHO could overcome its conservative organizational culture and 
its reluctance to invoke Article 19, international law could offer an effective way of 
advancing the Health-for-all strategy. 
  Her ideas were published in the American Journal of Law and Medicine under 
the title Making the World Health Organization Work  (Taylor 1992). The article was 
then brought to the attention of Ruth Roemer, then a professor of Public Health at the 
University of California, Los Angeles. Roemer was a trained lawyer, “staunch political 
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liberal and a lifelong fighter for social justice”, who had long been active at the 
intersection of law and public health working on issues surrounding psychiatric hospital 
admissions, access to abortion and tobacco control (Taylor 2005). Roemer also had 
international health expertise having been stationed in Geneva at the fledgling WHO in 
1951 with her husband Milton Roemer, before charges of disloyalty to the US under 
McCarthyism caused them to flee to Canada. The Roemers were great advocates of 
universal health care and saw privatization of health systems as a primary cause of 
health inequalities throughout the world (Roemer and Roemer 1990; Roemer 1988; 
Roemer 1988).  
 Roemer saw great potential in Taylor’s suggestion of using international law to 
advance global public health and suggested the area of tobacco control as a particularly 
fruitful application. Tobacco legislation was at the forefront of Roemer’s mind in 1993, 
as she had recently completed the second edition of a WHO-sponsored survey of 
tobacco control legislation worldwide: Legislative Action to Combat the World Smoking 
Epidemic ([1982]1993). While Roemer’s own work on tobacco control legislation 
focused exclusively at the national level, she saw in Taylor’s article the potential for 
international regulation.  
 In July 1993, Ruth and Milton Roemer met with Allyn Taylor over lunch at the 
UCLA faculty club. When Ruth Roemer suggested that Taylor apply her ideas to 
tobacco control, the idea “just clicked” in Taylor’s mind (Taylor 2013). It seemed to her 
that tobacco could be a perfect application of international law, especially from a 
technical standpoint. The tobacco market was dominated by a handful of transnational 
tobacco corporations who used similar strategies to market their products across 
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different national contexts. At the same time, a well-defined set of intervention 
strategies had been proven effective in discouraging tobacco consumption at the 
national level. Both of these considerations made tobacco control particularly amenable 
to international regulation (Taylor 2013). 
 Over the next year Taylor continued to develop the technical arguments in 
support of a tobacco treaty. Her work, however, was not initially well received. 
Presenting a paper at the Academic Council of the United Nations System at the Hague 
in June 1994, Taylor recalls the commentator beginning her comments by asking 
“What’s the big deal with tobacco?” And the comments went downhill from there 
(Taylor 2013. See also Taylor 1994). Similarly, when Taylor submitted her ideas to the 
9th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Paris 1994, her work was accepted 
only in poster form (Taylor 2013).  
 At the same time that Taylor was further developing the legal arguments for 
international tobacco regulation, Roemer was promoting the idea of a tobacco treaty 
among her fellow international public health advocates. In the summer of 1993, Roemer 
presented the idea at the First All-Africa Conference on Tobacco or Health, co-chaired 
by Derek Yach (Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005; Chapman et al. 1994).58 In 
October, she visited WHO headquarters in Geneva and discussed the idea with a 
number of senior staff members, including Neil Collishaw (see Chapter 3). Later that 
month, she promoted the idea at the annual meeting of the American Public Health 
Association in San Francisco. While there, she met with fellow tobacco control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Yach would later become the head of the WHO’s Tobacco Free Initiative under Director 
General Gro Harlem Bruntland. 
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advocate, Judith Mackay. Mackay recounts the meeting as follows: “On 26 October 
1993, Ruth Roemer invited me for an unforgettable breakfast during a conference in 
San Francisco. Had WHO ever considered a convention on tobacco? she asked me. I 
replied that WHO had meetings all the time – some might say too many! Ruth patiently 
explained that she meant a UN-style convention and asked me to convey this idea to 
WHO” (Mackay 2003, 551).  
 Mackay followed up on Roemer’s initial presentation of the idea to WHO and to 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was then the UN 
focal point for tobacco, but “it was very negatively received” (Mackay 2010). “You 
know,” Mackay told me,  “it had never been done before… There was an awful lot of 
impasse and inertia and the feeling it was too difficult” (Mackay 2010). Nevertheless, 
Roemer, Mackay and Collishaw all continued to promote the idea for a legally binding 
tobacco treaty both within the WHO and within the broader international tobacco 
control movement. 
 
The Paris Conference 
  One success came when they managed to get a resolution in support of the idea 
adopted by the 9th World Conference on Tobacco and Health in Paris in 1994. 
Collishaw recounted the story to me in the following way: 
[I]n [19]94 there was a World Conference [on Tobacco and Health] in 
Paris… And as luck would have it I was on the resolutions committee, 
which decided which resolutions presented by delegates would come for 
a vote. And the resolutions were submitted, theoretically anonymously, 
and the committee reviewed them, read them and picked the best ones.  
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So I was looking at these resolutions and there was one hand written one 
and I recognized the handwriting, [as] Ruth Roemer's. And sure enough, 
she wanted an international convention. And so the other members of the 
committee didn't, you know, they thought the convention was where we 
were at. 
 
Interviewer:  Like a conference? 
 
… so they kind of looked at me and said what's this?  And I said “oh 
that's a good one. Let's put that one in”. And they said “well ok, you 
know...you're from WHO (Collishaw 2013) 
 
The Paris conference thus adopted the resolution, which read: “This conference resolves 
that National Governments, Ministers of health, and the World Health Organization 
should immediately initiate action to prepare and achieve an International Convention 
on Tobacco Control to be adopted by the United Nation…” (Mackay 2003, 551). 
 The Paris conference was significant in another way too: for the first time, 
global estimates for the economic impact of tobacco were produced. World Bank 
economist Howard Barnum had, in the early 1990s, started to calculate the costs and 
benefits of tobacco production as part of the World Bank’s investigations into 
categorical cost-effective health packages (Jamison et al 1993).59 As the disease-burden 
associated with tobacco consumption became apparent through the GBD Study, DCP 
Project and the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, the World Bank 
ceased lending for tobacco production. The Bank also commissioned further analyses of 
the net costs and benefits of tobacco production (Barnum 1994, 361). At the Paris 
conference Barnum reported: “The World Bank has concluded that it does not make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Barnum has also been an early advocate of age-weighting and discounting in summary 
measures of population health at the World Bank. See (Barnum 1987) and my earlier discussion 
in Chapter 2. 
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good economic sense to lend money for tobacco projects but it does make good sense to 
lend for anti-tobacco activities in health projects” (Barnum 1994, 358). 
  Barnum characterized sharing this message with the Paris Conference attendees 
as an “extraordinary opportunity”, because “I know that you face opposition not only 
from the tobacco trade lobby but also, in some cases from your ministries of finance.” 
He continued: “I intend to give you a message to your ministers of finance. Tobacco is 
too great a problem to be left to the health sector alone…controlling the consumption of 
tobacco is not only good for people’s health but also an important policy for their 
countries’ economic prospects” (Barnum 1994, 358).  
Barnum went on to characterize tobacco consumption as an economic disaster, 
which produced an annual global loss of $200 billion dollars (measured in 1990 
USD).60 Each additional 1000 tons of tobacco consumption, Barnum further calculated, 
would cause 650 deaths and a net economic loss of $27,200,000 US dollars. Barnum’s 
conclusion was direct and succinct: “This, then, is the simple message. Tobacco 
consumption provides a net economic loss, and anti-tobacco policies are a cost-effective 
way to save lives and benefit the economy. I hope you are convinced and will convey 
this message to your ministers of finance” (Barnum 1994, 361).  
 Barnum’s message gained circulation beyond the immediate attendees of the 
Paris conference when it was featured in the 1994 December issue of the journal 
Tobacco Control. In addition to reprinting the talk, Tobacco Control devoted the lead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Barnum made his calculations using mortality estimates from US Surgeon General data. But 
he noted that newer estimates made by Alan Lopez and Richard Peto suggested that the 
economic costs of tobacco may be close to double his estimates (Barnum 1994, 359 fn 1). 
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editorial to Barnum’s tobacco economics and featured his talk prominently in its 
coverage of the Paris Conference.61 News editor David Simpson observed:  
The economics of tobacco gained a new level of prominence at the 
conference…By far the most dramatic economic data... came from a 
senior economist at the World Bank, whose paper on the effect of 
tobacco on the global economy showed a net negative impact of $200 
billion dollars. With ammunition like this, surely advocates can now 
begin to capture the economic high ground from the tobacco industry 
(Simpson 1994, 303).  
 
Alan Lopez had provided epidemiological “ammunition” with his tobacco mortality 
numbers as we saw in the previous chapter. Now, World Bank research into tobacco 
economics, which had been motivated by DALY calculations and the findings of the 
GBD study and DCP projects, provided tobacco control advocates with economic 
ammunition as well. 
  A number of tobacco control advocates realized how important the economic 
arguments were, in addition to the epidemiological arguments in advocating for strong 
tobacco control provisions with multilateral organizations like the World Bank and 
WHO and with national level governments. In an interview with US tobacco control 
advocate, member of the US Public Health Service and later, US delegate to early 
FCTC negotiations Thomas Novotny, he remarked: “People don’t care if you die [but] 
economic arguments became quite important” (Novotny 2013). Novotny continues: 
“[P]ublic health people don’t have the ear of the President like a minster of finance 
does. And you can say, “this is the right thing to do”, but unless it has an economic 
justification, it can be hard to get Heads of States to take action” (Novotny 2013). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Peto & Lopez’s newly published global tobacco mortality figures also featured prominently 
(Simpson 1994, 302).  
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Similarly, Alan Lopez recounted to me how a World Bank colleague, Prabat Jha, also 
saw the importance of the economic arguments in support of tobacco control. Jha was a 
medical doctor, an epidemiologist who had studied under Richard Peto and a health 
economist who was well-versed in the intricacies of the tobacco epidemic. Lopez 
recounts: “[Jha] was extremely influential and clever in saying that - and I remember 
the conversation -  “Alan, it's not just the body count here. Governments react to the hip 
pocket. What does it mean in terms of dollars?”  And he started the work at the [World] 
Bank… with [Dean] Jamison as part of the Disease Control Priorities work” (Lopez 
2013).  
 The simple message of Barnum’s tobacco economics – that tobacco production 
created a net loss to the global economy of $200 billion USD annually – carried the “hip 
pocket” message and was adopted and disseminated in journal articles, conference talks 
and public events (World Health Organization 1999a; Chaloupka, Yurekli, and Fong 
2012; “The United Nations Establishes a Focal Point on Tobacco” 1994; Reynolds and 
Tansey E M 2012; World Bank 1999a; Jha and Chaloupka 2000). But Barnum’s 
economic analyses contained very high degrees of uncertainty. This spurred further 
analyses of tobacco economics by the World Bank and the WHO, including work by 
Prabhat Jha who was seconded to the WHO’s Economics Advisory Service of the 
Cluster on Evidence, Information and Policy from his regular appointment as a Senior 
Health Specialist at the World Bank upon the appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as 
Director General of WHO in 1998.  
 The World Bank/WHO work on tobacco economics intensified throughout the 
late 1990s and resulted in a number of conferences and publications that attempted to 
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address “the analytic gap around the economics of tobacco control” (Jha and Chaloupka 
2000, xiii). For example, an international conference on the economics of tobacco 
control was held in Cape Town, South Africa in February 1998, the published 
proceedings of which were the first published volume devoted exclusively to economic 
analyses of the tobacco epidemic (Abedian et al. 1998). The following year Prabhat Jha 
and US Professor of Health Economics Frank Chaloupka published another volume 
devoted to “key questions such as: What is the economic nature of addiction? What is 
the rationale for governments to intervene in the tobacco market? Which interventions 
are effective and which are not? Does tobacco control hard the economy? What are the 
costs and cost-effectiveness of tobacco-control policies?” (Jha and Chaloupka 2000, 
xiii).62 In answering these questions, Jha and Chaloupka drew on the expertise of thirty-
nine contributing authors and four layers of peers review including triplicate reviews of 
each chapter’s key message by the World Bank. The book was primarily intended for 
technical staff within governments and international agencies, academic economists and 
epidemiologist and covered the following topics divided in to five Sections: 
Section I: descriptive overview of global trends in smoking, the impact of tobacco on 
health and the costs of tobacco use; Section II: economic analysis of tobacco use 
focusing on tobacco addiction, the costs and benefits of tobacco use and the economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 By this stage, Gro Harlem Brundtland had been appointment Director General of WHO and 
enthusiastically embraced tobacco control as a WHO priority – as I discuss later in this chapter. 
Thus, in a Foreword to Jha and Chaloupka’s volume co-signed by Brundland and World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn, they could proclaim: “Tobacco is rapidly becoming one of the 
single biggest causes of death worldwide, and by 203 is expected [to] kill about 10 million 
people per year…For both the World Health Organization  (WHO) and the World Bank, 
increased action to reduce this burden is apriority, as part of their missions to improve health 
and reduce poverty” (Jha and Chaloupka 2000, Foreword). 
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rationale for government intervention in the tobacco market; Section III: the 
effectiveness of policies intended to reduce demand for tobacco products; Section IV: 
issues affecting the supply of tobacco; Section V: discussion of the design of effective 
policies and strategic priorities for international organizations in responding to the 
global tobacco epidemic (Jha and Chaloupka 2000).  
 The key messages of Jha and Chaloupka’s (2000) technical volume were also 
published in a non-technical report by the World Bank entitled Curbing the Epidemic: 
Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control (World Bank 1999). Its message 
was clear: “Tobacco is among the greatest causes of preventable and premature deaths 
in human history. Yet comparatively simple and cost-effective policies that can reduce 
its devastating impact are already available. For governments intent on improving 
health within the framework of sound economic policies, action to control tobacco 
represents an unusually attractive choice” (World Bank 1999, X). The report made two 
more specific recommendations. First, that the aims of national governments deciding 
to take strong action against the tobacco epidemic should be directed towards deterring 
children from smoking, protecting nonsmokers from tobacco smoke exposure and 
providing all smokers with information about the health effects of tobacco. Such aims 
could be enacted through tobacco taxation, tobacco warning labels and tobacco 
advertising bans and by widening access to nicotine replacement therapies. Second, 
international agencies should give tobacco control policies due prominence and should 
“address tobacco control issues that cross borders, including working with the WHO’s 
proposed Framework Convention on Tobacco Control” (World Bank 1999, 11). 
 Crucially, the publication of the Curbing the Epidemic Report coincided with 
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the opening negotiations for the FCTC treaty and, according to all of my interview 
respondents, played a “crucial role” is advancing the FCTC treaty.63 However, the path 
to the opening of FCTC treaty negotiations was far from smooth. The idea for a FCTC 
treaty had, first, to overcome significant resistance at WHO. 
 
Initial Resistance at WHO 1994 - 1998 
Following the Paris conference, the idea for a legally binding approach to 
international tobacco control was formally proposed to WHO in two ways: First, in 
early 1995 Judith Mackay was asked by Director General Nakajima to conduct a formal 
review of the Programme on Substance Abuse, which now included the tobacco unit. 
Mackay used the opportunity to strongly recommend an FCTC treaty as a core 
component of the Programme’s strategic direction (Mackay 2003, 551). Second, 
Canadian delegate to the WHA, Jean Lariviere, drafted a resolution that was tabled at 
WHO executive board meeting in January.64 The text, requesting the Director General 
to investigate the feasibility of an “international instrument on tobacco control” was 
adopted by the WHA in May that year (WHA 48.11). Although Nakijima had 
commissioned Allyn Taylor and Ruth Roemer to prepare a feasibility study, resistance 
to the idea of a treaty remained strong at WHO.  
 In an oral history interview, Allyn Taylor recounted to me how the initial outline 
of the feasibility study was heavily criticized. The outline proposed a legally binding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 I discuss the influence of various economic approaches to the tobacco threat on the various 
articles that were incorporated into the FCTC treaty in Chapter 5. 
64 Lariviere benefited from unofficial assistance on the resolution from Neil Collishaw who, due 
to his employment by the WHO Tobacco unit, could not offer official help (Collishaw 2013).  
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treaty on tobacco control to be developed under the auspices of the WHO. A senior 
WHO official criticized the proposal as “ambitious to a fault”, emphasizing that “it is 
important to be realistic” (Roemer et al. 2005, 937). According to Neil Collishaw, this 
resistance came, primarily from the WHO legal department. Upon learning of Taylor 
and Roemer’s proposal for a tobacco treaty, the legal department called Collishaw to a 
meeting and said: “you have to go kill this” (Collishaw 2013). The legal department’s 
reticence stemmed from the lack of precedent, lack of expertise in international law and 
treaty management and, as always with WHO, a lack of resources (Collishaw 2013). It 
was believed that WHO should develop a non-binding code of conduct, like the 
Breastmilk Code, a non-binding international instrument that could be adopted by WHA 
as a resolution, or that a legally binding treaty should be developed by the UN (Roemer 
et al. 2005, 937).  
 In trying to convince the legal department of the necessity of a WHO tobacco 
treaty, Collishaw emphasized the dissimilarity between tobacco and other disease-
targets of WHO work:  
Like everybody else in WHO [the legal department] have to beg for 
resources and money and they felt that they developed a good modus 
operandi for getting health problems solved without treaties. And they'd 
point to examples, look what we did for smallpox and look what we did 
for river blindness.  And I said well, good, but you know there are not 
well-heeled sales persons standing on every street corner all around the 
world with shirt pocket dispensers of oncocherciasis and smallpox. But 
that's what we’ve got with tobacco. We have these big companies that 
are selling this stuff all around the world they aren't going to voluntarily 
stop doing it.  Just because you want them to, it's not like river blindness, 
it's...this is corporate disease. It's quite a different order than what WHO 
is used to dealing with.  Yet we have the responsibility for doing it. So 
we have authority under the constitution of the world health assembly.  
And I pointed right to the section [Article 19 on the] right of convention.  
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So the World Health Assembly says it's time to do it, well it's time to do 
it and time for legal services to get behind it. (Collishaw 2013). 
 
Collishaw saw tobacco as a different kind of health threat to what WHO usually 
addressed – corporate disease. Because they were different, Collishaw saw using 
Article 19 of the WHO constitution as both justified and necessary. 
 Despite pressure to recommend a non-binding instrument, Roemer and Taylor 
persisted in their recommendation for a legally binding tobacco treaty to be developed 
by the WHO in their final report, delivered in August 1995. The report, however, was 
then suppressed by WHO. Only a three page summary of the document was tabled at 
the WHO executive board meeting in January 1996 (EB97/INF,DOC.4) and Taylor and 
Roemer were forbidden from further distributing the full manuscript (Taylor Interview). 
Nevertheless, the executive board adopted the resolution based on the report summary 
(EB97.R8) and a formal resolution calling for a WHO framework convention was 
adopted by the WHA in May 1996 (WHA49.16). The resolution urged Member States 
to implement comprehensive tobacco control strategies (independent of the Framework 
Convention), further urged Member States to contribute extra-budgetary resources 
toward global tobacco control, and requested the Director General to “initiate the 
development of a framework convention in accordance with Article 19 of the WHO 
Constitution” (WHA49.16).  
 However, without dedicated budgetary funding or strong institutional support, 
the newly approved WHO tobacco treaty became just one of many competing priorities 
at WHO and languished over the following years. The idea was still advanced in other 
settings: at the 10th World Conference on Tobacco on Health held in Beijing, China in 
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1997, for example, Ruth Roemer, Allyn Taylor and Neil Collishaw each presented 
papers on the FCTC treaty under the International and Government Options session 
heading (there were six papers in total)(Lu et al. 1997). Barnum’s economic arguments 
for tobacco control were also advanced at the conference in World Bank-sponsored 
sessions on Tobacco Economics (Lu et al. 1997, Novotny 2013). However, the FCTC 
treaty did not receive further attention at the WHO until Gro Harlem Brundtland was 
appointed Director General in 1998.  
 
WHO TURNS 50: WHO REFORM, A RENEWED STRATEGY FOR 
HEALTH-FOR-ALL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 
 At least, the FCTC did not receive direct attention at the WHO. Instead, WHO’s 
treaty-making powers, conferred by Article 19, came under consideration as part of a 
wide-ranging review of WHO’s policies, mission and direction in the lead-up to its 50th 
Anniversary. Throughout the mid-1990s, the WHO was engaged in a process of reform 
in response to 1) the rising prominence of the World Bank in world health affairs, 2) the 
declining legitimacy of the WHO during Nakajima’s tenure 3) a breakdown in the 
relationship between the World Bank and World Health Organization due, in part, to a 
falling out between Nakajima and incoming World Bank President James Wolfensohn 
(Lopez 2013) and 4) rapid changes in the context of world health loosely referred to as 
“Global Change” (Godlee 1994; Horton 2002; Yamey 2002b; Brown, Cueto, and Fee 
2006; J. A. de Beyer, Preker, and Feachem 2000; Fidler 2001).  
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 In January 1992, the WHO Executive Board appointed a working group to 
report on the “WHO Response to Global Change” (World Health Organization 1993).65 
The report noted that the end of the Cold War, market liberalization, economic 
stagnation and increasing debt had resulted in countries becoming “increasingly 
preoccupied with health sector financing” (WHO 1993,1). This can be read as a thinly-
veiled critique of the World Bank’s involvement in world health affairs, especially 
through the DCP Project, the World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health and, 
to a lesser extent, the GBD Study. In other words, the report drew critical attention to 
the changing discursive opportunity structure of world health that was emerging with 
the transition from international to global health during the 1990s. 
 Nevertheless, the WHO Response to Global Change report insisted on the 
continued centrality of the WHO and suggested ways to reestablish its leadership within 
the changed historical context. While the report acknowledged the importance of other 
United Nations agencies and international bodies in matters of health, it noted that their 
involvement “should not displace WHO’s leadership” (WHO 1993, 2).66  The report 
reflected on the mission of the WHO, describing its objective, as enshrined in the 
constitution, as helping to ensure the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health. “To achieve this”, the report continued: 
WHO must have a clear sense of mission and direction. “Health for All” 
provides a valid and timeless aspirational goal. The association of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 It is to this working group that some historians of world health attribute the emergence of a 
focus on “global”, as opposed to “international” health at the WHO (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 
2006).  
66 The turf-war implicit here can also be seen as response to the Children’s Vaccine Initiative 
and later, the creation of UNAIDs – both of which addressed world health issues outside of 
WHO leadership. 
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“Health for All” with the Year 2000 has been a motivational concept for 
the past fifteen years. However, it can now be seen as limiting, 
sometimes misunderstood and proposing a time frame which is not 
universally attainable. More realistic operational targets and indicators 
are needed to guide future international health work by WHO and 
Member States (WHO 1993, 3).   
 
In order to clarify the organization’s mission and direction and define operational 
targets and indicators, a number of working groups were convened and activities 
undertaken under the general rubric of WHO reform (Clift 2013,37). For example, the 
WHO spent three years developing a revised policy of Health-for-all policy for the 
twenty-first century through a broad-based consultative process that included each of 
the WHO’s regional offices, academic consultants and members of civil society 
organizations (World Health Organization 1997a). A related working group reviewed 
the organization’s constitution and found, regarding Article 19, that “although the 
authority to adopt international conventions had never been exercised, it [is] a useful 
power to keep in reserve and should not be deleted from the Constitution” (World 
Health Organization 1997b).  
 The general orientation of the Health-for-all Policy for the twenty-first century 
was towards developing “a holistic global health policy” and translating the goal of 
Health-for-all into operational terms (Antezana, Chollat-Traquet, and Yach 1998, 3 
emphasis added). It positioned health as “an outcome and a goal of sustainable 
development” and emphasized the need to build sustainable health systems (Antezana, 
Chollat-Traquet and Yach 1998, 3-4). It also suggested the prioritization of disease 
prevention and control interventions according to “epidemiological measures of the 
burden of disease now and in the future, effectiveness of interventions to improve 
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health, and capacity (including human, institutional and financial aspects) to implement 
policies” (Antezana, Chollat-Traquet and Yac 1998, 5 emphasis added). In other words, 
although the renewed Health-for-all strategy criticized the changing context of world 
health and the World Bank’s approach to health sector financing, it adopted similar 
ideas about prioritizing health interventions according to disease burden and the 
availability of cost effective interventions that had been advocated in WRD 1993: 
Investing in Health, the GBD Study and DCP Project.  
 Importantly, the revised strategy also emphasized “the need to apply national 
and international instruments that will advance the “right to health” (Antezana et al. 
1998, 3). In adopting the revised Health-for-all policy for the twenty-first century the 
WHO used language that would support the eventual FCTC: “as global  
Interdependence increases, so will the need for global ethical, and scientific norms, 
standards, and commitments, including some that are legally binding” (World Health 
Organization 1997c, 14. See also Antezana, Chollat-Traquet, and Yach 1998; Yach 
1996; Yach 2014).  
 The various reform efforts were coordinated, in large part, by the Policy Action 
Coordinating Team of the Division of Development of Policy, Programme and 
Evaluation at the WHO, of which South African tobacco control advocate, Derek Yach, 
had recently been appointed Chief (Derek Yach 1996; Antezana, Chollat-Traquet, and 
Yach 1998). Derek Yach had encountered the idea for an FCTC treaty in late 1993 at 
the All-Africa Conference on Tobacco or Health and had become and early, staunch 
advocate for legally binding approach to international tobacco control (Chapman et al. 
1994). In his new role as Chief of the Policy Action Team, Yach also advocated for the 
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use of international law in advancing global health more generally. In an issue of 
WHO’s quarterly publication Health Statistics Quarterly devoted to the Health-for-all 
for the 21st Century, Yach co-authored a chapter on the role of international health law. 
Drawing on the work of Allyn Taylor and Ruth Roemer, he argued that health law had 
been underutilized: “With globalization and privatization of the economy, public health 
law is vital to protect and promote health. Persuasive and mandatory global instruments 
have become more important as global interdependence has increased” (L’hirondel and 
Yach 1998, 79).  
 The impact of globalization on world health was further analyzed by Yach in 
collaboration with Canadian medical doctor, MPH, and fellow WHO colleague Douglas 
Bettcher. Bettcher had recently graduated from the London School of Economics with a 
Graduate Diploma in World Politics and PhD in International Relations and was hired 
by Yach as part of the Policy Action Team to contribute to its work on globalization and 
health (Reynolds and Tansey 2012). In an influential two part article, entitled “The 
Globalization of Public Health” published in the American Journal of Public Health, 
Yach and Bettcher advocated for the Health-for-all Policy in the twenty first century, 
emphasized the role of international law in advancing global health, and promoted the 
WHO as the appropriate coordinating body for international health law efforts (see 
Figure 4.1) (Yach and Bettcher 1998; Yach and Bettcher 1998). Importantly, the article 
included the proposed Framework Tobacco Convention as an example of WHO efforts 
at international law making, even though no formal steps had been taken to initiate 
negotiations on the treaty.  
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Figure 4.1: Examples of International Public Health Law  
Reproduced from (Yach and Bettcher 1998b) 
 
 Although the FCTC was mentioned only briefly in the articles, the issue of 
tobacco control nicely illustrated what Yach and Bettcher meant by the globalization of 
public health issues. Bettcher recounts how tobacco control fit with the broader theme 
of the globalization of public health as follows:  
In the mid-1990s, there was a review of our [WHO’s] constitution and 
some countries thought that Article 19 could be dropped; it had never 
been used. It seemed to be rather dormant. Did WHO need to develop 
treaties? There was also a sense at WHO that it had been a scientific 
organization since its inception and that it didn’t get into politics…. 
What was also missing in 1996 was the sense that tobacco control is a 
transnational problem… like differential taxes, advertising across 
borders, differences between countries, smuggling, products being 
dumped without the appropriate warning labels. This became described 
as part of WHO dealing with the globalization of public health 
 (Reynolds and Tansey 2012, 11-12). 
 
Tobacco provided particularly rich illustration of the impact of globalization on world 
health.  
 Neil Collishaw also uses the case of tobacco advertising to highlight the 
transnational dimension of tobacco during the 1990s: 
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At that time Canada had banned tobacco advertising nationally, but had 
an exception for [television] broadcasts received from international 
sources, like formula one races. At that time they were all sponsored by 
tobacco companies, all the cars [were], right? Well, Australia also had a 
ban on national advertising, but they'd also succumbed to the pressure 
from the tobacco industry and had an exception for events staged in 
Australia that would be broadcast internationally, like the Australian 
Grand Prix. So I could sit in my living room [in Canada] and watch the 
Australian Grand Prix on my TV with all these tobacco sponsored cars 
racing around the track and big tobacco billboards all around the track… 
and both Canada and Australia had bans on advertising… Clearly there 
was international work to be done. And in the beginning people didn't 
get that, the whole international dimension here (Collishaw 2013). 
 
Yach and Bettcher’s work on the globalization of public health sought to highlight the 
need for international coordination in tobacco regulation in order to avoid the kind of 
situations that Collishaw’s anecdote illustrates.  
 Although Yach and Bettcher acknowledged the potential threats of 
globalization, they argued that these could be turned into opportunities to improve 
global health, especially through using the tools of international law, and saw the role of 
WHO as the lead coordinating body for regulatory approaches to governing global 
health. On the whole, Yach and Bettcher’s articles presented an optimistic picture of the 
future of global health and the leadership role of WHO within it. But other articles in 
the same issue of the Journal offered a different take. An editorial by Vicente Navarro 
criticized Yach and Bettcher’s article for ignoring the political context in which the 
globalization of health was occurring (Navarro 1998). Another editorial pointed out that 
while “In the past, WHO has been looked to as a leader in the struggle to meet world 
health needs… [m]ore recently, WHO’s leadership role has passed to the far wealthier 
and more influential World Bank, and the WHO mission has been dispersed among 
other UN agencies” (Silver 1998, 728). Yach and Bettcher’s rosy view of the future role 
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of the WHO amidst the global changes affecting world health was far from universally 
shared. 
 In the very same issue of the American Journal of Public Health, the lead 
editorial announced what would become an important event in the WHO’s adaptation to 
the new global health context: the appointment of Gro Harlem Brundtland as the new 
Director General of WHO. Brundtland faced a formidable task, the editorial predicted: 
After several uninspiring years of stolid and layered bureaucracy, we can 
hope for fresh thought, imagination, competence, and commitment. 
Leading the organization back into its historic position of international 
leadership – one that only some of her predecessors have been able to 
sustain – will be a formidable task… The contributions of Yach and 
Bettcher and George Silver’s editorial, all in this issue, make clear the 
magnitude of this task” (Susser 1998, 727). 
 
Brundtland took up her Directorship General of the WHO at a low-point in the 
organization’s history and amidst wide-reaching reform efforts aimed at adaptation to 
the changed discursive opportunity structure of world health during the 1990s.  
Brundtland came to the job with a clear vision of the future of WHO – a WHO that was 
the “moral voice and technical leader” in world health. And her vision very quickly 
came to include tobacco control as a key strategy in reasserting both the moral voice 
and technical leadership of WHO. 
 
BRUNDTLAND AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WHO: TOBACCO CONTROL AS 
A WHO PRIORITY  
 Histories of the FCTC treaty produced by those who were active in the process 
universally acknowledge the critical role that Gro Harlem Brundtland played in 
bringing about the tobacco control treaty (Mackay 2003; Ruth Roemer, Taylor, and 
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Lariviere 2005; Derek Yach 2014; Shibuya et al. 2003; World Health Organization 
2009). But in these histories, the problematization of the tobacco epidemic is taken as 
self-evident and, as a result, no reasons are given for why Brundtland adopted tobacco 
control as a priority when taking office as Director General of WHO. Furthermore, 
while these accounts rightly celebrate Brundtland as a champion of global tobacco 
control and the FCTC treaty, they pay little attention to the wide variety of constraints 
and opportunities that made the FCTC possible beyond Brundtland’s individual 
contributions. In this section, I argue that tobacco control in general, and the FCTC 
treaty in particular, were central to the project of WHO reform in which Brundtland, 
among others, sought to reposition the organization as the lead coordinating body in the 
field of world health by pursing health policies guided by the criteria of disease burden, 
cost efficacy and health equity. The FCTC thus became important to the role of the 
WHO in the transition from international to global health at the turn of the 21st century. 
 
A Thankless Task: Reforming the WHO in the Late 1990s 
 When Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed Director General of WHO, the 
organization had reached a low-point in its history. The Economist magazine 
characterized the situation of the organization and its incumbent leader in the following 
way: 
If the job had been advertised, the prospectus would have read something 
like this: 
 
The client is a 50-year-old multinational concern that was once the 
global leader in its sector. Recently, however, it has lost its direction. 
Though the market it serves is still growing rapidly, it is also changing in 
ways that threaten the relevance of the client's traditional strengths. The 
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client has also suffered over the past decade from weak leadership, and 
rival concerns have been competing for its territory. Nevertheless its 
brand is still strong, and while it may never regain its previous 
monopoly, it can probably be repositioned as primus inter pares in the 
sector. Its rivals need its expertise and it should be able to carve out a 
comfortable niche if it is prepared to co-operate with them. This will 
require a significant change of attitude on the part of some employees 
and that, together with the antiquated management structure and an ill-
advised growth in the number of senior managers over the past few 
years, may indicate the need for some corporate downsizing. 
The client, of course, is the World Health Organization (WHO). And the 
thankless task of reforming it has gone to Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
former prime minister of Norway, chairman of a seminal environmental 
report and fully paid-up member of the International Great and Good 
(“Repositioning the WHO” 1998, 1). 
 
The article continued: “Dr Nakajima's reign saw the WHO's exclusive franchise on 
world health eroded” before observing that the most serious threat to the WHO’s 
“monopoly” was the involvement of the World Bank in world health affairs. In 
comparison with the WHO’s budget of $900 million, which had remained unchanged in 
real terms for the previous 14 years, the World Bank portfolio of health lending during 
the late 1990s had grown to $10 billion – and was continuing to grow at a rate of $1 
billion to $2 billon a year (1998, 4-5).  
 Unlike her predecessors, though, who often perceived the World Bank as a 
threat, to Brundtland the growing involvement of the World Bank provided an 
opportunity. In January 1998, while still one of five nominees for the position of 
Director General of the WHO, Brundtland gave an interview to Fiona Godlee, editor of 
the British Medical Journal. In response to a question about the current domination of 
world health by the World Bank, Brundtland characterized the involvement of the bank, 
and its considerable financial resources as an asset: “The Bank's interest in international 
health is a great asset. Each organisation should respond to needs by doing what it does 
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best. But we can coordinate our efforts even better based on the traditional division of 
work, where the WHO provides expertise” (Godlee 1998). Brundtland continued that if 
elected, she “would be looking forward to strengthening the WHO's relations with the 
World Bank” (Godlee 1998). 
 A few short weeks later, on January 1998, Gro Harlem Brundtland was 
appointed the new Director General of the WHO. Brundtland came to the position with 
a clear vision for reforming the organization and with considerable experience in the 
fields of medicine, public health, national and international politics and development. 
She trained as a medical doctor in her native Norway before completing a Masters 
degree at the Harvard School of Public Health. Upon returning to Norway she entered 
the public service working as a state physician for a number of years before becoming 
the Norwegian Minister for Environmental Affairs in 1974. She then became Norway’s 
first female Prime Minister in 1981, serving two subsequent terms for the Social 
Democratic party from 1986-1989 and 1990-1996. Between her first and second terms, 
at the Request of the UN Secretary-Gerneral, she chaired the World Commission of the 
Environment and Development, better known as the “Brundtland Commission”, which 
introduced the term “sustainable development”. The resulting publication, Our Common 
Future, motivated the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, also known as the Rio Summit or Earth Summit, at which the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted (Brundtland 2005).  
 Early in her preparations to take up leadership of the WHO, Brundtland met 
with President of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, and they both expressed 
commitment to collaborate and cooperate (“Repositioning the WHO” 1998). Crucially, 
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Brundtland appointed Dean Jamison, lead author of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 1993: Investing in Health as head of the Health and Development 
arm of her transition team and adopted many of the ideas associated with the investment 
logic of the report: prioritizing health interventions according to the global burden of 
disease measured in DALYs and the availability of cost-effective interventions. Other 
World Bank consultants were brought to the WHO to serve in Brundtland’s new 
“cluster” on Evidence and Information for Policy, including Christopher Murray, co-
author of the GBD study (Lopez 2013) and Prabhat Jha, co-editor of the Curbing the 
Epidemic report (Jha and Chaloupka 2000; World Bank 1999a). Bruntland also 
expressed commitment to continued WHO reform and to “Bringing health to the top of 
the political agenda” (McGregor 1998, 343). 
 Bruntland’s vision for the WHO was elaborated further in her address to the 
World Health Assembly in May 1998 as incumbent Director General. Although she 
would not officially take up her post until July, the work of determining priorities and 
articulating the path forward was already well under way. To the assembled delegates, 
she spoke: 
…[A]s we approach a new century…WHO must cope with complex 
processes of transition. 
The transition from one century to another sees changes which will be 
faster and more dramatic from an economic, social and health 
perspective… 
 
In addition to the historical transition into the twenty-first century, Brundtland also 
flagged a concern with the coming health transition – an issue that featured prominently 
in the World Bank’s investigations into health systems planning and health sector 
financing. Brundtland then tied these together with the theme she had developed in her 
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global environmental work: development. 
We have another transition, the transition from communicable to the 
noncommunicable diseases. They cannot be seen as competing tasks. 
They are complementary. We need to fight both. The burden of disease 
is the burden of unfulfilled human development…  
 
Finally, she drew on the same themes articulated by Yach and Bettcher in their 
vision of the future role of the WHO in responding to the globalization of health: 
Globalization is opening up new opportunities for growth and progress. 
But the benefits are not adequately distributed. Globalization has also 
brought new and critical threats to health and the environment… 
World trade, environmental change, lifestyles and culture; in all these 
fields we must be able to analyse the driving forces and speak out for 
health and development.  
The world is in transition. So accordingly WHO must be in transition” 
(Brundtland 1998, emphases in original) 
 
Brundtland saw the organization as having failed, so far, to adapt to the world in 
transition but, like Yach and Bettcher, she focused on the opportunities, not just the 
problems, presented by the globalization of health. 
 Brundtland went on define her vision of the key mission of WHO amidst global 
change: to be the “moral voice and the technical leader in improving the health of the 
people of the world” (Brundtland 1998.) To do so, she argued the organization would 
have to unify its work on the ground, build stronger partnerships with member states, 
other UN agencies, international financial institutions, the NGO community, the private 
sector and elevate the status of health on the development agenda. All the while, the 
WHO would underpin its work with solid facts. “I wish to focus on the technical 
support and normative work of the World Health Organization and at the same time 
bring the Organization more firmly into the political arena” (Brundtland 1998).  
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Brundtland’s vision for “politicizing” the WHO had a peculiar meaning, though. She 
did not mean, simply, that WHO would cease shying away from controversy or 
politically sensitive health topics like population control. Nor would it mean engaging 
in overtly ideological battles about selective primary health care. Instead, Brundtland 
sought to politicize the WHO by using scientific evidence to elevate global health 
concerns from matters of health to matters of finance:  
For WHO to be the leading advocate for health we need to know the 
relevant facts, not only have the conviction that health is essential. 
Health is not only a moral obligation and a basic human right. Health is 
pure and sound economics. 
 
In July I will establish as separate function on Evidence for Health 
Policy. We need to get our statistics right and keep them right through 
research and constant update… We need to know the burden of disease 
and how health policy can contribute to change. We need to know the 
cost-effectiveness of interventions and we need to define our priorities 
accordingly. 
 
To be the leading advocate for health we need to take that evidence to 
decision-makers around the world. We will report on the news of fact. 
And the fact is that healthy people help build healthy economies” 
(Brundtland 1998).  
 
Crucially, those facts and that evidence would come from the same sources that served 
as background to WDR 1993:Investing in Health, namely the GBD Study and DCP 
Project.  
 Using scientific estimates of the burden of disease and the cost-effectiveness of 
health interventions, Brundtland sought to position health as “sound economics” and as 
central to the development agenda in order to make health a priority for the  “whole of 
government”. Health Ministers, she assumed, would need little persuasion. But, WHO – 
through their member state delegates – “should remind Presidents, Prime Ministers and 
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Finance Ministers that they are truly health ministers themselves, key to the well-being 
of their people. Health investments are sound investments for poverty reduction and 
economic growth” (Brundtland 1998, 5). 
 Having articulated her general vision for the WHO, Brundtland then moved on 
to discuss two projects that she wished to start work on from the moment she took 
office on July 21st. Adopting the same broad categorizations of disease causes as the 
DCP project, she first addressed the “unfinished agenda” of communicable diseases 
with an immediate focus on malaria and a longer view to tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and 
tropical disease.67 But the second, stemmed from the “emerging threat” of 
noncommunicable disease: tobacco. Brundtland explained the focus as follows: 
We need to address a major cause of premature death which is 
dramatically increasing – killing four million people this year – and – if 
we let it go on without action – 10 million people in 2030 – half of them 
dying in middle age – not old age. The major focus of the epidemic is 
now shifting to the developing countries. 
 
I refer to tobacco. I am a doctor. I believe in science and evidence. Let 
me state here today. Tobacco is a killer.” (Brundtland 1998, 6 emphasis 
in original).  
 
Drawing on the mortality projections of the GBD study, Brundtland also adopted the 
recommendation of tobacco control as a particularly cost effective health priority.  
 In her realignment of the organizational structure of WHO, Brundtland created 
the Tobacco Free Initiative, a cabinet-level program devoted to tobacco and appointed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 In her speech to the WHA, Brundtland followed the categorizations of the DCP Project and 
classified HIV/AIDS as part of the “unfinished agenda”. But in a speech given to WHO staff 
two months later, she singled out HIV/AIDs for special mention. With WHO as incoming chair 
of the Committee of Co-sponsoring Organizations of UNAIDs, Brundtland expressed her 
commitment to supporting the work of UNAIDs. She also acknowledged that GBD forecasts 
had underestimated to impact of HIV/AIDs worldwide (Gro Harlem Brundtland 1998c).  
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Derek Yach – South African tobacco control advocate, early FCTC champion, WHO 
reform visionary and optimist about the role of the WHO in the new era of global health 
– as its head. With Brundtland as head of the WHO and Yach at the helm of the TFI, 
negotiations for the FCTC quickly got underway. 
 In oral history interviews with key actors in the FCTC process, I asked many of 
my respondents why Brundtland prioritized tobacco control at the WHO. To some of 
these life-long anti-tobacco campaigners, this seemed a dumb question: tobacco was an 
obvious priority. Nevertheless, most offered at least some speculation on Bruntland’s 
motivations. One respondent drew on Brundtland’s experience in medicine and public 
health. He described Bruntdland’s appointment as DG as “very critical” to the eventual 
passage of the FCTC: “She took it on as a personal issue,” he reported. When I asked 
him why, he replied “She's a physician.  And for the same reasons that it appealed to me 
[i.e. seeing first-hand the downstream health consequences of tobacco use and wanting 
to combat them upstream]. I think she saw the benefit of it and heard the rationale, 
economic and otherwise, and the global burden of disease and said this is [terrible], 
we've got to do something about this” (Novotny 2013).  
 Allyn Taylor, the initial author of the idea for the FCTC, explained to me that 
Brundtland was a different kind of Director General than what WHO had traditionally 
known. Taylor pointed out that while Brundtland was a Doctor, she also had a strong 
background in international affairs and international law making and wasn’t intimidated 
by the overtly political dimensions of treaty negotiations (Taylor 2013).68  
 Judith Mackay, who was a member of Brundtland’s transition team recalls 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 It is a requirement of the WHO that its director general hold medical qualifications.  
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proposing the idea of tobacco control as a WHO priority to Dr Brundtland. Along with 
Neil Collishaw and Sir Richard Peto, Mackay was part of the team who suggested 
tobacco control:  
[When Brundtland was appointed Director Genera] malaria was one of 
her cabinet projects and she wanted another. And several of us had to go 
and make a presentation as to why the different topics should be 
prioritized.   
 
And so I spoke on tobacco… I show pictures, which I do, rather than text 
[in my presentations].  And because I'm a campaigner, she responded to 
that. She's really obviously sort of quite a health campaigner at heart. 
And she made tobacco a cabinet project, and [as a result]… the whole 
idea of this convention went onto the fast track (Mackay 2010). 
 
While Mackay emphasized the visual impact of tobacco related disease, Neil Collishaw 
emphasized the numbers. In response to my asking why Brundtland became interested 
in tobacco control, he responded:  
Because of all the work that we'd been doing, just putting the facts out 
there. That there [were] 3 million deaths and that it [was] going grow 
to...I think we were estimating 10 million deaths by 2020. It will just 
keep growing after that unless the world takes this problem seriously.  So 
that, she understood that message (Collishaw 2013).  
 
These numbers, of course, came from Collishaw’s own work, but also from the work of 
Alan Lopez as part of the GBD study.  
 Lopez also indicated the numbers produced by the GBD study as key to 
Brundtland elevation of tobacco control as a WHO priority. When Brundtland became 
Director General, Lopez told me, she immediately “brought [Christopher] Murray 
in…and then Burden of Disease went from being banned at WHO basically to being a 
key tenet of the WHO policies” (Lopez Interview). Lopez continues: 
[Brundtland] was very, very interested in evidence.  She's a very tough 
Norwegian, Scandinavian, independent woman, and she said: “I don't 
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want to know about ideology.  Show me the evidence.”  And she 
engaged in evidence discussions… she wanted evidence and she thought 
Burden of Disease offered a platform for generating evidence, not about 
whether we think this is important but what's the evidence, what's the 
comparative importance about this versus that and how do I know. The 
Burden of Disease was the way (Lopez 2013).  
 
The global burden of disease constituted the evidence base for tobacco control as an 
evidence-based priority, and alongside the World Bank’s tobacco economics, for the 
FCTC as an evidence-based treaty. 
 The global burden of disease did provide compelling evidence that tobacco was 
a growing health concern and that it would continue to grown at an alarming pace into 
the future. But the GBD characterization of the tobacco threat also appealed to 
Brundtland’s concern with repositioning the WHO as the “moral voice” of global health 
by focusing in issues of health equity. This was because the future burden of the 
tobacco epidemic was projected to fall disproportionately on the global South. In her 
own recollection on why she chose tobacco control as a priority in her 2005 
autobiography, Brundland recalled: 
The fact is that four million people die each year from tobacco related 
diseases. Tobacco is ranked second on the list of the world’s killers, 
responsible for 6 percent of the causes of fatal disease. But the future 
predictions were what really caught my attention: if people continue 
smoking the way they do today, by 2020 tobacco will be the leading 
cause of death and disability, killing more than ten million people each 
year. Some 70 percent of the tobacco deaths will be in the developing 
world, which cannot afford this added burden (Brundtland 2005). 
 
Tobacco provided the opportunity for the WHO exercise both its moral voice and 
technical leadership by prioritizing a health concern that was a leading cause of disease, 
and was anticipated to disproportionately affect the developing world in the coming 
decades if immediate action was not undertaken. Immediate action, in the form of an 
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international treaty of the same kind that eventuated from Brundtland’s own 
environmental commission had been approved by the WHO, but without funding or 
institutional support, had languished over the previous two years. International 
regulation, of the sort proposed for tobacco control, had also been identified as key to 
repositioning the WHO amidst the changing context of world health and as central to 
the Health-for-all strategy for the twenty-first century (Yach 1996; Yach and Bettcher 
1998; Yach and Bettcher 1998b). Brundtland quickly arranged institutional support and 
dedicated funding by making tobacco control a cabinet-level project. Official 
negotiations for the FCTC began shortly thereafter.  
 Brundtland saw the potential for a tobacco treaty to re-assert the WHO’s 
centrality within the field of global health by enacting Article 19 of the organization’s 
constitution. According to Douglas Bettcher, this took great courage, among other traits. 
His reflection on Brundland’s role in the creation of the FCTC is worth quoting at 
length:  
Dr Brundtland is a very courageous person. If you embark on using 
Article 19 of the WHO Constitution for the first time, you can’t be a 
timid DG. She’s not like that. She’s been known all the way through her 
political career as having courage and foresight. She played a critical part 
in this undoing of WHO’s conservative, very narrow model of public 
health; this idea that you can’t have legal instruments and the WHO is 
afraid of messy political negotiations and all that stuff.  
 
She had been, as you remember, the commissioner of the Sustainable 
Development Commission for the UN Secretary-General in the 1980s. 
She knew all about complex negotiations. She was the Norwegian prime 
minister three times, so she was much attuned with how health links with 
foreign affairs, how it links with different sectors, how it links with 
social determinants and how negotiations can be a messy mud fight. But 
she was committed that WHO had to do it, had to get in there and had to 
stand up for the truth and what is right.  
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Also, she realized you can’t do that with the small budget that WHO had 
for tobacco control. WHO said: “Of course, tobacco control is a great 
priority, it’s a total priority, it’s the largest preventable cause of death.” 
But poor Neil [Collishaw] only had one staff member with him, and 
there was one regional adviser in Europe working on tobacco control 
almost full-time; for other regions there were only staff working part-
time for tobacco control. So Dr Brundtland said: “We have to have a 
platform for this. We need a high-level cabinet project in WHO to 
advance tobacco control, and this project is very important. The tobacco- 
control group must be accountable to me. It’s got to be accountable to 
my office, to my cabinet. I’m going to watch the negotiation of the treaty 
closely. I’m going to make sure this is a success. It’s got to have money, 
and we’ve got to do it now, and we have to get moving, and we have to 
develop the mechanics for the negotiation to proceed.” WHO had never 
had a notion of how to develop a treaty negotiation-making apparatus, so 
she sent us out in the field to the other treaty secretariats to get the 
precedents and get moving with the precedents to develop the mechanics 
to do this.  
 
She also established a new budgeting system. Before, we had a kind of 
system for planning our budget that was like a patchwork quilt. It was a 
lot of little things, and we never really knew what the priorities were. 
She developed a notion of budget prioritization in the WHO, and tobacco 
became one of the top priorities. The prioritization was done on the basis 
of disease burden, death and the potential to make a public health impact, 
which also put tobacco up towards the top. We were then placed in a 
situation where we could do this (Reynolds and Tansey 2012, 35-36). 
 
Brundtland was, by all accounts, critical in elevating tobacco control as a WHO priority 
and bringing about the FCTC treaty. In turn, the FCTC was central to Brundtland’s 
vision of WHO reform and to reasserting the leadership role of WHO within the newly 
altered health landscape in the transition from international to global health.  
 Reflecting on Brundtland’s tenure after her announcement that she would not 
seek a second term, Gavin Yamey of the British Medical Journal observed:  
Brundtland managed the seemingly impossible. She took WHO out of 
the doldrums and gave it back some international credibility. On the 
global stage, the organization has a newfound confidence, negotiating an 
international treaty on tobacco control and brokering partnerships with a 
wide spectrum of society. It would now be inconceivable to hold an 
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important meeting on global health without WHO’s involvement 
(Yamey 2002a, 1358). 
 
At least according to this observer Brundtland had succeeded in reestablishing 
the WHO as the central actor in global health. 
 
The FCTC Treaty Comes Into Force 
 In the early morning hours of February 28th 2003, during the last few months of 
Brundtland’s time as Director General, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) 
of FCTC agreed on a final text of the treaty. The INB had met over six sessions, from 
October 2000 to February 2003 in order to forge a consensus on the structure, content 
and precise wording of the FCTC treaty (World Health Organization 2009).69 The final 
text was then forwarded to the WHA for consideration during its annual meeting in 
May. To great acclaim, the text of the treaty was unanimously adopted by the WHA on 
23rd May 2003. Reflecting on the achievement, Brundtland observed: “The convention 
we have agreed on is a real milestone in the history of global public health” (Kapp 
2003, 839).  
 Following the adoption of the treaty text by the WHA, the Framework 
Convention was opened for signature from 16-22 June 2003 at WHO headquarters in 
Geneva, then at the United Nations headquarters in New York City from June 30th 2003 
to 29th June 2004. According to the WHO’s official “History of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control”, signing the treaty was a political act that indicated the 
agreement of a Member State to ratify it and its commitment not to oppose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The work of the INB had been preceded by two meetings of the FCTC Working Group in 
October 1999 and March 2000 (World Health Organization 2009).  
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implementation of the provisions by other States” (2009: 26). On the first day, 28 
Member States and the European Union ceremonially signed the treaty. “Children 
accompanied each of the official representatives from Member States that signed the 
treaty, signifying the stewardship role of these countries in ensuring a healthy, tobacco-
free world for future generations” (World Health Organization 2009, 26). By the time 
the treaty was closed for signature in June 2004, it had acquired 168 signatories.  
 Then began the process of treaty ratification. According to international law, a 
treaty requires the ratification of 40 Member State signatories before it can enter into 
force. Ratification procedures vary from country to country. In Australia, for example, 
matters of international law are decided by the Federal (Commonwealth) Parliament, 
whereas matters of tobacco control had historically been decided across both Federal 
and State/Territory Parliaments. The Federal Parliament thus made the decision to ratify 
the FCTC in October 2004 with the dual effect of bringing tobacco control regulation 
more firmly under the powers of the Federal Government and tying domestic tobacco 
control more closely to international developments driven by the FCTC (Scollo and 
Winstanley 2012).70 By contrast, the process of treaty ratification in the United States is 
more complex and is complicated by relative power of State Governments relative to 
the Federal Government. As a result, the United States, though a signatory to the FCTC, 
did not forward the treaty to Congress for ratification.71 The treaty entered into force on 
February 27, 2005 – 90 days after it had been ratified, acceded to, accepted or approved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Australia’s ratification of the FCTC also had the effect of bringing tobacco control regulation 
more firmly under the powers of the Federal Government and tying domestic tobacco control 
more closely to international developments driven by the FCTC (Scollo and Winstanley 2012).  
71 For a fascinating account of the treaty negotiating process by one of the Head US delegates 
see (Bernard 2012).  
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by a total of 40 member States. The FCTC has subsequently gained 180 Parties to the 
Convention – making it one of the most widely and rapidly adopted treaties in United 
Nations history.  
 Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland was no doubt a key actor in the 
WHO’s adoption of tobacco control as a global health priority, its pursuit of a legally 
binding FCTC treaty and in reestablishing the WHO’s international credibility during 
the late 1990s. But she neither accomplished these feats alone nor in a historical, social 
or political vacuum. Instead, as I have tried to highlight, Brundtland’s accomplishments 
as Director General of WHO, including inaugurating the negotiations for the FCTC, 
depended on the confluence of a range of contextual factors: the creation of a the 
DALY metric, the GBD study and the DCP Project, the crisis and subsequent period of 
reform at WHO, a growing interest the economics of tobacco at the World Bank, the 
cooperation between the World Bank and WHO and the professionalization of the 
movement for international tobacco control. While various histories of the FCTC 
highlight and celebrate the individual role played by Brundtland, I have tried to show 
that the election of Gro Harlem Brundtland as Director General of the WHO – much 
like the creation of the DALY metric I discussed in Chapter 2 – was a necessary 
condition for the creation of the FCTC. But neither, on its own, was a sufficient cause 
of the treaty. Instead, the creation of the epidemiological and economic evidence-base 
problematizing a current and future tobacco epidemic and the political mobilization for 
international tobacco control that culminated in the eventual passage of the FCTC are 
best conceptualizes as having been coproduced amidst the changing historical context 
of the field of world health at the turn of the 21st century.  
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NEGOTIATING THE TOBACCO TREATY  
 Many detailed accounts of the negotiations of the FCTC treaty have been 
produced by scholars of political science, global governance, international law, civil 
society and social movements (Rosskam and Kickbusch 2011; Mamudu and Glantz 
2009; Derek Yach 2014; Assunta and Chapman 2006; Shibuya et al. 2003). I do not 
recount the treaty-negotiation process here. Instead, I wish to highlight a few select 
elements that helped speed the passage of the treaty and which pertain to the argument 
being developed throughout this dissertation. These include positioning the WHO as the 
lead coordinating body among a range of partner organizations, the creation of an active 
transnational NGO movement, public hearings in advance of treaty negotiations, the 
deployment of various rhetorical strategies throughout the negotiating process and, 
crucially, the publication and dissemination of the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic 
(1999) report during the negotiations.  
 
Working in Partnership 
 Work towards the FCTC began in earnest very quickly after Brundtland’s 
appointment as Director Genreal. Immediately upon taking office, she created the 
Tobacco Free Initiative as a Cabinet Level Project and provided considerable resources 
in support of work towards the treaty. She applied to the United Nations 
Foundation/United Nations Fund for International Partnerships, which provided grants 
of over $7 million USD for Global Health Leadership and Tobacco Control Projects 
(United Nations General Assembly 1998). Much of this funding went to support the 
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work of the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI). Brundtland also moved to build partnerships 
across other UN agencies, multilateral organization, international financial institutions, 
the private sector and civil society in line with her vision of WHO reform. She 
petitioned UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to move the UN focal point for tobacco 
from its then-current location under the UN Conference on Trade and Development and 
bring it under WHO’s stewardship. In mid-1999, the Secretary General’s UN Task 
Force on Tobacco Control was established, with WHO as Chair (United Nations 1999, 
2000).72 The WHO then coordinated work on the social and economic issues of tobacco 
control among: 
• The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) 
• The United Nations Office of Human Resources and Management and the 
Medical Service, both within the Department of Management of UN Secretariat 
• the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
• the International Civil Aviation Organzation (ICAO) 
• the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
• the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
• the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
• United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
• The World Bank 
• the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
• the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations 
Development Group (UNDG) 
• the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)  
• the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) 
• the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and 
• the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (United Nations 1999).  
•  
The Task Force facilitated close collaboration between these agencies, so that “there 
would always be the capacity to respond” to concerns about trade, job losses, revenue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Part of Brundtland’s motivation for requesting a transfer of the UN Focal Point was the 
revelation, through recently released tobacco industry documents, that the former UN contact 
person was largely sympathetic to the tobacco industry (Reynolds and Tansey 2010, 60). 
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shortfalls, labor and agricultural concerns and other issues associated with tobacco 
control during FCTC treaty negotiations (Reynolds and Tansey 2010, 61-62).   
 Importantly, at the first meeting of the task force in September 1999, the various 
agencies were briefed by Brundtland and Yach on four things relating to the global 
tobacco epidemic: public health trends, tobacco economics, the activities of the tobacco 
industry and the proposed FCTC. In doing so, they drew extensively on data from the 
GBD study and from the World Bank’s report Curbing the Epidemic (United Nations 
1999). 
 As the Interagency Task Force began their work, so too did the WHO FCTC 
Working Group. Meeting in October 1999 and March 2000, the working group was 
convened in order to draft a proposed text of the treaty (World Health Organization 
1999b). Two of its very first agenda items included technical briefings on the 
epidemiology of the tobacco epidemic, which drew on the results of the GBD study and 
economics of tobacco control, which summarized and reported on the World Bank’s 
Curbing the Epidemic Report (World Health Organization 1999c. See also WHO 
Documents A/FCTC/WG1/3 and A/FCTC/WG1/2). From the very start, then, the FCTC 
working group was equipped with a dual evidence base: the epidemiological evidence 
of the GBD study and the economic evidence of the Curbing the Epidemic report. One 
established, this evidence base was frequently referenced throughout the treaty 
negotiating process and in subsequent meetings of the Conference of the Parties of the 
FCTC treaty. Table 4.1 lists the key meetings in the FCTC process. 
 
 
 	  
206 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Relevant meetings in the FCTC negotiating process 
 
Group/Meeting Date Location 
1st Meeting of the FCTC 
Working Group 
25-29 October 1999 Geneva, Switzerland 
2nd Meeting of the FCTC 
Working Group 
27-29 March 2000 Geneva, Switzerland 
1st Session of the 
Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Body (INB) 
16-21 October 2000 Geneva, Switzerland 
2nd Session of the INB 30 April – 5 May 2001 Geneva, Switzerland 
3rd Session of the INB 22-28 November 2001 Geneva, Switzerland 
4th Session of the INB 18-23 November 2002 Geneva, Switzerland 
5th Session of the INB 14-25 October 2002 Geneva, Switzerland 
6th Session of the INB 17 – 28 February 2003 Geneva, Switzerland 
1st Session of the Open-
ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group (IGWG)73 
21-25 June 2004 Geneva, Switzerland 
2nd Session of the IGWG 31 January – 4 February 
2005 
Geneva, Switzerland 
1st Conference of the 
Parties 
6 – 17 February 2006 Geneva, Switzerland 
2nd Conference of the 
Parties 
30 June – 6 July 2007 Bangkok, Thailand 
3rd Conference of the 
Parties 
17 - 22 November 2008 Durban, South Africa 
4th Conference of the 
Parties 
15 – 20 November 2009 Punte Del Este, 
Uruguay 
5th Conference of the 
Parties 
12 – 17 November 2012 Seoul, Republic of 
Korea 
6th Conference of the 
Parties 
13 – 18 October 2014 Moscow, Russian 
Federation 
 
 
Creating a Transnational NGO Movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group was convened between the acceptance 
of the treaty by WHA and its ratification by 40 member state parties and in advance of the 
establishment of the Conference of the Parties after the FCTC entered into force. 
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 In addition to partnering with other UN agencies and multilateral organizations, 
upon electing to take on tobacco control as a WHO priority Brundtland also moved to 
build capacity among the international tobacco control movement. In October 1998, 
Brundtland, Yach and Bettcher met with the handful of NGOs that were aware of the 
FCTC and created what would come to be known as the Framework Convention 
Alliance, an transnational network of NGOs, to support the treaty negotiation process. 
Initially, Brundtland provided funds to the British-based Action on Smoking and Health 
(ASH) to identify how best to involve civil society in the FCTC negotiations. ASH 
coordinated among similar NGOs worldwide and created an online repository for 
networking and collaboration called Globalink (http://www.ncdlinks.org/globalink/). 
The international tobacco control movement was, at this point, able to align itself with 
the WHO as a key ally and establish itself now as a transnational, or global, public 
health movement (Kay 2005; Kay 2011. See also Fourcade 2006).  
 Two additional UN Foundation grants – Tobacco kills – don’t be duped and 
Channeling the outrage –– helped provide funding to further galvanize the global 
tobacco control movement. These grants sought explicitly to reignite the moral outrage 
frame that had animated much of the early international tobacco control movement and 
channel it into widespread support for the FCTC using extensive media advocacy and 
health information campaigns. It was able to do so, in part, because of the formerly 
secret tobacco industry documents that had been released in 1998 as part of the Master 
Settlement Agreement in the United States of America. Through these documents, it 
was very quickly revealed that the industry had been spreading misinformation about 
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the addictive nature of tobacco products for years. The Tobacco Kills – don’t be duped 
grant drew attention to these informational issues: 
Freedom of information issues, especially the public’s right to know 
about the health consequences of tobacco use on the one hand, and the 
tobacco industry’s practices on the other, will be emphasised. The 
Tobacco Free Media initiative will seek to house tobacco control issues 
where they belong – at the top end of national and international political 
agendas and at the centre of public health debates in countries. In doing 
so, the initiative will seek a new language, a new idiom and a new sense 
of purpose and direction for tobacco control…The political, social and 
economic commitment and will to circumscribe if not altogether prevent 
the tobacco industry’s domination of the "health information 
marketplace" and its devastating effects on global health depends greatly 
on the effective development of a new health communication platform. 
This platform must be based on evidence. It must be ethical and credible. 
It must be able to package accurate, relevant, and impartial information 
in ways which ignites people’s righteous anger at being lied to, 
manipulated, and exploited by tobacco interests and spark the creation of 
a popular tobacco free world global movement. Tobacco, especially the 
industry’s marketing and promotion practices affords a strong case for 
informed social outrage (United Nations Foundation 1998). 
 
Brundtland saw that the tobacco industry documents from the Master Settlement 
Agreement would be a “critical tool” for advancing the moral outrage frame of the 
tobacco threat.74  
 Brundtland initiated an investigation into the influence of the tobacco industry in 
the UN system, especially into “efforts to prevent implementation of healthy public 
policy and efforts to reduce finding of tobacco control within UN organization” (Zeltner 
et al. 2000, 1). She appointed a Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents 
in October 1999, which conducted an extensive investigation into the industry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The Tobacco industry documents have proved a valuable resource for a number of actors and 
for a number of purposes. They constitute an archive that has prompted important historical 
scholarship (A. Brandt 2007; Proctor 2011) and a treasure trove of proof of tobacco industry 
manipulation and interference in tobacco control efforts (Griffith 2014; Zeltner et al. 2000; 
Benson 2012; S. Glantz, Mamudu, and Hammond 2008; Derek Yach and Bettcher 2000). 
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documents. The following August the committee produced a 250 page report entitled 
“Tobacco Industry Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World 
Health Organization” (Zeltner et al 2000). According to the press release accompanying 
the report:  
The Committee found that the tobacco industry regarded the World 
Health Organization as one of their leading enemies, and that the 
industry had a planned strategy to "contain, neutralise, reorient" WHO's 
tobacco control initiatives. Tobacco industry documents show that they 
carried out their plan by: 
• staging events to divert attention from the public health issues raised by 
tobacco use; 
• attempting to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy activities 
carried out by WHO; 
• pitting other UN agencies against WHO; 
• seeking to convince developing countries that WHO's tobacco control 
program was a "First World" agenda carried out at the expense of the 
developing world; 
• distorting the results of important scientific studies on tobacco; 
• discrediting WHO as an institution (World Health Organization 2000a). 
 
The report created a very potent sense the tobacco industry was an omnipresent threat to 
transnational tobacco control efforts. As one participant in the FCTC negotiations told 
me:   
 [T]he disclosure of the tobacco industry’s internal documents, which 
came out during the US trials… showed the tobacco industry was a 
habitual liar and was indulging in the obfuscation of facts. [As a result of 
the industry documents] … all the statements that were being made 
about the tobacco industry by the anti-tobacco activists, but which were 
being ignored by the media and by the public as, you know, that these 
were anti-smoking fanatics of fascists or whatever, suddenly they were 
all proved to be true. And people said here is an evil industry. …[This] 
transformed the international tobacco control scene. (Interview 2010). 
 
 
The sense that the tobacco industry was a constant, if invisible threat, continued to 
animate the transnational tobacco control movement at the time I was conducting field 
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work during 2009-2010. At the 13th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in 
Mumbai, India in 2009 – almost every session I attended that mentioned the tobacco 
industry professed the belief “that they are probably here in this room, now” (Field 
Notes, 3/8-12/2009). Similarly, when I travelled to the 4th Conference of the Parties of 
the FCTC treaty in November 2010, I was almost denied access to the event because I 
was suspected to be an industry representative. The Rules of Procedure for the 
Conference of the Parties states that proceedings are open to the public. Upon travelling 
to Uruguay to observe the meeting, I learned that the number of public admission 
badges is limited to thirty because it is assumed that only members of the tobacco 
industry would want to observe the proceedings. The queue to secure one of the thirty 
public badges began to form before daybreak for each day of the negotiations. Luckily, 
I was able to secure a press badge and gained access to the Conference Proceedings as a 
student reporter, instead.  
 
Public Hearings 
 The Zeltner report was delivered in August 2000, just as the negotiations for the 
treaty were about to begin. The FCTC working group had agreed on a provisional text 
of the treaty in early 2000, the WHA had accepted the provisional text in May, and the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) was to begin negotiating in October. In 
advance of the first INB negotiating session, the WHO held public hearings into the 
proposed FCTC – the first in the Organization’s history and the first time any UN 
agency had solicited views from all parties interested in a proposed convention (World 
Health Organization 2000b). Funding for the public hearings was provided by the UN 
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Foundation grant Channeling the Outrage. Administered by the WHO’s Tobacco Free 
Initiative, as part of its NGO capacity building initiatives, the project aimed “to build 
non governmental organization (NGO) capacity in tobacco control, particularly in 
developing countries” (World Health Organization 2000c). At the public hearings, over 
500 submissions were made and representatives of 144 organizations and institutions 
gave verbal testimony before the hearing’s panel. Among the participants were 
representatives of almost all major tobacco multinationals and state tobacco companies, 
tobacco farming groups and a greatly expanded range of anti-tobacco public health 
agencies, women’s groups, community organizations and academics (World Health 
Organization 2000d). 
 The hearings gave the WHO an opportunity to draw a clear line in the sand, 
between those helping to advance the cause of global tobacco control and those who 
would hinder an effective FCTC. In Brundtland’s official response to the hearings, she 
reported: 
All groups with a commitment to public health expressed extreme 
concern about the impact of tobacco use on the current and future health 
of populations, especially in developing countries. They urge rapid and 
decisive action. In contrast, most tobacco companies concentrated on 
what they believe to be the boundaries of “reasonable” and “appropriate” 
actions. Some questioned the role of WHO and the FCTC process in 
promoting action and making progress to reduce the public health impact 
of tobacco. Further, several tobacco companies continued to deny that 
passive smoking constitutes a threat to health (World Health 
Organization 2000e). 
 
Drawing on the theme of tobacco industry denialism that had emerged from the industry 
documents and from the Zeltner report, Brundtland cast the tobacco industry as 
continuing its long history of deceit and denial into the current FCTC negotiations.  
 	  
212 
 
Brundtland continued: 
In general, the tobacco companies have indicated support for policies 
and measures that are known to have a very limited impact on youth and 
adult consumption of tobacco. They appear to be against the 
interventions that WHO, the World Bank and public health 
experts have identified as having a measurable and sustained impact on 
tobacco use. 
These are a combination of 
• increased excise taxes, 
• bans on tobacco advertising, sponsorship and marketing, 
• controls on smoking in public places, 
• expanded access to effective means of quitting, 
• tough counter-advertising and 
• tight controls on smuggling. 
I hope that Member States will focus on these interventions as they 
deliberate about the measures to be included both in the FCTC and in 
their national laws and policies (World Health Organization 2000e). 
 
 
In this way, Brundtland positioned the tobacco industry as a wolf in sheep’s clothing – 
proposing ineffective interventions in the hopes of undermining effective tobacco 
control regulation. She expressed her hope that member states would remained focused 
on what WHO recommended as evidence based tobacco control strategies.  
 Brundtland also drew on the work carried out by other UN agencies on the 
social and economic effects of tobacco regulation coordinated by WHO in its role as 
Chair of the UN Interagency Task Force: 
 
In much of their testimony, companies that are part of the tobacco 
industry focus on political, financial and human rights issues. They re-
state well known predictions that international action to reduce tobacco 
use will lead to sudden and massive job losses, people driven further into 
poverty and threats to the sovereignty of nations. As we heard 
from other groups, these predictions do lead to genuine concern among 
decision makers: however, careful research has also shown that in most 
cases the predictions have no evidence base. It thus seems likely that the 
companies are trying to confuse the negotiating process that will be 
taken forward by delegates from WHO’s 191 Member States. They seek 
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to do this just before the FCTC Intergovernmental Negotiating Body 
which starts Monday the 16th of October (World Health Organization 
2000e). 
 
Finally she clearly drew a clear line between the public health community and the 
tobacco industry: “Our analyses suggest that there is a stark contrast in positions of 
WHO and most Member States on the one hand, and those of the tobacco companies. 
We in WHO urge the immediate implementation of the measures that are known to have 
a sustained impact on reducing tobacco use. We would wish that this can be undertaken 
without interference by tobacco companies (World Health Organization 2000e). 
 The tobacco industry became a clearly identified adversary that the transnational 
tobacco movement united against. As Ruth Roemer put it, “You know this is a very nice 
fight to have because the enemy is very clear. The tobacco companies have been 
absolutely vicious in concealing what they knew…and about pushing tobacco 
marketing on children and in the developing world (World Health Organization 2009, 
3). Similarly, when I interviewed a Delegate to the FCTC negotiations from a country 
of the global south, he reported to me that anti-tobacco industry sentiment helped 
consolidate action in support of the FCTC among low and middle-income countries: 
[T]he feeling that we were working together against the tobacco 
industry, which was a clearly identified adversary, also helped to 
consolidate our positions and strengthen the coalition… when some of 
the developed countries like the US or Japan took [pro-industry] 
positions, there was a sense of disappointment or sometimes even 
outrage that our interests were not being looked at and tobacco industries 
interests were being given greater precedence. 
 
 So all the more, we put our backs up and said no, you need to [fix this]. 
So in a sense I think the fact that we saw ourselves as victims of the 
tobacco epidemic and as being targeted by the tobacco industry, it gave 
us the sense of moral purpose, which coupled with hard core economics 
and looking at the health stats also enabled us to take well argued 
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positions, both within the countries and among our regions. [As a 
result]… we had fundamentally a belief that tobacco was becoming an 
increasing threat for most developing countries… The governments 
realized that tobacco was becoming a health threat, an economic threat, 
and that we needed protection against tobacco, both at the national level 
and at the global level (Interview 2010).   
 
Scholars of social movements have highlighted effect of a clearly defined antagonist on 
processes of movement mobilization (Benford and Hunt 1992, 39). This was the case 
during the early years of the movement for international tobacco control, which 
identified the tobacco industry as the primary antagonist of its moral outrage frame. 
Now, although the global tobacco epidemic had been characterized primarily in the 
seemingly objective language of epidemiological and economic forecasts and it was this 
characterization that gained traction with the powerful multilateral organization such as 
WHO and the World Bank, the moral outrage frame was being invoked once more in 
order to reignite a global tobacco control movement. The WHO and World Bank could, 
in this way, target their actions towards a depersonalized and economized impending 
epidemic, while antitobacco activists/advocates could simultaneously mobilize around a 
reignited moral outrage frame directed towards a deceitful and harmful tobacco 
industry.75 The public hearings that Brundland organized helped to solidify the 
transnational tobacco control movement and reignited the moral outrage frame in 
advance of the FCTC negotiations. 
 
Symbolic and rhetorical strategies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Interestingly, though, the actual articles that eventually came to constitute the FCTC treaty do 
not seek to intervene upon the tobacco industry but rather, seek to govern the global tobacco 
epidemic through demand reduction strategies, i.e. by altering the costs and benefits of smoking 
in such a way as to discourage individuals from starting or continuing to smoke.  
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 Another rhetorical strategy that helped to unify the global tobacco control 
movement, especially in the global South, was the unequal protection afforded by 
tobacco control regulations across different national contexts. For example, tobacco 
companies would comply with national laws regarding health labels on their products 
within those jurisdictions, but for products sold in other territories, their packages 
wouldn’t include warning labels. Judith Mackay elaborates:  
There were double standards. For example, [tobacco companies] might 
put on a health warning in the US, but then not put one on…in an Asian 
country.  I spoke quite a lot about that, and what the tobacco industry 
would say is, we abide by the laws of the country, if they require a health 
warning, we'll put on a health warning.  And that's what they do. 
 
But I counter argue that by saying that it was, just ethically wrong, that 
they were putting a health warning …on in one place and not in another. 
So that's unequal treatment, that exploits. [The] almost, not exactly 
colonial, but certainly economically colonial aspect of the transnational 
companies, was a message that really found resonance in the developing 
countries in the early days (Mackay 2010). 
 
Neocolonial arguments, similar to those invoked by the early international tobacco 
control movements helped to ignite a similar moral outrage, as described by Mackay, 
and helped mobilize support for a strong FCTC. 
 The moral outrage frame was adopted by the nascent Framework Convention 
Alliance (FCA), which was founded and continued to receive financial support from the 
WHO with funds from its UN foundation grants to support the FCTC process. As a 
coalition of various national and transnational NGOs, the FCA did not directly 
participate in the FCTC process, as participation was limited to member state 
delegations. Nevertheless, the FCA adopted a number of strategies and tactics from 
other treaty-making processes to influence delegations and persuade member state 
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delegates to support a strong treaty (Mamudu and Glantz 2009). For example, during 
each of the sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), the FCA 
published a daily Alliance Bulletin reporting on the previous day’s proceedings. 
Highlights of the publication included the “Orchid” and “Dirty Ashtray” awards for 
tobacco control leadership and bad behavior respectively (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Orchid and Dirty Ashtray award 
Image reproduced from (“Orchid and Dirty Ashtray Award” 2000) 
 
 The FCA’s Alliance Bulletin also contained a daily update of an important 
rhetorical device that was modeled on global HIV/AIDs advocacy: the death clock. The 
death clock had been unveiled in Geneva on October 25th 1999 to coincide with the first 
meeting of the FCTC Working Group. A press release for the Campaign for Tobacco 
Free Kids, which helped organize the clock, recounted:  
The “Death Clock,” measuring more than 6 feet in length, will track the 
minute-to-minute death toll from tobacco-caused illness around the 
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globe. Organizers intend to bring the ticking clock to every negotiating 
session to emphasize the continuing human toll of tobacco use. “This 
clock will be a concrete reminder to governments of how much is at 
stake in these negotiations,” said Bill Novelli, President of the 
Washington, D.C.-based Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids. “Every 
week, more than 50,000 people die from tobacco-related illness 
worldwide. We can and must put a stop to this (Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids 1999).  
 
The death clock continued to tick throughout the treaty negotiations, through the FCTC 
COP meetings and has a permanent presence on the FCT’s webpage (see Figure 4.3). 
Calibrated according to figures from the GBD study, the clock increases by one 
tobacco-related death every five or so seconds. From its unveiling in 1999 until April 
2015 it has registered over 77,600,000 tobacco related deaths. Interestingly, the death 
toll numbers can be read in two different ways. On one reading, the death toll could be 
read as wasted human life and seen to align with the moral outrage framing of the 
tobacco problem. But on the death toll could equally be read in terms of wasted human 
capital and, in this way, resonated also with the economic characterization of the global 
tobacco epidemic. 
    
 
Figure 4.3: Successive images of the “Death Clock” 
Images from fctc.org. Accessed April 24, 2015 
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 The epidemiological characterization of the tobacco epidemic also served in a 
somewhat unexpected way to unify regional voting blocs during the FCTC negotiations, 
especially within the WHO African region. As early as 1993 at the First All Africa 
Tobacco Control Conference (the conference at which Ruth Roemer initially presented 
the idea of a tobacco treaty to Derek Yach), tobacco control advocates worried that the 
health consequences of tobacco “held little weight with governments of countries that 
often already had massive public health problems” (Chapman, Yach, Saloojee and 
Simpson 1993, 189).  Negative trade balances, shrinking markets and deforestation 
were proposed as arguments with more immediate appeal and, it was thought, more 
persuasive power for mobilizing tobacco control action. However, the epidemiological 
forecasts provided by the GBD study and the cost-effectiveness arguments produced by 
the DCP project proved sufficiently compelling for the African region to unite in its 
support for strong global tobacco control. According to one South African tobacco 
control advocate, there was a sense that this was one epidemic that Africa could avoid. 
The future burden of disease motivated an anticipatory ethic among the African 
countries, which then formed a voting block in support of a strong FCTC treaty (Field 
Notes 3/12/2009, 11/10/2011). 
 The final aspect of the FCTC treaty negotiations that I wish to highlight is the 
role played by the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic report. As I mentioned, the 
report was published to coincide with the opening of the first session of the FCTC 
working group. As a result, the epidemiology and economics of the global tobacco 
epidemic served as a dual evidence base from the very start of the treaty negotiations. In 
addition, the Bank printed and distributed over 17,000 copies of its Curbing the 
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Epidemic report in over 10 different languages, ran a website dedicated to tobacco 
economics and hosted over 60 seminars and workshops around the world on tobacco 
taxation during the negotiating period 1999-2003 (Reubi 2013, 217). In each of these 
forums the Bank promoted its key messages (see Figure 4.4). According to one of my 
interviewees who participated in the FCTC process, the report was instrumental to the 
negotiations because of the presumed objectivity of economic arguments:  
[T]hat report was highly valuable to the negotiation… basically the 
[World] Bank came out and said, listen, you know... we are economists 
we have no moral judgment about tobacco. But our studies say that apart 
from a handful of countries...Malawi and Zimbabwe… tobacco is a net 
loss. And that was a very powerful message to the finance ministry. So 
we had the health advocates [saying] you shouldn't smoke – its bad for 
health. Right? But there was a lot of… assumptions that tobacco was 
actually quite positive to national economies… But the fact that the Bank 
came out with the position that it was a net economic loss for most 
countries, was at least in my opinion crucial in negotiation (Interview 
2013). 
. 
The moral outrage framing helped mobilize strong support for the FCTC among the 
global tobacco control movement while the epidemiological and economic 
characterizations of the global tobacco epidemic provided persuasive evidence in 
support of the treaty to ministries of health and ministries of finance. As a result,  
both the moral outrage framing and the epidemiological/economic characterization of 
the global tobacco epidemic served to motivate support for a strong FCTC.  
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Figure 4.4: Key messages of the Curbing the Epidemic Report. 
From (World Bank 1999b) 
  
Curbing the Epidemic Key message: 
Tobacco kills.  Smoking already causes one in 10 adults deaths worldwide.  Until recently, deaths and 
disease caused by smoking mainly affected rich nations but the impact is now rapidly shifting to the 
developing world.  By 2030, tobacco will kill 10 million people each year, the biggest single cause of 
death worldwide.  Seventy percent of those deaths will be in low-and middle-income countries, where 
tobacco use is growing fast, and many people do not know the risks. 
Few people dispute that smoking is damaging health on a global scale.  However, many governments 
have been wary of acting to control smoking through higher taxes, comprehensive bans on advertising 
and promotion, or restrictions on smoking in public places due to concerns that interventions such as 
these could have harmful economic consequences. 
"Curbing the Epidemic" addresses important economic and social issues that confront policymakers 
when dealing with tobacco.  The report: 
• estimates the gains in health and lives that tobacco control could achieve 
• assesses the conseuences of tobacco control for economies and individuals 
• demonstrates that the economic fears that have deterred policymakers from taking 
action are largely unfounded. 
Countries that adopt measures to reduce tobacco use can prevent millions of premature deaths 
and much disability, especially among the poor.  The most effective (and cost-effective) measures 
are: 
• taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products 
• non-price measures, especially comprehensive bans on advertising and promotion of 
tobacco, information, including porminent health warning labels, and smoking restrictions 
• cessation treatments and programs:  nicotine replacement therapy, counseling and support, 
anti-depressants etc that can help smokers to quit. 
These measures generally will not harm economies.  In almost all countries, there would be no net loss 
of jobs.  Evidence shows that higher tobaco taxes generate increases in revenues.  Even where 
smuggling becomes a serious problem, tax increases bring greater revenues and reduce smoking. 
Governments, international agencies, NGOs and citizens can all help to reduce the devastating impact 
on global health from smoking.  Moderate action could win substantial health gains in the 
21stcentury. 
The report is the outcome of strong collaboration amond governments, non governmental 
organizations (NGOs), researchers and Universities, agencies within the United Nations system, 
including the World Health Organiztion, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund, and the office on Smoking and Health at the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I showed how amidst the newly altered global health landscape of 
the 1990s, the results of the GBD study and DCP Project as well as the World Bank’s 
economic analyzes of tobacco epidemic were seen as compelling evidence in support of 
tobacco control at the WHO. This epidemiological/economic characterization of the 
tobacco epidemic found resonance with important constituencies – with the World 
Bank, of course, and with representatives of national ministries of finance of WHO 
member-state delegates – and with Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland upon her appointment as 
Director General of the WHO. In her role as Director General, Brundtland was tasked 
with reforming the WHO and with reasserting the centrality of the languishing 
organization within a newly crowded field of global health actors. Brundtland 
effectively mobilized the epidemiological/economic characterization of the tobacco 
epidemic and gained support for the FCTC treaty among a range of partner 
organizations. In turn, Gro Harlem Brundtland was able to partially realize her vision 
for the WHO as “the moral voice and the technical leader in improving the health of the 
people of the world” (1998 Speech to General Assembly). The epidemiology of the 
tobacco threat served as an epistemic hinge between technical and moral aspects of the 
tobacco epidemic because a disproportionate share of the future burden of tobacco 
related death and disease was forecast to fall on countries of the global South. 
Brundtland was no doubt central to the successful passage of the FCTC, but her 
accomplishments were made neither alone nor in a historical and political vacuum. 
Instead, as I try to highlight here, Brundtland mobilized a particular set of constraints 
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and opportunities that emerged from the changing context of world health during the 
1990s.   
 During the treaty-making process a number of developments helped speed its 
passage: public hearings in advance of treaty negotiations, the creation of an active 
transnational NGO movement and reigniting of the moral outrage frame, the 
deployment of various rhetorical strategies and, crucially, the publication and 
dissemination of the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic (1999) report during the 
negotiations. In the next chapter I move from the global problematization of tobacco 
control and the accomplishment of the FCTC, that is from how the science and policy of 
global tobacco control were coproduced, to the content of the treaty itself. I examine in 
greater depth particular articles of the treaty and how they purport to govern the health 
of the global population in the new era of global health.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
KNOWING THE RISKS AND BEARING THE COSTS OF SMOKING: 
DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGIES FOR THE NEOLIBERAL 
SUBJECT 
  “The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) is the first 
treaty negotiated under the auspices of the World Health Organization. The WHO 
FCTC is an evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people to the highest 
standard of health. The WHO FCTC represents a paradigm shift in developing a 
regulatory strategy to address addictive substances; in contrast to previous drug 
control treaties, the WHO FCTC asserts the importance of demand reduction strategies 
as well as supply issues” (World Health Organization 2003b, vi). 
 
 The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(WHO FCTC) was claimed to usher in a new era of global health not just because it was 
an unprecedented legally binding world health, nor because it helped reestablish the 
WHO’s role in the field of global health, nor even because of the unique level of 
international cooperation it inspired. The WHO FCTC was claimed also to represent a 
“paradigm shift” in the control of diseases caused by harmful and addictive substances 
because it emphasized demand reduction strategies. That is to say, instead of regulating 
tobacco products, the FCTC treaty primarily regulates the behaviors of tobacco-using 
people.  In attempting to intervene upon the risky yet still perfectly legal decision to 
consume tobacco products, then, the FCTC attempts to govern global health through 
prescribing health-maximizing, risk-minimizing behaviors – i.e. by prescribing the 
conduct of conduct of the global population. And it attempts to do so by correcting what 
the World Bank identified as a market failure in the decision to smoke, i.e. that smokers 
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neither full know their risks nor bear the costs of their individual consumer choice 
(1999a). The two central demand reduction strategies of the FCTC are designed to 
correct for this market failure through education (increasing smokers” knowledge about 
the risks of smoking) and taxes (increasing the “costs” involved in deciding to smoke). 
In this chapter I argue that both of these demand reduction strategies are based on a 
model of a cost-benefit calculating neoliberal homo oeconomicus – the same figuration 
of human action that I argued undergirds the DALY metric discussed in Chapter 2. 
Education campaigns and taxation strategies both seek to alter the costs and benefits of 
present and future smoking in such a way that the decision not to smoke is the only 
rational course of action. Furthermore, I argue that they do so by bringing the future 
costs of smoking into present cost-benefit calculations in an attempt to effect the self-
optimizing behavior of neoliberal homo oeconomicus. I begin by outlining the demand 
reduction articles of the FCTC before turning to examine in greater detail taxation and 
education strategies designed to combat the global tobacco epidemic. 
 
DEMAND REDUCTION STRATEGIES OF THE FCTC 
 The FCTC treaty in its final iteration consists of thirty-eight articles, the 
majority of which deal with technical and definitional issues including the precise use 
of terms, the relationship of the FCTC to other international legal instruments, and the 
settlement of treaty-related disputes. But Parts III and IV of the treaty, encompassing 
eleven articles in total, deal with specific tobacco control measures designed to curb the 
negative health effects of the global tobacco epidemic. Part III (Articles 6  - 14) covers 
demand reduction strategies including taxation, protections from tobacco smoke 
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exposure, product regulations and disclosures, cessation advice and, public awareness 
and education measures. The remaining three articles (Articles 15 – 17) constitute Part 
IV of the treaty and cover supply-side regulations. These are limited to preventing the 
illegal trade of tobacco products (i.e. smuggling), restricting sales of tobacco products 
to minors and a vaguely worded commitment to “promote, as appropriate, economically 
viable alternatives for tobacco workers, growers and, as the case may be, individual 
sellers” (WHO 2003, 16).  Throughout my fieldwork, I repeatedly observed members of 
the international tobacco control community profess a commitment to and solidarity 
with tobacco farmers, especially those in low and middle-income countries, who were 
anticipated suffer lost livelihood as a result of the FCTC (Field Notes 3/8-12/2009, 
11/15-20/2010). However, this aspect of the treaty has received very little attention 
from academics, campaigners, or funding bodies. Instead, academic research has 
focused on the tobacco industry’s use of tobacco farming groups as a front for anti-
regulatory lobbying efforts (Mair and Kierans 2007; Chapman 2007; Russell, 
Wainwright, and Mamudu 2014; S. Glantz, Mamudu, and Hammond 2008; Glantz and 
Balbach 2000).  
The objective of the treaty, specified in Article 2 is to “protect present and future 
generations from the devastating health, social, environmental and economic 
consequences of tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a 
framework for tobacco control measures to be implemented by the Parties at the 
national, regional and international level” (WHO 2003, 5). To achieve this objective the 
treaty lays out a set of guiding principles in Article 4. The first guiding principle 
emphasizes that “[e]very person should be informed of the health consequences, 
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addictive nature and mortal threat posed by tobacco consumption and exposure to 
tobacco smoke” (WHO 2003, 5). Additional guiding principles point to the necessity of 
strong political commitment, international cooperation, comprehensive multisectoral 
collaboration, and the participation of civil society in implementing the treaty’s 
objectives.  Article 5 of the treaty details the Parties’ general obligations, including the 
requirement that each Party develop a comprehensive national tobacco control strategy, 
establish a national focal point for tobacco, protect the national tobacco program from 
tobacco industry interference and raise financial resources for the effective 
implementation of the FCTC. 
 Part II of the treaty, “Measures relating to the reduction of demand for tobacco”, 
begins with Article 6 (WHO 2003, 7). Although the first guiding principle of the treaty 
focuses on the necessity of health information about the harms of tobacco, the first 
demand reduction measure focuses on price and tax strategies to reduce the demand for 
tobacco.  Article 6 states that “The Parties recognize that price and tax measures are an 
effective and important means of reducing tobacco consumption by various segments of 
the population, in particular young persons” (WHO 2003, 7). Member states that have 
become Parties to the FCTC treaty have thus, by ratifying Article 6 of the convention, 
indirectly contributed to the global consensus that taxation strategies are an effective 
public health measure to control the global tobacco epidemic. However, even though 
tobacco taxation had become widely acknowledged as an “evidence based best 
practice” in tobacco control by the mid-2000s, it was not always viewed as such. In fact, 
even as late as the mid-1990s, tobacco taxation was seen primarily as a revenue raising 
strategy to which many tobacco control advocates objected because it was seen as a 
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highly regressive. I examine the changing science of tobacco taxation below.  
 Having positioned tobacco taxation as a first principle of demand reduction 
strategies, the FCTC treaty then goes on to cover further non-price measures to curtail 
global tobacco consumption. These include protection from exposure to tobacco smoke 
(Article 8), regulation of tobacco contents and emissions (Article 9) and product 
disclosures (Article 10) – each to be enacted through national law. Articles 11 and 12 
address “Packaging and labelling of tobacco products” and “Education, communication, 
training and public awareness” respectively (WHO 2003, 9-11). Together, they form the 
core of the risk communication strategies designed to correct for market failure in the 
decision to smoke due to imperfect information about the health consequences of 
smoking.  
 Article 13 covers “Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship” and 
promotes a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising (WHO 2003, 11-12). Finally, 
Article 14, the last article of the treaty addresses “Demand reduction measures 
concerning tobacco dependence and cessation”. This article suggests that parties 
endeavor to “facilitate accessibility and affordability for treatment of tobacco 
dependence including pharmaceutical products” (WHO, 2003 13). From the very 
inception of the FCTC treaty making-process at the WHO, Director General Brundtland 
and TFI Director Derek Yach understood the importance of sending the clear message 
that “anti-tobacco does not mean anti-corporate” (Yach 2014 4). One manifestation of 
this message was the launch of a partnership between four major pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture tobacco cessation products and the WHO at the World 
Economic Forum in 1999.  
 	   	  
228 
 
 In the sections that follow I detail how tobacco taxation was re-conceptualized 
from a mere revenue raising tactic to the “First Principle of tobacco control worldwide” 
(Warner 2014, i4) during the 1990s due to developments in economic theories of 
tobacco consumption and addiction. Taxation as a tobacco control strategy was then 
taken up by the World Bank, which gave considerable support and publicity to the idea 
– especially through the publication of the Curbing the Epidemic report (World Bank 
1999). I then turn to development of a new method for communicating the health risks 
of smoking, the graphic warning strategy, which was created for Australian antismoking 
campaigns during the 1990s and has subsequently been adopted worldwide. I argue that 
both taxation and public education strategies are predicated on a vision of the risk-
minimizing, health-maximizing neoliberal homo oeconomicus who incorporates both 
current and future costs and benefits in their rational calculations. I conclude with a 
visual tour of graphic tobacco warning labels worldwide. 
 
TOBACCO TAXATION, RATIONAL ADDITION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH  
 For centuries, governments have taxed tobacco primarily for the purposes of 
raising revenue. Writing in the late 18th century, Adam Smith, in his Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, grouped tobacco with sugar and rum as 
commodities which were almost universally consumed but were “no where necessaries 
of life… [and] are therefore extremely proper subjects of taxation” (Smith 1976). 
Alternatively, tobacco has been subject to “sin taxes,” i.e., taxes on items like tobacco 
that are seen as amoral or unholy (though not illegal) and whose use was therefore 
punished through taxation.  It was not until the second half of the 20th century that some 
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governments, especially in high-income countries, began to use tobacco taxes for public 
health purposes by increasing tobacco taxes in an effort to reduce tobacco consumption 
(Chaloupka, Yurekli and Fong 2012, 172).  
 Increased tobacco taxes were initially met with resistance from many public 
health professionals who believed that using taxation as a tobacco control strategy was 
both ineffective and morally repugnant (Warner 2014, i4). Tobacco taxes were seen as 
ineffective because smokers were believed to be addicted to tobacco products. From the 
perspective of economic theory, cigarette smoking (and addictive behavior more 
generally) was seen as irrational and therefore not amenable to conventional economic 
analysis (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 4. See also Schelling 1984). The demand for 
addictive products was not seen to follow one of the most fundamental laws of 
economics: the downward-sloping demand curve (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 4). The 
demand curve describes the relationship between price of a product and the quantity of 
it demanded by consumers. Generally, as prices rise, demand for a product falls. The 
relationship between a commodity’s price and consumer demand for it is called price 
elasticity. Because cigarettes are addictive, it was assumed that cigarettes would exhibit 
complete price inelasticity – addicts would pay higher and higher prices in order to 
satisfy their addiction i.e., demand would remain high despite an increase in price. As a 
result, tobacco taxes were seen not only as ineffective, they were seen as highly 
regressive: in addition to simply not working, higher tobacco taxes would 
disproportionately effect people of lower income and lower educational attainment who 
were overrepresented amongst smokers (Warner 2014).   
 The first steps towards the reconceptualization of taxation as an effective 
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tobacco control strategy were taken by US economist Eugene Lewit. Lewit completed 
his PhD at the City University of New York under the guidance of Michael Grossman 
and worked with Grossman at the National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER). In 
his PhD, Lewit applied human capital theories of household production to questions of 
prenatal care and infant survival (Lewit 1977). He subsequently collaborated with 
Michael Grossman and Douglas Coate to evaluate the impact of various tobacco control 
strategies on the demand for cigarettes in the United States. These included the impact 
of the application of the Fairness Doctrine to tobacco advertising from July 1967 to 
January 1971 (see Chapter 3), the introduction of an advertising ban on tobacco 
products beginning in January 1971 and the impact of the federal excise tax on tobacco 
demand (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman 1981). Importantly, they used individual level 
data on the demand for cigarettes based on Cycle III (1966-1970) of the U.S. Health 
Examination Survey and, later, data from the 1976 Health Interview Data, to determine 
that smoking behaviors were indeed sensitive to price increases, especially among 
teenage smokers. Lewit and colleagues found the elasticity of smoking prevalence 
among 12-17 year old smokers to be -1.2 and the elasticity of quantity smoked to be -
1.4. This meant that for every 10% increase in cigarette prices, teenage smoking 
prevalence would decrease by 12% while teenagers’ total demand for cigarettes would 
fall by 14% (Lewit, Coate and Grossman 1981, 568. See also Warner 2014). Further 
research, published the following year, found that for adult smokers, a 10% increase in 
price would decrease the demand for cigarettes by 4.2% (Lewit and Coate 1982). Lewit 
et al’s finding that teenagers (and members of lower socio-economic groups) were more 
sensitive to price increases than adult smokers seemed especially promising, because 
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these were the very same groups with whom traditional public health education 
campaigns were least effective (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman 1981; Lewitt and Coate 
1982; Townsend 1987. See also Reubi 2013).  
 Lewit and colleagues’ findings were quickly taken up by US health economist 
and tobacco control advocate Kenneth Warner for their policy implications. In 1985, the 
temporary doubling of the U.S. federal cigarette excise tax from 8 cents per pack to16 
cents per pack was scheduled to end. Drawing on the findings of Lewit and his 
colleagues, Warner argued that continuing the higher excise tax rate would prevent two 
million Americans from smoking, including more than 460 000 teenagers. Furthermore, 
it would prevent more than 480 000 tobacco-related premature deaths from occurring in 
the future (Warner 2012, i4). Following a well-orchestrated advocacy effort by 
Washington-based public health organizations, the US Senate decided to continue to 
higher excise tax rate, in part because of these economic arguments (Warner 2012 i4).  
 In addition to catalyzing this advocacy effort, Lewit, Coate and Grossman’s 
research also helped spark multiple lines of academic research. The first resulted in over 
100 studies documenting the outcomes of various “natural experiments” in tax 
increases, price fluctuations and cigarette consumption, including studies questioning 
the degree of variation in price elasticity according to age, gender and socioeconomic 
status (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2011. See also Warner 2014). 
These studies were originally conducted in countries with well-established tobacco 
control programs and well-developed academic research programs in health economics, 
namely the U.S., U.K. and Canada. Eventually, similar studies were undertaken in low- 
and middle-income contexts as well (S. Chapman and Richardson 1990; Kostova et al. 
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2011; K. E. Warner, Tam, and Koltun 2013). The results of these studies helped to 
ameliorate concerns over the regressively of tobacco tax increases because higher 
sensitivity to price increases was found among smokers of the lowest incomes. As a 
result, it could be argued that although tobacco taxes were inherently regressive 
(because of the higher concentration of smoking among low income populations), 
tobacco tax increases were not necessarily regressive:  
In many countries, tobacco use among the lowest income/SES 
populations is most responsive to price, while use among the highest 
income/SES populations is least responsive. Thus, a tax increase that 
raises tobacco product prices will lead to the largest declines in smoking 
among the lowest income persons, and the burden of tax increase will 
fall more heavily on higher income consumers whose smoking behavior 
changes little in response to the tax increase (Chaloupka, Yurekli, and 
Fong 2012, 176).  
 
Formulated in this way, tobacco tax increases could, counter-intuitively be seen as 
progressive (or at least, as reducing the regressively of tobacco taxes left unchanged).  
 The second line of academic research investigated how addiction affects price 
sensitivity and inspired a cascade of studies in the area of “rational addiction studies” 
(Warner 2014). While prior economic models either ignored addiction or treated it as an 
irrational behavior, these new models incorporated addictive behaviors within the 
proper domain of economic analyses (Chaloupka, Tauras, and Grossman 2000, 107). 
Three different approaches were developed: so-called “imperfectly rational” models, 
“myopic addiction” models and, importantly, Gary Becker’s “rational theory of 
addiction”. The imperfectly rational models of addiction assumed that smokers held 
inconsistent short-run and long-run preferences. Such an approach is illustrated by the 
work of US economist and Nobel prize-winning game theorist Thomas Schelling. 
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According to Schelling, “Everybody behaves like two people, one who wants clean 
lungs and long life and another who adores tobacco… The two are in a continual 
contest for control; the ‘straight’ one often in command most of the time, but the 
wayward one needing only to get occasional control to spoil the other’s best laid plans” 
(1978, 290). These models of the imperfectly rational addiction were developed 
theoretically, but didn’t find empirical application in smoking or any other addictive 
behavior (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 11). “Myopic addiction” models first 
introduced the idea that current consumption could depend on past consumption by 
“modeling current demand as a function of a “stock of habits” represented by the 
depreciated sum of all past consumption” (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 12. See also 
Houthakker and Taylor 1970). However, while smokers were seen to realize the 
dependence of current smoking on past smoking (i.e. that smoking is addictive), they 
were seen as failing to take into account the future consequences of current smoking 
decisions.  
 The third, and most influential model of rational addition modeled smoking as a 
fully rational behavior i.e. that addicts are aware of the dependence of current choice on 
past behavior and consider the future implications of their consumption decisions when 
making current choices (Chaloupka, Tauras, and Grossman 2000, 108). Importantly, the 
rational theory of addiction was developed most fully by Chicago School economist, 
economic imperialist and neoliberal thinker Gary Becker. Becker’s rational theory of 
addiction, first developed as a theoretical model in collaboration with George Stigler in 
1977, treated the consumption of addictive goods as a rational behavior amenable to 
explanation by rational choice theory (Stigler and Becker 1977). “Rationality” was 
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taken to mean that individuals make consumption decisions based on the maximization 
of current and future utility.  
 Lewit, Coates and Grossman’s empirical findings prompted Becker to return to 
rational studies of addiction to further develop the model (Becker and Murphy 1988). 
Becker and Murphy argued that:  
Rational consumers maximize utility from stable preferences as they try 
to anticipate the future consequences of their choices. Addictions would 
seem to be the antithesis of rational behavior…Yet…we claim that 
addictions, even strong ones, are usually rational in the sense of 
involving forward-looking maximization with stable preferences. Our 
claim is even stronger: a rational framework permits new insights into 
addictive behavior. 
 
People get addicted not only to alcohol, cocaine, and cigarettes but also 
to work, eating, music, television, their standard of living, other people, 
religion, and many other activities. Therefore, much behavior would be 
excluded from the rational choice framework if addictions have to be 
explained in another way. Fortunately, a separate theory is not necessary 
since rational choice theory can explain a wide variety of addictive 
behavior (Becker and Murphy 1998, 675-676). 
 
This passage has at least two important implications for the argument being developed 
here. First, it illustrates Becker’s commitment to rational choice theory as applicable to 
all human behavior, even behaviors like the consumption of addictive substances, which 
appear to be irrational. Put differently, it demonstrates Becker’s neoliberal approach to 
human action and his economic imperialism (Lemke 2001; Foucault 2010; Fine 2002). 
Second, it demonstrates how Becker’s rational theory of addiction conceptualizes 
addiction not as a property of things, but rather as a property of people, or more 
accurately, of their behavior. Addiction to cigarettes or cocaine – which are both 
physically and psychologically addictive – are rendered equivalent to addiction to 
eating, music, or religion. Like the myopic addiction model, addiction is here 
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conceptualized as the effect of past consumption on current consumption decisions. A 
consumer who is addicted to a product must have bought the product before and will 
require the same or increasingly larger quantities of the product in order to derive the 
same degree of utility from its consumption (Chaloupka, Tauras, and Grossman 2000; 
Lewitt and Coate 1982; Warner 2014). Unlike the myopic or imperfect models, though, 
the Becker-Murphy model insisted that “individuals consistently maximize utility over 
their life cycle, taking into account the future consequences of their choice” (Warner 
and Chaloupka 1999, 12–13).  
 Becker then developed a number of hypotheses from the rational model of 
addiction including “adjacent complementary” or the idea that “the quantities of the 
addictive good consumed in different time periods are complements… current 
consumption of an addictive good is inversely related not only to the current price of the 
good, but also to all past and future prices” (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 13). In this 
way, the temporarily of future smoking decisions was collapsed into current cost-benefit 
calculations. Through the complex mathematical calculations of the model, strong 
adjacent complementarity was shown to lead to “unstable steady states” helping to 
explain the abstinence/binge behavior frequently observed among addicts as well the 
bimodal distribution of consumption found among addictive goods (Warner and 
Chaloupka 1999, 13).  
 The case of cigarette consumption provided a particularly good empirical testing 
site for work in rational addiction studies because cigarettes are one of the very few 
addictive goods that are legal for sale and because there exists good data on tobacco 
consumption due to both epidemiological studies and national tax accounts. Another 
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key implications of Becker’s rational addiction model and its collapsed temporality of 
consumption choices was that long-run effect of a permanent change in price was 
anticipated to exceed the short run effect. In other words, smokers were seen to be more 
responsive to permanent price changes rather than temporary fluctuations.  
 Becker had initially developed the rational theory of addiction during the 1970s 
in collaboration with George Stigler. He then further developed the model with his PhD 
student Michael Grossman, who in turn, continued to work in rational addiction studies 
with his own PhD students. One in particular, Frank Chaloupka, set about empirically 
testing the rational theory of addiction using data on cigarette consumption from the 
Second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey conducted in the late 1970s. 
In his PhD dissertation Chaloupka reported: “significant intertemporal linkages are 
found in cigarette consumption…Future events are found to have a significant impact 
on current consumption” (Chaloupka 1988, v). In other words, Chaloupka found 
empirical verification of Becker’s model and lent support to the vision of smokers as 
rational addicts. In future research, Chaloupka “found consistent evidence that cigarette 
smoking was an addictive behavior and that smokers did not behave myopically”,  i.e. 
that smokers behaved rationally (Warner and Chaloupka 1999, 13). Further, he found 
the long-run price elasticity of demand for cigarettes to be within the rang of -0.27 to -
0.48, significantly larger than those derived from the conventional calculation of price 
elasticity using the same data (Warner et al. 1995; Warner and Chaloupka 1999). The 
implication here is not only that smokers weight future price in current consumption 
decisions, but that current action to increase cigarette prices (through taxation) provides 
a way to intervene upon the future tobacco epidemic through these higher long-run 
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price elasticities. 
 The rational theory of addiction quickly became the most widely applied 
economic model of addiction (Chaloupka, Tauras, and Grossman 2000, 108). Of course, 
several of its assumptions drew criticisms; for example, that smokers have perfect 
foresight, that smokers do not regret their past smoking decisions and that smokers have 
a full awareness of the consequences of smoking. Nevertheless, the policy implication 
of the general economic approach to tobacco addiction was proclaimed to be clear: 
“…because of the dependence of current consumption on past consumption…the effect 
of a permanent change in price will be greater in the long-run than in the short-run, 
suggesting that permanent real price increases and strong tobacco-control efforts, which 
raise the actual and perceived costs of smoking, can be effective in significantly 
reducing smoking” (Chaloupka, Tauras, and Grossman 2000, 108).76 
 Work in the rational theory of addiction was taken up by the World Bank in its 
economic studies of tobacco and came to constitute a corner stone of the 
recommendations delivered in the Bank’s influential Curbing the Epidemic Report. By 
2014, seasoned tobacco economist Kenneth Warner could report:  
Taxation has become a First Principle of tobacco control worldwide, 
hailed by the World Bank’s 1999 “bible” of international tobacco 
control, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of 
Tobacco Control, and embodied in Article 6 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. Virtually everyone engage in tobacco 
control now understands the importance of keeping cigarette prices high 
and the role of raising taxes in doing so (Kenneth E Warner 2014, i4). 
 
The imprint of Becker’s rational theory of rational addiction, then can be seen in both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The graphic warning approach to communicating the risks of smoking, which I discuss 
below, is one way in which the perceived costs of smoking may be increased.  
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the World Bank’s economic approach to tobacco control and the World Health 
Organization’s embrace of taxation as a first life defense against the global tobacco 
epidemic. 
 
Economic justifications for tobacco taxation 
 Even though Becker, Chaloupka and others had provided both theoretical and 
empirical arguments in support of tobacco taxation as a tobacco control strategy, the 
question remained whether government intervention in the tobacco market was justified 
on economic grounds. This question prompted an additional line of academic research 
into economic rationales for intervention in the tobacco market.  
 As I mentioned earlier, tobacco has been taxed for the purposes of revenue 
raising or on the moral invocation of a “sin tax” for hundreds of years. It wasn’t until 
the middle of the 20th century that tobacco taxes were adopted for the public health 
purpose of discouraging tobacco consumption. Nevertheless, concerns lingered about 
the regressively of tobacco taxation and raised questions about the justification for such 
taxes, regardless of their public health intent. One justification emerged along the lines 
of traditional Pigouvian taxation: taxation aimed at redressing economic externalities. 
According to economic theory, perfect markets exist where consumers hold perfect 
information about consumption decisions and bear all the costs associated with their 
consumption choices. In reality, some consumption decisions are said to general 
negative externalities, costs born by someone other than the individual consumer. In the 
case of smoking, such “social costs” were seen in areas ranging from health care costs 
borne by the State, irritation borne by non-smoking bystanders, to harm suffered by 
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victims of “passive smoking”. A Pigouvian tax attempts to correct for such negative 
externalities by incorporating taxes – set at rate equivalent to the social costs – into the 
price paid by consumers. In other words, Pigouvian taxes do the same work of sin taxes 
in an economic, seemingly amoral, frame. 
 Some health economists began using social cost arguments to advocate for 
tobacco taxation beginning in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Smokers generated higher 
health care costs and took more time off work than nonsmokers, such arguments 
claimed, and as a result, generated costs for society (for a recent version of this 
argument see Collins and Lapsley 2010). However, smokers’ rights advocates quickly 
countered that while smokers typically generate higher health care costs, they also 
typically die younger than non-smokers, thus generating net savings on the account of a 
shorter duration of health care demands and by drawing less from public funds in the 
form of pension benefits (W. K. Viscusi 1993; K. Viscusi 2003)77. While the debates 
between those who thought smokers generated net cost via health care needs and those 
who believed smokers generated net savings via dying younger raged, World Bank 
economists proposed another justification for intervention in the tobacco market: market 
failure. In its Curbing the Epidemic report, the Bank argued that the decision to smoke 
constituted a form of market failure because consumers neither knew all the risks nor 
bore all the cost associated with their consumption decision.  
 Traditional economic theory holds that the allocative efficiency of a society’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Such arguments became particularly relevant to the Master Settlement Agreement in the 
United States, which sought to recover from the tobacco industry costs borne for health care by 
the 48 plaintiff States (Wolfson 2001; Stanton A. Glantz and Balbach 2000; Studlar 2002; A. 
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resources is best achieved through the consumption choices of individuals in an 
unfettered marketplace, i.e. through the principle of consumer sovereignty within a free 
market (World Bank 199, 29). The allocative efficiency argument holds, however, only 
if consumers hold perfect information about and bear all the costs of their consumption 
choices. Because smokers were shown to neither know all the health risks associated 
with smoking nor bear all the costs of their decision to smoke, smoking was 
conceptualized as a form of market failure.   
 The report skirted the issue of social costs by acknowledging the huge amount 
of variation found around the world with respect to different levels of public and private 
financing for healthcare costs. Nevertheless, the report surmised, “smokers clearly 
impose direct costs, such as health damage, on non-smokers. There are probably also 
financial costs, for example in healthcare, although they are more difficult to identify or 
quantify” (World Bank 1999, 34). As a result, the Bank argued not only that the tobacco 
epidemic posed an economic threat, but that government intervention was justified on 
economic grounds. Governments could regulate tobacco products without violating the 
first principle of neoclassical economic theory: consumer sovereignty. The report 
proclaimed: “…it appears unlikely that most smokers either know the full extent of their 
risks or bear all of the costs of their choice. Thus, their consumption choices may result 
in inefficient allocation of resources. Governments may therefore be justified in 
intervening to adjust the incentives to consumers to they smoke less” (1999, 34). Put 
differently, the Bank argued that in governing global smoking behaviors, Governments 
were justified in altering the costs and benefits in such a way so that the decision not to 
smoke was the only rational course of action. In this way, the cost-benefit calculating, 
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health-maximizing, future-oriented neoliberal homo oeconomicus could be steered 
towards enacting the desired form of self-optimizing conduct: making the individual 
decision not to smoke. 
 
HEALTH INFORMATION, RISK COMMUNICATION and GRAPHIC WARNINGS  
The Curbing the Epidemic report identified market failure as the primary 
justification for Government intervention in the tobacco market. But taxation was no the 
only strategy advocated. Correcting for the informational side of market failure also 
became an important intervention strategy. After taxation, the Bank also recommended 
increasing consumer information as a strategy to dissuade individuals from smoking. 
“The long-term downward trend in smoking prevalence in most high-income countries 
over the past three decades”, the Bank reported, “has coincided with a long-term 
upwards trend in people’s levels of knowledge about the harmful effects of smoking.” 
(World Bank 1999, 46). The report identified tobacco warning labels and mass media 
counter-advertising campaigns as effective ways to increase consumer knowledge about 
the health risks of smoking. Here I analyze the development of a new approach to 
communicating the health risks of smoking that coincided with the rise of taxation as a 
global tobacco control strategy: the graphic warning strategy. Like tobacco taxation, the 
graphic warning strategy operates on a collapsed temporality by attempting to bring 
future health consequences into current cost-benefit calculations in the decision to 
smoke. It does so by eliciting a strong negative emotional response to graphic pictorial 
representations of smokers’ presumptive futures, especially their presumed future 
health. In doing so, the graphic warning strategy attempts to raise the actual and 
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perceived future costs associated with smoking, thereby tipping the cost-benefit 
calculations of future-oriented utility-maximizing rational smokers. Here, I analyze the 
campaign that introduced the graphic warning strategy: Australia’s National Tobacco 
Campaign that was launched in July 1997. I then trace how the graphic warning strategy 
has been adopted as evidence-based “best practice”, especially for tobacco product 
warning labels, worldwide.  
 
 THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL TOBACCO CAMPAIGN 
 “Every cigarette is doing you damage” 
 On June 12th 1997, the Australian Federal Government launched the country’s 
first national-level anti-smoking campaign. Delivering the message that “every cigarette 
is doing you damage”, the National Tobacco Campaign (NTC), has become a 
paradigmatic model for effective antismoking initiatives worldwide, and is credited 
with having reduced Australia’s smoking rate from 25% in 1997 to a record low of 
16.4% in 2007 (health.gov.au). The campaign has been recognized by the advertising 
industry both domestically and internationally with awards for its creativity, credibility, 
originality and effectiveness. Over thirty countries from around the world have adopted 
materials from the campaign for use in their domestic antismoking initiatives 
(Australian Government Department of Health and Aging 1997). Importantly, the 
FCTC cites the campaign’s strategies, rationale and effectiveness as evidence in support 
of its own guidelines for the implementation of Articles 11 and 12 of the treaty (World 
Health Organization; World Health Organization). 
 With Federal funding of AUD$7 million over its first two years – the largest 
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sum ever allocated to any Australian anti-smoking effort – the NTC launched a 
coordinated, nation-wide mass media campaign unprecedented in both its reach and 
production value. While earlier campaigns had relied largely on pro-bono advertising 
work for its creative content and community service placing for its circulation, the NTC 
engaged the services of a well-known advertising agency and secured prime-time paid 
advertising spots on major Australian network stations. 78  With continued high levels of 
joint Federal and State funding, the NTC has sustained its media presence on television, 
radio and in print media for almost two decades.  
 The NTC is remarkable for a number of reasons: for its novelty as Australia’s 
first national antismoking campaign, its longevity and intensity, and the considerable 
levels of funding it has continued to secure.  In addition, the messages and rhetorical 
strategies embraced by the NTC have significantly diverged from earlier antismoking 
efforts in important ways. While earlier antismoking advertisements were seen to focus 
on the probabilistic risk of catastrophic illness, highlighting serious but often long-
delayed clinical outcomes such as heart attack or tracheotomy and used rhetorical 
strategies including patient testimonials, illustrative analogies and direct medical 
advice, the NTC sought to take smokers “on a journey through their own body” to 
witness the “damage smoking does to [them]” (Australian Government Department of 
Health and Aging 2006). As Dr David Hill, Chairman of the Ministerial Tobacco 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Brown, Melhuish, and Fishlock, the agency responsible for the campaign, also handles 
accounts for the popular Australian beer brand “Tooheys”, the largest domestic dairy producer 
“Dairy Farmers, as well international corporations such as furniture giant “Ikea”, car brand 
“Renault” and the international authority on weight-control, “Weight Watchers”. See 
www.bmf.com.au. 
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Advisory Group put it; 
We have endlessly broadcast the devastating statistics about the risk of 
smoking. This approach has met with limited success, one reason being 
that smokers sometimes translate warnings about risk into terms such as: 
“Smoking is like buying a ticket in a lottery that is drawn when you 
reach 70, and that’s a risk I am prepared to take” (Bennet 2006, 10) 
  
In alluding to the temporal distance between current tobacco consumption decisions and 
future health consequences, Dr. Hill highlights the very same feature of tobacco related 
disease that Alan Lopez, Neil Collishaw and Tipani Piha had to contend with in 
modeling the various stages of the global tobacco epidemic (See Chapter 3). In order to 
collapse this temporal distance between current consumption decisions and probabilistic 
future health consequences, the NTC emphasized that “every cigarette is doing you 
damage”, i.e the each decision to smoke a cigarette results in negative health 
consequences.  
 In order to achieve the dual aims of education and affective response, the NTC 
introduced graphic warnings to visually represent the physical harms of smoking in 
ways that were simultaneously visceral and credible (Hill and Carroll 2003). Chairman 
Dr Hill, explained: "The campaign is designed to personally involve the smoker by 
taking them on a journey through their own body. We believe that the advertisements 
will produce a strong and emotional response" (Bennett 2006, 10 emphasis added). I 
argue that the attempt to reveal the internal health effects of smoking relies on long-
standing cultural narratives about science and medicine that lend to medical images the 
mantle of authoritative and objective knowledge. Using Van Dijck’s (2005) concept of 
the “endoscopic gaze” which, she argues, privileges a depersonalized view from within 
the body, I demonstrate how the NTC’s use of medical images anchors the visceral 
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reaction is aims to elicit in the apparent objectivity of medical images.  
 The “every cigarette” campaign inaugurated the NTC’s graphic warning 
rhetorical strategy in 1997, with the release of television advertisements taking the 
viewer on a journey through the smoker’s body to three different disease destinations 
(“Artery”, “Lung” & “Tumor”). Still images from the three advertisements provided the 
basis for the development of print advertisements and, eventually, tobacco product 
warning labels, while the particular health effects served as the basis for four of the nine 
radio spots that were developed during the first six months of the campaign (the other 
five provided supportive messages and advice for people in the process of quitting) 
(Hill & Carroll 2003, ii11). Over the following year, two additional television spots 
were developed (“Call for help” & “Brain”), while the final two installments (“Tar” & 
“Eye”) were introduced to coincide with the WHO’s World No Tobacco Day in May 
2000 (Hill & Carroll 2003, ii11). Figure 5.1 provides a summary of the content of the 
NTC television advertisements. 
 All but one of the television ads follows a similar structure while the remaining 
ad (“Call for help”) clarifies the role of the national Quitline service. In each of the five 
“journey” televisions spots, the opening sequence depicts a familiar scene – a man 
waiting at a bus stop, a young woman sitting on her couch, a mother watching her 
young children. In each ad, the smoker lights up to the enhanced sound of the strike of 
the lighter and an extreme close up of the end of the cigarette being lit and engulfed in 
flames. As the smoker inhales, the viewer is sucked into the interior of the body. At 
rapid speed the viewer follows the inhaled smoke as it swirls through the mouth, past 
the trachea and down into the bronchial tubes. From here, the different health effects of 
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smoking are shown including blindness, stroke-inducing blood clot, accumulation of tar 
in the lungs, fatty build up in the arteries, the development of lung cancer and the 
destruction of the lungs. 
 
Figure 5.1: Summary of the “Every cigarette is doing you damage” campaign 
advertisements 
Reproduced from (Hill and Carroll 2003) 
  
These medical facts are displayed either from inside the body, as with the development 
of lung cancer and the bursting of delicate blood vessels in the eye, or within the 
clinical confines of the hospital operating theatre where, for example, in the anatomical 
pathology of the stroke victim’s disembodied brain. As the smoker exhales, the camera 
similarly retreats back up the bronchioles, past the trachea and out through the mouth. 
The advertisement concludes with the particular smoker either coughing or quickly 
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taking another drag of the cigarette before returning to the task at hand – be it looking 
after their children, or catching an approaching bus. Each advertisement begins and 
finishes with the “every cigarette is doing you damage” tagline, and all end with the 
“smoky endframe”, conveying details of the national QUITline. In total, between the 
July 1997 and 2000, six television advertisements, nine radio spots, and a host of print 
media were developed, each emphasizing one of the health effect of smoking 
graphically depicted in the ads.  
 Each advertisement begins and finishes with the “every cigarette” tagline, and 
concludes with the “smoky endframe”, conveying details of the national Quitline (see 
Figure 5.2). To a background soundtrack of an eery, dissonant chord the dimly-lit 
endframe appears. Initially, the bold-type details of the Quitline, as well the smaller 
message attributing the ad to the NTC, are the only legible text. Behind the text is a 
somewhat ambiguous image, shrouded in wafting smoke. Reminiscent of a silhouetted 
cigarette package, with a solitary burning stick in the foreground, the image could 
equally be read as a thoracic X-ray, depicting the spinal column and lungs of a smoker. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: “Smoky Endframe” 
Stills from 0:25 and 0:28 respectively. Reproduced from 
www.quitnow.info.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/smokescreen-lp. 
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The billow of smoke illuminating the details of the Quitline could be that emanating 
from the cigarette butt, or that contaminating the interior of the smoker’s body. As 
additional smoke wafts from left to right across the screen, the “every cigarette” tagline 
emerges. The brightness of the tagline message is both shifting and irregular. It wavers 
slightly, appearing to float in the smoky haze as an authoritarian voice-over proclaims 
that “every cigarette is doing you damage”.  
            Still visual imagery similar to that used in the televisions spots was adapted by 
the NTC for print-media advertising, while the television ad’s eerie sound effects, 
authoritarian male voice-over, and “every cigarette” tagline were adopted for use in 
radio spots. The radio ads also invoked the television spots by inviting listeners to 
visualize the health effects of smoking on their own bodies: 
...close your eyes and think about the damage every cigarette is doing 
inside your body. See the delicate tissue of your own lungs being 
attacked by smoke... and “rotting”. Imagine your own arteries clogged by 
fatty gunk - like the one in the TV commercial. Cravings only last a few 
minutes. Seeing the damage inside your body, can help you fight them... 
(“See the Damage” 1997). 
 
In total, between the launch of the “every cigarette” campaign in 1997 and 2000, six 
television advertisements, nine radio spots, and a host of print media were developed by 
the NTC, each employing graphic warnings about the ways in which smoking effects 
the health of every individual smoker. 
  The NTC continued its heavy media presence through the early years of the new 
millennium even though it did not release further campaign materials. Nevertheless, its 
emphasis on graphic warnings reached a new in March 2006 when the Australian 
Federal Government introduced graphic health warnings as a required component of the 
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package labeling for all tobacco products sold in Australia. Consisting of full-color 
images and stark causal claims about the physical harms of smoking, the graphic 
warning labels built on the successes of the NTC, employing already- familiar images 
and the same rationale as earlier aspects of the campaign (see Figure 5.3) The emphatic 
message created by bold typeface, white-on-black or -red text,  and horrific visual 
representation of the oral pathology of mouth cancer were intended to shock. 
                    
 
Figure 5.3: “Mouth Cancer” graphic warning label front (left) and back (right) 
Reproduced from http:// 
www.quitnow.info.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/warnings-mouth 
            
The Government media release introducing the graphic warning labels characterized 
them in terms striking similar to other aspects of the “every cigarette” campaign: 
Graphic images that aim to shock Australian smokers by revealing the 
physical effects cigarettes have on the body are the focus of a new anti-
smoking campaign officially launched today at Parliament House, 
Canberra... The new graphic health warnings provide a strong and 
confronting message to smokers about the harmful health consequences 
of tobacco products and convey the “quit” message every time a person 
reaches for a cigarette. The graphic images, in combination with the 
health warnings and explanatory messages, are intended to increase 
consumer knowledge of health effects relating to smoking, to encourage 
cessation and to discourage uptake or relapse (Pyne 2006). 
 
The same goals that were articulated with respect to the NTC television advertising 
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campaign, namely the intent to educate smokers and produce an affective response, 
were similarly evident here in the aim to shock and smokers. 
            However, despite the emphasis on the “shock value” of the graphic warnings, 
the images were nonetheless presented as neutral portrayals of the real health 
consequences of smoking. Drawing on the presumed neutrality of scientific knowledge, 
Chairman Dr David Hill gave reassurance of the “rigorous scientific approach” 
employed throughout the development of the graphic warnings: “Scientists and medical 
experts have been involved in the campaign from an early stage and have verified that 
the advertisements are a fair representation of the pathological impact of smoking” 
(Bennet 2006). Similarly, the campaign advertisements proclaiming simply to make the 
effects of smoking “plainer to see” and to “make smokers more aware of the health 
effects of smoking”.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Print advertisements introducing Australia’s graphic warning labels 
Reproduced from 
http://www.quitnow.gov.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/warnings-posters 
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The putative objectivity of the graphic warning strategy subsequently became the theme 
for the WHO’s World No Tobacco Day in 2009, which emphasized graphic warning 
labels under the slogan: “Showing the truth, saving lives” (See Figure 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Showing the truth, saving lives: The case for pictorial health warnings 
World No Tobacco Day 2009. Reproduced form  
http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/wntd/2009/materials/brochure/en/ 
 
 
 In using visual representations of the internal health consequences of smoking, 
the NTC draws on well-establish cultural narratives that equate medical images of the 
interior of the body with authoritative and objective knowledge, which lend significant 
credibility to the graphic warning rhetorical strategy. I discuss these narratives next. 
 
Medical display and scientific objectivity: practices of witnessing  
  The National Tobacco Campaign’s novel rhetorical strategy of visually the 
physical harms of smoking, draws on a much longer history of “witnessing” in both 
science and medicine (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Jordonova 1995). In the case of 
medicine, practices of witnessing initially centered around dissections and pathological 
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anatomy and, later, anatomical atlases that were deemed credible on the basis of their 
author’s reputation and connection (Jordonova 1995, 203. See also van Dijck 2005). By 
the mid-19th century a new emphasis on the epistemic virtue of “objectivity” displaced 
the testimony of reliable, well-connected authors, and redefined the ways in which the 
authority of knowledge-claims could be achieved. As Daston and Galison (2010) 
explain, to be objective “is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower – 
knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgement, wishing or striving. 
Objectivity is blind sight, seeing without inference, interpretation or intelligence” (17). 
Mechanical modes of image-production soon rose to ascendency, photography in 
particular. With the direct relationship between image and referent that photography 
was assumed to assure, photographs eventually replaced illustrations as the primary 
mode of visual representations in both science and medicine, and became the technique 
through which credible and objective images could be produced. 
            Throughout the later half of the 19th century, photography was employed in 
scientific and medical practice in a variety of ways. In medicine, it was used to 
document and categorize patients of medical institutions, to trace the development of 
disease, in anthropometric measurement and in physiognomy (Sturken and Cartwright 
2009, 282). By the 1890s with the development of X-rays, medical image-making was 
seen to offer a new vision of the interior body. The same objectivity associated 
photographic images was extended to images mechanically produced by X-ray 
techniques as well (Cartwright 1995). Unlike early medical photographs, though, X-ray 
images thoroughly captured the public’s - with the development of X-rays, medical 
images began to permeate popular culture in ways that blurred the distinctions between 
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public and private, specialized knowledge and popular fantasy, and medical science and 
popular culture (Cartwright 1995,107). 
 Cultural theorist José Van Dijck has theorized the more contemporary 
convergence of technology, medicine and popular culture in the proliferation of 
endoscopy, ultrasound or MRI, CAT and PET scans. She proposes the notion of the 
“endoscopic gaze” to highlight how medical images are seen to present a neutral, 
seemingly “objective” view of the body’s interior. As she explains: 
The interplay of technology, medical practice, and cultural appropriation 
becomes manifest in what I will refer to as “the endoscopic gaze.” In 
contrast to Laura Mulvey’s “cinematic gaze”, the endoscopic gaze 
signifies the surgeon’s view from within the body, enabled by medical 
technology. In the case of the cinematic gaze, the spectator is forced to 
adopt the perspective of the camera, which often produces a 
depersonalized, detached view of the object; the endoscopic camera 
similarly creates a seemingly “objective”, neutral view of the object, in 
this case, the body’s interior...We no longer peer from the outside in, 
through an incision in the skin; instruments now allow us “immediate” 
access to the body’s tiniest details (van Dijck 2005, 66). 
 
The “endoscopic gaze”, then, privileges a depersonalized view from within the body, 
showing “objective” knowledge about the body’s interior.  
 The operation of the endoscopic gaze is evidence in each of the television ads. 
Each of the opening sequences depicts a familiar scene – a man waiting at a bus stop, a 
young woman sitting on her couch, a mother watching her young children. In each ad, 
the smoker lights up to the exaggerated sound of the strike of the lighter and an extreme 
close up of the end of the cigarette as it is lit and engulfed in flames. As the smoker 
inhales, the viewer is sucked into the interior of the body. At rapid speed the viewer 
follows the inhaled smoke as it swirls through the mouth, past the trachea and down into 
the bronchial tubes. From here, a variety of different health effects of smoking are 
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“revealed”: blindness, stroke-inducing blood clot, accumulation of tar in the lungs, fatty 
build up in the arteries, the development of lung cancer and the destruction of the lungs. 
These medical facts are witnessed either from inside the body, as with the development 
of lung cancer and the bursting of delicate blood vessels in the eye, or within the 
clinical confines of the hospital operating theatre, as with the pathological anatomy of a 
stroke victim’s disembodied brain. As the smoker exhales, the viewer similarly retreats 
back up the bronchioles, past the trachea and out through the mouth. The advertisement 
concludes with the particular smoker either coughing or quickly taking another drag of 
the cigarette before returning to the task at hand, be it looking after their children, or 
catching an approaching bus. Each advertisement begins and finishes with the “every 
cigarette” tagline, and concludes with the “smoky endframe”, conveying details of the 
national Quitline. 
 In each of the “journey” televisions spots, the smoker lights their cigarette with 
great relief. For example, the “artery” spot show a disheveled man lighting his first 
cigarette of the day from the kitchen stove. Another (“lung”) depicts a young woman 
searching between the cushions of her sofa, before pulling out a bent cigarette, 
straightening it out, and lighting it up. Yet another (“stroke”) shows a mother slipping 
out onto her balcony, out of the line of sight of her two young children, who are now 
playing unsupervised in the living room. As the smoker inhales and the viewer is 
sucked into the interior of the body the apparent objectivity of the endoscopic gaze 
takes over. While the viewer witnesses some of these medical fact as displays of 
pathological anatomy (“Artery” and “Stroke”), the initial journey into the body and 
descent down the bronchial tubes invokes the same cultural narratives of medical 
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authority and scientific objectivity that accompany the endoscopic gaze. For example, 
after passing down the bronchial tubes, the “Stroke” advertisements cuts to the clinical 
confines of an operating theatre, or perhaps an autopsy lab, where the dissection of a 38 
year old stroke victim’s disembodied brain is displayed. In the “Artery” spot, a fatty 
build-up is squeezed from the aorta of a smoker whom, we are told, was aged 32. In 
each case, the depersonalized, detached view of the object that Van Dijck associates 
with the endoscopic gaze is evident; the surgeon or anatomist performing these 
dissections remains anonymous and is identified only by their gloved hands, or masked 
and goggled face. Adding to the apparent objectivity of these clinical scenes is a subtle 
invocation of the cultural narrative of photographic truth. This is accomplished through 
the overlay of gradated markings and the artefacts of medical film on the pathology 
scene. In the “Stroke” and “Artery” stills shown below (Figure 5.6), the putative 
objectivity established by the initial endoscopic journey into the body is maintained by 
the continuation of an impersonal view of the object. The authority of science is  
 
Figure 5.6: Stills from “Stroke” and “Artery” 
Reproduced from 
http://quitnow.info.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/smokescreen-lp. 
 
invoked by the steely, sanitized and highly controlled environs of the clinical laboratory 
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setting, and reinforced by a subtle appeal to the putative objectivity and photographic 
truth of the medical image. 
 While the endoscopic gaze is invoked in these two televisions spots, it is more 
thoroughly employed in the “Tumor” and “Eye” advertisements, in which the viewer 
witnesses the health effects of smoking from within the interior of the body. In both of 
these ads, the viewer is sucked into the body with the smoker’s initial inhalation of 
smoke. In the “Tumor” spot, the viewer remains suspended in the airway, witnessing 
the continued intake of smoke into the smoker’s lungs. The notion of photographic truth 
is similarly invoked here; as the scene cuts to a further close-up of the lining of the 
lungs, it is accompanied by the familiar sound of a digitalized camera-shutter, and 
employs same gradated artefacts of medical imaging films discussed above (see the 
outer perimeter of both images in Figure 5.6). 
            The narrator informs the viewer that “New research shows how tobacco smoke 
attacks a vital gene which protects lung cells from cancer. One damaged cell is all it 
takes to start lung cancer growing” (“Tumor” script, accessed 2009). Still suspended in 
the airway, the viewer witnesses a cancerous tumor begin to grow. All the while, tufts 
of smoke continue to waft by, further attacking the lungs and aiding the growing 
pathology (see Figure 5.7). The ad cuts to a different endoscopic scene within the lungs. 
Similarly under attack by tobacco smoke, this narrow passage is closing in, presumably 
due to cancerous growth. As the airway becomes almost entirely constricted, the viewer 
is drawn back up through the bronchioles and expelled with the smoker’s exhalation of 
smoke. While the viewer has now witnessed the damage caused by smoking, the 
smoker - still blithely unaware - continues to smoke, taking a last drag of his cigarette 
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before the arrival of his approaching bus. 
   
 
Figure 5.7: Stills from “Tumor” 
Reproduced from 
http://quitnow.info.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/smokescreen-lp. 
 
            Similarly with the “Eye” advertisement; after the viewer is initially drawn into 
the smoker’s body, the advertisement cuts to an external close up of an eye, held open 
by a speculum (see Figure 5.8). The camera zooms closer and closer, eventually passing 
through the pupil into the interior of the eye.  
 
 
Figure 5.8: Stills from “Eye” 
Reproduced from 
http://quitnow.info.au/internet/quitnow/publishing.nsf/Content/smokescreen-lp. 
 
The muffled sound of a heartbeat contributes to the sense that the viewer has journeyed 
into the body’s interior, while the use of camera zoom and the artefacts of medical 
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imaging films invoke the same notion of photographic truth as the “Tumor” ad 
discussed above. Once within the interior of the smoker’s eye, the viewer again 
witnesses the damage caused by smoking. The narrator explains: “Chemicals from 
tobacco smoke get into your blood stream and can damage the delicate blood vessels 
inside your eye. We now know that smoking is a major cause of irreversible blindness” 
(“Eye” script). The viewer remains within the eye as a delicate blood vessel bursts, and 
bruising begins to spread across the retina. Having witnessed this health effect of 
smoking, the viewer begins to retreat. However, rather than returning by the same route 
through the pupil, the viewer is similarly expelled with the smoker’s exhalation through 
the mouth, connecting the internal damage to the eye more explicitly with the effects of 
tobacco smoke.         
            Scholars of visual culture have drawn attention to the traffic between medicine 
and the media as one of the most fruitful sites analysis of visual representation 
(Cartwright 1995; Van Dijck 2005). Collectively, they have demonstrated the 
interwoven development of science, medicine and popular culture in domains as diverse 
as the early cinema (Cartwright 1995), the nature-film (Mitman 2013), MRI, PET and 
brain scans (Joyce 2008; Prasad 2014; Beaulieu 2002) and twentieth century public 
health (Serlin 2010). The media often serves to communicate medical knowledge while 
also producing the spectacle of displaying the interior body. In order to accomplish both 
of these simultaneously, medical images must be seen to be both authoritative and 
credible – a task that is achieved by drawing on cultural narratives of scientific 
objectivity. Medical images and photographs seem to reveal the facts of nature, and to 
enable practices of witnessing by a general, non-specialized audience. By appealing to 
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the scientific objectivity and credibility of medical images, the endoscopic gaze creates 
the spectacle of revealing the interior of the body, while enabling viewers to witness the 
public display of medicine’s “matters of fact”.  
 The endoscopic gaze pervades the Australian National Tobacco Campaign; in its 
attempt to reveal the internal health effects of smoking, in purporting to enable smokers 
to witness the damage smoking does to them, and in its claim to make the effects of 
smoking “plainer to see”. The graphic warning strategy, and attendant deployment of 
the endoscopic gaze, has since been taken up as best practice in tobacco control 
worldwide. This can be seen in the rapid adoption of graphic warning labels worldwide. 
 
The FCTC and Graphic Warning Labels 
 As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Article 11 of the FCTC treaty deals with 
“Packaging and labeling of tobacco product”. In addition to prohibiting the use of 
misleading terms such as “low tar”, “light” and “mild”, Article 11 requires that each 
unit packet and package of tobacco products carry health warnings describing the 
harmful effects of tobacco use. The article then lays out five criteria for adequate 
warning labels. Warning labels, the treaty specifies: 
I. shall be approved by the competent national authority 
II. shall be rotating 
III. shall be large, clear, visible and legible 
IV. should be 50% or more of the principal display areas but shall be no 
less than 30% of the principal display areas, 
V. may be in the form of or include pictures or pictograms (World 
Health Organization 2003b, 9–10). 
 
While the treaty itself does not require member state parties to implement graphic 
warning labels (labels may be in the form of pictures), the guidelines for 
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implementation of Article 11 of the FCTC, adopted by the 3rd Conference of the Parties 
at in Durban, South Africa 2008 more firmly recommended the use of graphic 
warnings. The Guidelines state:  
Evidence demonstrates that the effectiveness of health warnings and 
messages increases with their prominence. In comparison with small, 
text-only health warnings, larger warnings with pictures are more likely 
to be noticed, better communicate health risks, provoke a greater 
emotional response and increase the motivation of tobacco users to quit 
and to decrease their tobacco consumption. Larger picture warnings are 
also more likely to retain their effectiveness over time and are 
particularly effective in communicating health effects to low-literacy 
populations, children and young people (World Health Organization).  
 
The guidelines also draw on the logic of Australia’s NTC graphic warning strategy:  
Evidence suggests that health warnings and messages are likely to be 
more effective if they elicit unfavorable emotional associations with 
tobacco use and when the information is personalized to make health 
warnings and messages more believable and personally relevant. Health 
warnings and messages that generate negative emotions such as fear can 
be effective, particularly when combined with information designed to 
increase motivation and confidence in tobacco users in their ability to 
quit (World Health Organization). 
 
The guidelines also emphasize the cost-effectiveness of tobacco warning labels, 
carefully specifying that the costs of placing required health warning labels of tobacco 
produces is borne by the tobacco industry (World Health Organization).  
 Graphic warning labels have been rapidly adopted as a cost-effective tobacco 
control measure by Member State national governments, the global tobacco control 
movement and by philanthropic donors. For example, in 2006 philanthropist and former 
Mayor of New York City launched a $125 global initiative – and partnered with the 
WHO – to reduce tobacco use in low and middle-income countries. In 2008 this sum 
was in increased to $500 million with additional funds from Bloomberg and from the 
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Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The initiative aims to reduce tobacco use through 6 
specific strategies under the MPOWER acronym, each of which links to a specific 
article of the WHO FCTC:  
M – Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies 
P-Protect people from tobacco smoke 
O – Offer to help to quite tobacco use 
W –Warn about the dangers of tobacco 
E- Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
R – Raise taxes on tobacco (“WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 
2008: The MPOWER Package” 2008). 
 
In the first MPOWER report on the global tobacco epidemic in 2008, it was reported 
that only 4% of the global population were covered by “best practice” tobacco warning 
labels, which had been implemented by 5 countries. By 2012, the last year for which 
data was reported, this share had increased to 14% of the global population shared 
among 30 countries. Similarly by 2012, 54% of the global population was reported to be 
covered by “best practice” anti-tobacco mass media campaigns. This rate had increased 
by 32 percentage points (from 22% of the global population) since 2010 (“WHO Report 
on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 2008: The MPOWER Package ” 2008, 2013). In 
addition to endorsing the graphic warning strategy for tobacco warning labels, the 
MPOWER report advocated the use of graphic mass media campaigns against tobacco 
as a universal tobacco control measure: While it has long been established that anti-
tobacco advertisement that graphically show the harms of smoking are effective in hig-
income countries, new research…shows that they are also effective in low- and middle-
income countries… Ads using images that graphically demonstrate the health harms of 
tobacco use are shown to be easily understook and consistently effective in all 
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countries, regardless of income level (“WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic 
2008: The MPOWER Package" 2013, 66). 
 In order to help facilitate country-level sharing of pictorial health warnings and 
messages, the WHO now hosts a WHO FCTC Health Warnings Database with health 
warning labels and messages shared by 21 countries. The database is searchable among 
23 thematic categories including addiction, health effects, parental smoking, pregnancy 
and quitting/cessation. Below I reproduce a selection of these warning labels to 
illustrate the widespread uptake of the graphic warning strategy (See table 5.1. All 
images are reproduced from http://www.who.int/tobacco/healthwarningsdatabase/en/). 
Many, though not all, of the the graphic warnings from around the world adopt the 
“endoscopic gaze” of Australia’s NTC that I described above. But even those that adopt 
a different visual strategy attempt to elicit a strong negative affective response to the 
presumptive future of smokers’ health graphically displayed by the warning label. In 
doing so, these demand reduction strategies attempt both to education smokers about 
the risks of smoking and increase the real and perceived costs of smoking by education 
and affective smoker’s consumption choices. The graphic warning strategy thus aims to 
alter the costs and benefits of current and future smoking in such a way that deciding 
not to smoke is the only rational course of action for the neoliberal homo oeconomicus. 
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Table 5.1 Graphic Warning Labels around the world 
 
 
Caption: Smoking can cause a slow and 
painful death 
Country: European Union  
 
 
Caption: Smoking causes heart 
diseases 
Country: Mauritius 
 
 
Caption: The Ministry of Health Warns: 
Use of this product blocks arteries and 
makes blood circulation more difficult 
Country: Brazil 
 
 
Caption: Cigarette Causes 
Miscarriage 
Countries: Malaysia and Singapore 
 
 
Caption: Smoking when pregnant harms 
your baby 
Region: European Union 
 
 
Country: Singapore 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the WHO FCTC represents a “paradigm shift” 
in the control of diseases caused by harmful and addictive substances because it 
emphasizes demand reduction strategies. Instead of regulating tobacco products, the 
FCTC treaty primarily regulates the behaviors of tobacco-using people. I have shown 
how it attempts to do so by correcting what the World Bank identified as market failure 
in the decision to smoke, i.e. that smokers neither full know their risks nor bear the 
costs of their individual consumer choice (1999a). The two central demand reduction 
strategies of the FCTC are designed to correct for this market failure through education 
(increasing smokers” knowledge about the risks of smoking) and taxes (increasing the 
“costs” involved in deciding to smoke). Education campaigns and taxation strategies 
both seek to alter the costs and benefits of present and future smoking in such a way 
that the decision not to smoke is the only rational course of action. I argue that both of 
these demand reduction strategies are based on a model of a cost-benefit calculating 
neoliberal homo oeconomicus – the same figuration of human action that I argued 
undergirds the DALY metric discussed in Chapter 2. 
In attempting to intervene upon the risky yet still perfectly legal decision to 
consume tobacco products, then, the FCTC attempts to govern global health through 
prescribing health-maximizing, risk-minimizing behaviors – i.e. by prescribing the 
conduct of conduct of the global population. And by bringing the future costs of 
smoking into present cost-benefit calculations in an attempt to effect the self-optimizing 
behavior of neoliberal homo oeconomicus. 
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CONCLUSION: 
GOVERNING GLOBAL HEALTH 
 
 In February 2015, WHO Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland hosted 
celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the creation, acceptance and entry-into-
force of the world’s first public health treaty: the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. Dr Margaret Chan, Director General of the WHO, addressed ministers, 
ambassadors, representatives of the Geneva missions, civil society organizations and a 
variety of UN colleagues who had assembled to celebrate the occasion. “This is one of 
the most important anniversary celebrations I have ever attended”, she told the 
audience. “Tobacco use stands out as the single greatest cause of preventable morbidity 
and mortality worldwide” (World Health Organization 2015). The tobacco threat was 
matched, however, by an innovative solution and signature WHO accomplishment, the 
FCTC treaty: “The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control stands out as the 
single most powerful preventive instrument available to public health. I want to 
commend the vision of Dr Brundtland in taking this forward” (World Health 
Organization 2015).  
Chan continued her address by reflecting on the role she had played in the 
treaty’s evolution. She characterized herself and Brazilian WHO delegate Dr Vera 
Costa e Silva, among others, as “early midwives” to the treaty as they had served as co-
vice chairs of the very first working group of the FCTC treaty in 1999. “Everywhere I 
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go”, Chan confessed, “I promote the Framework Convention” (World Health 
Organization 2015). 
 Chan highlighted a number of specific ways in which the Framework 
Convention was “truly a landmark victory for public health”. Most importantly, she 
argued, it saves lives. The FCTC also serves, she reported, as an outstanding model of 
intersectoral collaboration in support of health objectives: “The importance of this 
model continues to grow as more and more of the 21st century’s biggest threats to health 
have root causes that lie in non-health sector” (World Health Organization 2015). But 
she reserved her lengthiest praise for the evidence-based approach of the FCTC treaty: 
“[The FCTC] demonstrates the persuasive power of evidence-based arguments. When 
public health policies cross purposes with the interests of powerful economic operators, 
economic arguments trump public health time and time again. Not this time. Public 
health won” (World Health Organization 2015).  
This dissertation has presented a slightly different account. Whereas Chan 
characterizes the FCTC as a public health triumph over economic arguments, I have 
shown how, in the case of the FCTC, public health and economic arguments aligned: 
the FCTC won because its evidence base was economic.  
Chan’s characterization of the FCTC as an “evidence based” treaty conforms to 
the model of “cognitive convergence” that dominant public health narratives of the 
FCTC treaty almost universally espouse. On this model, different parties adopt 
convergent ideas based on shared scientific understandings of the world and enact social 
change on the basis of scientific evidence. Science is seen as prior to and as a 
determinant of social policy and as standing outside of social, political or historical 
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context. In contrast to this simple linear causal story from scientific evidence to policy 
outcome, this dissertation has taken an interdisciplinary approach in order to attend to 
the complexity involved in the emergence of the global tobacco epidemic, the 
development of the FCTC, and the transition from international to global health more 
generally. 
Building on theoretical work in Science and Technology Studies, biopolitics and 
social movements theory, this dissertation has argued that the accomplishment of the 
FCTC treaty depended on a new way of quantifying disease, economizing life and 
governing health that emerged in the transition from international to global health at the 
dawn of the 21st century. Both the science and the policy of global tobacco control have 
been coproduced in ways that have depended on the historical, social and political 
context of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In this conclusion, I summarize the 
dissertation’s central argument and contribution before giving a brief illustration of the 
ongoing relevance of the analysis offered here.  
 
GUIDING QUESTIONS AND KEY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 The dissertation was guided by three interrelated research questions: 1) How did 
the threat posed by tobacco come to be seen as an issue of global concern? In other 
words, how did the “global tobacco epidemic” emerge as an object of knowledge? 2) 
Why did international regulation, in the form of a legally binding, WHO sponsored 
treaty, emerge as the best strategy for intervening upon the global tobacco problem? 
And 3) What light does the case of the FCTC shed on the transition from international 
to global health during the 1990s more generally?  
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Colonial tropical medicine, cold war international health, neoliberal global health 
To answer these questions, I began by tracing the history of attempts to deal 
with the problem of health on a transnational scale through three eras: colonial tropical 
medicine, cold war international health and contemporary neoliberal global health. I 
illustrated how, during each of these eras, developments in the practice of world health 
were intimately tied to the science of health and hygiene, to geopolitical transformations 
at both the national and international level, and ideological contests on the world stage. 
During the first era, colonial tropical medicine drew on the new fields of parisitology, 
germ theory and epidemiology and coupled them with extant colonial structures of 
authority in order to attend to the vital needs of white bodies in tropical lands. The 
founding of the London School of Tropical Medicine captures the essence of this era. 
Not long after the establishment of the London School, the creation of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s International Health Division began to shift the emphasis of world health 
away from tropical medicine towards a more internationalist approach – one that would 
gain increasing momentum after each of the World War, reaching its peak in the 
geopolitical climate of the Cold War. Cold War international health quickly became 
aligned with US foreign policy objectives and focused on the vitality of those bodies 
perceived to be vulnerable to the spread of communism within the geographic space of 
the Third World. The tensions within the World Health Organization’s Malaria 
Eradication Program are emblematic of this era. Even in this broad overview, the 
fundamental interconnectedness of science and politics of world health was apparent.  
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I then traced the development of contemporary global health, the contours of 
which are still emerging. The transition from international to global health during the 
1990s is usually attributed to processes of neoliberal globalization, especially to the rise 
of a set of neoliberal economic policies known collectively as the Washington 
consensus. In these accounts the declining role of WHO dating from the budget freezes 
of the 1980s, the relative ascendance of the World Bank and its associated structural 
adjustment policies in world health affairs, the proliferation of public-private 
partnerships and Bill Gates-style global health philanthrocapitalism and focus on 
reemerging and infectious diseases like HIV/AIDs, pandemic influenza, SARS, malaria, 
tuberculosis and the Ebola virus feature prominently. So too does the 1993 publication 
of the World Bank’s World Development Report Investing in Health. However, many 
of these accounts focus on the impact of the report on the structure of the field of world 
health, i.e. on the dominant institutional actors, the structures of global health delivery, 
and the financing of health care services. Frequently left out is attention to the 
epistemological importance of Investing in Health, that is, to how it has shaped the 
mode of rationality that underpins the health of the global population as a scientific and 
political problem.  
 
The FCTC admist the new global health 
Although the FCTC is frequently cited as a landmark global health intervention, 
at first glance, the FCTC treaty doesn’t seem to fit comfortably with the characterization 
of the contemporary global health landscape given above. It was negotiated under the 
auspices of the now-decentered WHO and operates through the national governments of 
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its member-state parties and deals with non-communicable diseases (at least those 
caused by tobacco use), all in a public health frame in which questions of privatization 
or structural adjustment are largely peripheral. In light of my general characterization of 
the field of global health, the FCTC presents a puzzle: Why tobacco? And why now? 
In attempting to answer this puzzle, I showed how a new mode of rationality 
emerged in the transition from international to global health – one that can be seen in a 
lesser-known but equally important dimension of the Investing in Health report: its 
introduction of the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) metric. The DALY metric is 
a summary measure of population health developed to calculate the incidence of health 
and disease at the global aggregate level: the so-called “global burden of disease” 
(Murray and Lopez 1996a). It is a decremental measure equivalent to the loss of one 
year of life lived in perfect health.  The DALY metric was designed to fulfill two 
primary purposes. First, it was intended to account for the “full loss of healthy life” due 
not only to death, but to disease and disability as well, by measuring both mortality and 
morbidity in the same unit of analysis. Second, it was intended to facilitate the use of 
cost-benefit analysis in prioritizing potential health interventions in the units of dollars 
spent per DALYs gained. In this way, the DALY metric was designed to facilitate the 
optimization of global health by aiding national government in directing scarce health 
resources towards “essential health services” in the most economically rational way 
(Jamison, Mosely, et al. 1993).  
 
Quantifying disease, economizing life, governing health 
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But far more than just facilitating cost-benefit calculation and economic 
rationalization, I argued that the DALY metric accomplishes an economization of life by 
imagining health as a form of human capital and, as the very title of the World Bank 
report suggests, as a site of investment. The logic of Investing in Health prioritizes those 
public health strategies, like tobacco control, that attempt to intervene upon the health 
behaviors of individuals in order to make them more health-maximizing, i.e. its primary 
governmental strategy is self-governance. I demonstrated this emphasis on self-
governance strategies through the demand reduction strategies of the FCTC. I argue that 
in addition to the semantic shifts and neoliberal structural reforms, this new way of 
knowing and governing the health of the global population is key in understanding the 
transition from international to global health at the end of the 20th century. 
Crucially for the FCTC, the DALY metric also brought both the scale of the 
global tobacco epidemic and the cost-effectiveness of interventions to curb its spread 
into sharp relief, especially through the uptake and redeployment of the DALY metric 
in the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study and Disease Control Priority (DCP) 
project. These studies were part of broader World Bank efforts to come to terms with 
the changing historical context of world health during the latter part of the twentieth 
century due to the “epidemiological transition”. They also comprised part of the World 
Bank’s attempts to define a “categorical” middle-way through the selective vs 
comprehensive primary healthcare debates of that era. The GBD study and DCP project 
helped constitute the global tobacco epidemic as an object of epidemiological and 
economic knowledge and made tobacco control and obvious priority for important 
transnational institutions including the World Bank and World Health Organization. 
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The early tobacco control movement 
However, the newly recognized burden of the tobacco epidemic was not the first 
warning of an impending tobacco threat. Nor did the World Bank’s problematization of 
the global tobacco epidemic lead directly to the creation of global tobacco control 
interventions in a strictly linear way. The World Bank’s burden-of-disease 
characterization of tobacco and the World Health Organization’s solution to that 
problem in the form of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control did proceed 
chronologically: the DALY metric was first published in 1993, the full results of the 
GBD study in 1996 (World Bank 1993; Murray and Lopez 1996a). The initial idea for a 
WHO Treaty was also conceived in 1993 and the World Health Assembly (WHA) 
adopted resolutions to pursue a legally binding international instrument of tobacco 
control in 1995 and 1996 (Ruth Roemer, Taylor, and Lariviere 2005; Mackay 2003). 
And although these became complementary and mutually reinforcing developments, 
each was motivated by slightly different epistemological, organizational and political 
concerns. In other words, while these were necessary conditions for the eventual 
passage of the FCTC, they were not sufficient causes. 
I showed how the international tobacco control movement, beginning in the 
1960s and 1970s initially framed their grievances in terms of moral outrage and 
positioned the tobacco industry and its relentless pursuit of profits at the expense of 
human lives as the movements primary antagonist. The industry’s disregard for human 
life was seen as particularly egregious in light of the emerging epidemiological 
evidence on the extent of smoking-related disease and growing awareness of tobacco 
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industry marketing practices in the global South. Of course, a similar moral-outrage 
frame animated much national-level anti-smoking activity during this same period. 
However, on its own, the moral-outrage frame did not find resonance within the 
discursive context of the field of world health at the time, which was focused primarily 
on infant mortality and child survival. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the international 
tobacco control movement underwent considerable professionalization, helped develop 
epidemiological and economic forecasts of the tobacco threat, and subsequently adopted 
these forecasts as an important epistemic resource in advocating for international 
tobacco control. The tobacco threat was re-characterized as a depersonalized impending 
epidemic with dire anticipated consequences for both human health and national 
economies. This re-characterization coincided with a change in the discursive context of 
the field of world health with the transition from “international” to “global health” 
during the 1990s. With neoliberal economic rationalities ascendant in the field of world 
health and with the tobacco epidemic now couched in decidedly economic terms, 
international tobacco control began to gain traction with important transnational 
organizations such as the WHO and World Bank.  
 
Tobacco at WHO 
However, the idea for a FCTC was initially met with skepticism and even 
hostility at the WHO, especially from the WHO’s legal department. It was eventually 
embraced by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland upon her election as Director General of the 
WHO in 1998 as part of a broader program of WHO reform. Importantly, Brundtland 
adopted the World Bank’s World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health as her 
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“roadmap” to reforming the WHO and was guided by its recommendations for 
prioritizing health interventions according to a logic of economic rationalization, i.e. 
DALYs gained for dollars spent. Tobacco control presented an opportunity for the 
WHO to: 1) demonstrate its technical leadership by mobilizing scientific evidence in 
support of a legally-binding approach global tobacco control (largely in the form of 
GBD epidemiological forecasts and economic studies co-sponsored by the World Bank) 
and 2) re-assert its moral voice regarding health equity, especially in light of the 
disproportionate burden of tobacco-related illness that was projected to fall on countries 
of the global South. It also gave the WHO an opportunity to position itself as the lead 
coordinating body within the field of global health by enacting Article 19 of its 
constitution and negotiating an unprecedented legally-binding health treaty. Tobacco 
control became a WHO priority at this point: Brundtland created the Tobacco Free 
Initiative (TFI) and appointed South African epidemiologist and anti-smoking 
campaigner Derek Yach as its head. With Brundtland at the helm of the WHO and Yach 
as head of the TFI, negotiations for the FCTC quickly got underway.   
During the treaty-making process a number of developments helped speed its 
passage: public hearings in advance of treaty negotiations, the creation of an active 
transnational NGO movement, the deployment of various rhetorical strategies and, 
crucially, the publication and dissemination of the World Bank’s Curbing the Epidemic 
(1999) report during the negotiations. The WHO also helped reignited the moral-
outrage frame in the wake of the publication of formerly secret tobacco industry 
documents released after the Master Settlement Agreement in the United States. This 
moral-outrage frame helped unify and mobilize renewed efforts among the tobacco 
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control movement, which at this stage, and with help from the WHO, became a 
transnational or global public health movement. 
The World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(WHO FCTC) was claimed to usher in a new era of global health not just because it was 
an unprecedented legally binding world health, nor even because of the unique level of 
international cooperation it inspired. The WHO FCTC was claimed also to represent a 
“paradigm shift” in the control of diseases caused by harmful and addictive substances 
because it emphasized demand reduction strategies. That is to say, instead of regulating 
tobacco products, the FCTC treaty primarily regulates the behaviors of tobacco-using 
people.  In attempting to intervene upon the risky yet still perfectly legal decision to 
consume tobacco products, then, the FCTC attempts to govern global health through 
prescribing health-maximizing, risk-minimizing behaviors – i.e. by prescribing the 
“conduct of conduct” of the global population (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, 2). 
And it attempts to do so by correcting what the World Bank identified as a market 
failure in the decision to smoke, i.e. that smokers neither full know their risks nor bear 
the costs of their individual consumer choice (1999). In the final empirical chapter I 
showed how the two central demand reduction strategies of the FCTC are designed to 
correct for this market failure through education (increasing smokers” knowledge about 
the risks of smoking) and taxes (increasing the “costs” involved in deciding to smoke). 
Education campaigns and taxation strategies both seek to alter the costs and benefits of 
present and future smoking in such a way that the decision not to smoke is the only 
rational course of action. As a result, both of these demand reduction strategies are 
based on a model of a cost-benefit calculating neoliberal homo oeconomicus – the same 
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figuration of human action that undergirds the DALY metric. As such, the mode of 
rationality and governmental strategies, seen in the DALY metric and demand reduction 
strategies of the FCTC respectively, both conform to the neoliberal vision of 
governance that I argued underpins the transition from international to global health.   	  
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The emergence of global health has prompted critical reflection across a range 
of humanistic and social scientific disciplines over the last few years. However, much 
of this analytic attention has been focused on global dimensions of infectious diseases 
such as HIV/AIDs, pandemic influenza, SARS, malaria, tuberculosis and, more 
recently, the Ebola virus. To this valuable literature, this dissertation adds a case study 
of non-communicable diseases - those caused by tobacco use – and an analysis of the 
continued significance of the WHO amidst a newly crowded field of global health 
actors.  It also contributes to historical scholarship on global tobacco control and its 
place in the history of world health. More fundamentally, though, it contributes to 
interdisciplinary studies of the relationship between science, society and the state, 
especially as each of these is rearticulated within an increasingly global context. It 
draws on, and contributes to work in science and technology studies, biopolitics and 
neoliberalism, social movements and political sociology, and social studies of post-
colonialism and globalization. I’d like to suggest that while notions of biopolitics and 
the politics of life itself have been very fruitfully developed in relation to the biological 
life sciences, at the microscopic level and with respect to the genome – I think that in 
the case of global health and tobacco control we see another site in which a politics of 
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life itself is being articulated But in this case the political work is accomplished through 
the economic sciences, at the macro level and with respect to the productive potential of 
the global population.  
 
CONTEMPORARY RESONANCES 
Here, I return to the theme of the economization of life. Popular public health 
narratives present a picture of the development and acceptance of the FCTC as 
dependent largely on the strength of its evidence base and the political will of its key 
advocates. In contrast, I presented a history of the FCTC treaty that emphasizes its 
dependence on a new way of quantifying disease, economizing life and governing 
health that emerged during the 1990s and on the ability of political actors to frame 
arguments in ways that resonated with those developments. In turn, I argued that this 
tripartite process is important in understanding the transition from international to 
global health at the dawn of the 21st century. Some recent examples illustrate the 
continued relevance of economization in the field of contemporary global health 
 First, in December 2013, the Lancet reported on the findings of a Lancet 
Commission it had sponsored to revisit the case of investment in health and 
development with a view to achieving health gains by 2035 (Jamison et al. 2013; 
Norheim 2014). The occasion for the commission was the 20th anniversary of the 1993 
World Development Report: Investing in Health. Chaired by a familiar cast of 
characters – namely Lawrence H. Summers and Dean T Jamison, both of whom played 
key roles in the 1993 report – the Global Health 2035 report had four key messages: 1) 
there is an enormous payoff from investing in health 2) a “grand convergence” in health 
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is achievable within our lifetimes 3) Fiscal policies are a powerful and underused lever 
for curbing of non-communicable diseases and injuries and 4) Progressive universalism, 
a pathway to universal health coverage (UHC), is an efficient way to achieve health and 
financial protection (Jamison et al. 2013, 1898-1899).  
Supporting the conclusion that there is an enormous payoff to investing in 
health, the report concluded that reductions in mortality alone accounted for 11% of 
recent economic growth in low and middle-income countries. This figure, however, 
accounted only for the economic benefit of increased productivity. The 2035 report also 
introduced a new metric intended to “capture the value of better health in and of itself” 
or the so-called “intrinsic value” of life. Termed the “value of additional life-years” 
(VLYs), this metric built on refinements made to the DALY methodology over 
successive iterations of the GBD study. After the initial GBD study, whose results were 
based on estimates of population health in 1990 with projections to 2030, subsequent 
updates were made by the WHO’s Disease Burden Unit for the years 2000, 2001, 2003 
and 2004. In 2008, estimates were made based on data from 2004. More recently, the 
GBD study has carried out in a new institutional home: the Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation (IMHE), directed by Christopher Murray and funded by Bill Gates. The 
IMHE published GBD results for 2010 in late 2013 and provided the data on which the 
Lancet Global Health 2035 commission was based.  
The value of additional life-years (VLYs) ascribes economic value to increased 
life expectancy, thereby helping to calculate a country’s “full income – the income 
growth measure in national income accounts plus the VLYs gained in that period. 
Between 2000 and 2011, about 24% of the growth in full income in low-income and 
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middle-income countries resulted from VLYs gained” (Jameson et al. 2013, 1898). Put 
different, the VLY metric takes the DALY methodology to its logical extreme: it 
incorporates the value of life itself more fully into national income accounts. The 
economization of life that I described as accomplished by the DALY metric is 
accomplished to an even fuller extent with the VLYs metric. It is a commonplace in the 
field of global health to observe, “what gets measured gets done”. This dissertation has 
shown that how one measures, matters, too.   
Second, the World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report took as its focus 
Mind, Society Behavior, using approaches from behavioral economics, psychology, 
political science and anthropology to examine how individual-level decisions can be 
influenced to effect changes in areas ranging from poverty reduction and child 
development to work productivity, health decision-making and climate change. 
Importantly in the area of health, tobacco control mass media campaigns served as a 
prominent example of how to effect individual behavior change and alter social norms 
at once (World Bank 2015). However, such interventions depend on altering the 
perceived costs and benefits of particular health decisions in such a way as to render 
rational only the desired course of action. In other words they are underpinned by the 
same notion of the cost-benefit calculating, risk-minimizing, health-maximizing, 
neoliberal homo economicus that also underpins the demand reduction strategies of the 
FCTC. In directing interventions towards individual-level decisions about health 
behaviors, more systematic global health interventions – namely investment in health 
infrastructure or the provision of clinical services – can recede into the background.  
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Finally, and as I mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, in September 
2011, the United Nations General Assembly convened a high-level meeting to address 
the prevention and control of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). It was only the 
second time in history that such a meeting had been devoted to a topic related to health, 
the first having been in response to the HIV/AIDs pandemic a decade earlier. Unlike the 
earlier meeting, at which the vast majority of the burden of HIV/AIDs was 
acknowledged to fall on the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 2011 summit 
presented the threat posed by NCDs as both universal and as a threat to health and 
economies alike (United Nations General Assembly 2001).  
By contrast, the cost of implementing a range of “best buy” interventions to 
prevent NCDs – like the FCTC - was low and the likely payoffs, high. One report 
produced by the WHO and World Economic Forum claim: “… the return on this 
investment [in NCD control] will be many millions of avoided premature deaths…[and] 
many billions of dollars of additional output” (2011, 3). NCDs were here positioned by 
the UN, by the WHO and by the WEF as a threat to both the health of the population 
and as a threat to the economy. Conversely, strategies to combat NCDs are imaged as a 
solid investment in health and in economic growth with an expected yield of positive 
future returns.  
Just twenty-five earlier, in 1978, the World Health Organization celebrated the 
thirtieth anniversary of its founding with a conference on primary health care at Alma-
Ata in the Soviet Union. There, the famous Alma-Ata declaration was made in which 
the WHO reaffirmed that “health, which is a state of complete physical, mental and 
social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, is a fundamental 
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human right”. “[T]he attainment of the highest possible level of health”, the declaration 
continued,  “is a most important world-wide social goal whose realization requires the 
action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health sector” 
(“Declaration of Alma-Ata”). Famously, the WHO committed itself to the goal of 
achieving “health for all by the year 2000”. In contrast to the UN NCD Declaration in 
2013, this earlier declaration positioned health as both a human right and as a “most 
important world-wide social goal” – one that the resources of the economic sector must 
be harnessed to support.  
In the thirty years from the Alma Ata declaration of 1978 to the 2013 UN NCD 
Summit the conceptualization of health that underpins world health efforts shifted 
dramatically from “health for all” to “health as investment”. In this dissertation I have 
tried to explain the epistemological origins and some of the policy consequences of this 
shift through an analysis of the coproduction of global tobacco control science and 
global tobacco control policy. In turn, I have argued that the new way of quantifying 
disease, economizing life and governing health that can be seen in the development of 
the world’s first public health treaty – the World Health Organization’s Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control – contributes to our understanding of the transition 
from international to global health at the dawn of the 21st century. 
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